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Report on Palau

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REPORT ON PALAU

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Preface

The materials presented in this report cover only those aspects of the Wisconsin CIMA project studied by the writer. Such crucial topics as Palau money and the subsistence economy, nativistic and reform movements, personality and culture, essential for a comprehension of the whole, are referred to but are outside the scope of this analysis. Findings of the author's two prior field trips to Palau are cited where relevant, but they have not been duplicated in this presentation.

Palau is a complex society and a changing one. No attempt has been made to survey all of its social components. Caution needs to be exercised concerning generalizations made about the area, for in such a dynamic culture social relationships and institutional arrangements are constantly changing. For example, some observations made in past studies by German, Japanese, and American scholars, though not true today, are not in error; they portray the society at the time of the field work and, as far as this writer could ascertain, were authentic at the time the investigations were made. It is essential to note, however, the particular locality in which any given study was made. Palau has a highly variable series of patterns. Generalizations based on one area do not necessarily hold true for the population as a whole: how common this variance is will be documented in this report.

The general orientation of this inquiry is to explore the forces integrating Palau society as a whole. How has it been able to adjust to changing conditions with so little disorganization. The conclusions offered are to be viewed as indicative rather than conclusive. Many topics have been neglected which merit further study. This writer is convinced that no one can claim to "know all about Palau"; all that one can aspire to is some insight into selective features of the culture.

The question of terminology requires a special statement. As in all other phases of Palau, there is much variation in usages. The norms of what are the "correct" terms cannot be answered in any final way. Hence a degree of arbitrary selection is involved in the choice of nomenclature for this report. The range of usages is illustrated in one section of the following discussion of kinship groupings. The patterns described there apply as well to other terminology.

This study was made possible only because of the help of a number of individuals. Mr. Harry Uyehara and Pastor W. Fey, as interpreters, effected meaningful communication. I am indebted to both Mr. and Mrs. Fey for their gracious hospitality throughout our stay in Palau. I wish to express my sincere thanks for the many kindnesses extended to our

research group, especially those by Admiral Wright, Captain C. M. Hardison, Commander L. M. Duke, Commander W. J. McNulty, Commander R. W. Kenney, Lt. N. J. Cummings, Lt. F. Avilla, members of the Geological Survey, the Island Trading Company, the Bishop Museum Staff, the Pacific Science Board--Honolulu Office, the Staffs of NATS, and the Officers Clubs of Makalapa, ComMar, and Palau. To Harold J. Coolidge and Dr. George P. Murdock, I am appreciative for the assistance and support given to this project. To the Pacific Science Board, National Research Council, the Office of Naval Research and to the United States Navy, I am grateful for the financial aid and many services given to us. The University of Wisconsin kindly granted me a leave of absence to pursue this study and undertook the task of financial administration of the allotted funds. I wish to express my sincere thanks to Dean Mark H. Ingraham, Assistant Dean Robert B. Doremus, A. W. Peterson, Clarke Smith, N. G. Cafferty and Dr. T. C. McCormick of the University for their assistance to this project. Finally, I am indebted to many people in Palau who probably will never see this report. Nevertheless, I wish to add that without the help of Joseph Telie, Medoes, Meltel, Arklai, Aibedul, Ngoriakl, Mrs. Bismark, Rengelbai, Aukong, Soharleong, Olengeau and numerous others who gave so much of their time and advice, this study could not have been made. My colleagues, Mahoney, Ritzenthaler, Uyehara and Vidich, in many ways helped to clarify my grasp of the subject matter. For any errors in this report, I apologize to my Palau friends who tried so hard to educate me.

In conclusion, I dedicate this report to the couple who have given their lives to the welfare of Palau and who, in doing so, have represented not only their own faith but Western civilization--Pastor and Mrs. Fey.

John Useem

University of Wisconsin
June, 1949

I. INTRODUCTION TO PALAU

The Palau islands are the westernmost extension into the South Pacific of American Micronesia. They lie north of New Guinea, east of the Philippines, and nearly 6,000 miles west of the United States. Palau consists of the largest group of islands in the Carolines. This chain of coral atolls and volcanic islands stretches about a hundred statute miles from north to south: the 180 square miles of land are concentrated primarily in one large island, Babelthuap, which is over 150 square miles of rolling volcanic hills whose highest elevation does not exceed 700 feet. All of the islands are narrow, the widest one measures at its maximum only eighteen statute miles across. In addition to Babelthuap, there are eight other islands of some size, a dozen smaller ones, and numerous tiny islets. The main inhabited islands today are five: Kayangel, a small atoll at the northern end of the group, Babelthuap and Koror in the central sector, and, at the southern end, Peleliu and Angaur. In ancestral times, there were at least ten other occupied islands--these were abandoned several generations ago for the most part and their populations resettled on the five islands.

Palau was politically autonomous prior to the Nineteenth Century. No outside group had ever attempted to conquer it and it had no aspirations to conquer any outside group. The natives were independent but not totally isolated from the rest of the Pacific world. There were intermittent migrations into the islands from surrounding areas and continuous transactions with neighboring peoples.

Acculturation

During the past century and a half Palau has experienced culture contact with many peoples stemming from the world powers. The Spanish formally exercised control over Palau for fourteen years, from 1885 to 1899; the Germans for fifteen years, between 1899 and 1914; the Japanese in the thirty-year span 1914-1944; and the United States since then. The relative brevity of the Spanish and German eras, plus the absence of Spanish officials and the small number of German ones, in contrast to the Japanese, limited the extent of their influence on native life. Japanese administration passed through four phases: the Navy period of control (1914-1918), a mixed Navy and civil service organization (1918-1922), South Seas Bureau (1922-1940), and in the end a mixed Army-Navy rule (1940-1945). Between 1944 and 1945 the Palau islands were divided into two jurisdictions: the United States held the outer islands of Angaur, Peleliu and Kayangel, while the Japanese occupied the inner group of Koror and Babelthuap. With the end of World War II, American forces assumed full administrative responsibility for the entire area.

There are six distinctive features of Palau's contact with the outside world which merit attention as an orientation to the discussions which follow.

(1) No attempt was made by any of the incoming groups to eliminate the inhabitants either as a means for obtaining the islands' resources or to insure the security of the occupying forces. The Palau people have been viewed as an asset in the estimate of the foreigners. They have been encouraged to participate in newly-introduced programs and to assimilate foreign ways, rather than being shunted off to reservations or isolated from the outsiders. On their part, the Palau people have welcomed each incoming group as a valued addition, voluntarily submitting to the domination of the powerful nations and adopting into their clans the small groups of natives who intermittently drifted in from surrounding territories. From the time the British East Indian packet, the Antelope, was cast on the shores of Palau in 1783 down to the present, there has been little hostility and no conspiracy to oust the foreigners. Even the recent nativistic movement which had some anti-Japanese overtones did not have as its goal emancipation from outside control, but presumed that some other foreign nation would govern Palau. Today, in the estimation of the native population, there could be no greater disaster than the immediate and complete withdrawal of the foreigners.

(2) Both the foreign and native groups have shared a favorable outlook on the co-existence of a dual economy and a pluralistic culture. "Modern" and "native" styles and all the gradations in between have been sanctioned. While the foreigners did reform selected aspects of native life and indirectly influenced others, no systematic attempt has ever been made to destroy or suppress the native social order. Official policy of every government has been to support and preserve Palau's basic patterns. This has enabled the varying sections of native society to select a way of life in accord with their personal aspirations, provided new outlets to those discontented with their prior stations in life, and, at the same time, insured the preservation of the basic institutions of Palau. It has made it possible for individuals to gain foreign goods and training without depriving themselves of the traditional security of the ancestral subsistence-reciprocity-mutual aid systems. In the course of a life cycle, the young have worked with the foreigners and then, when older, have retired to their home villages. While there have been frictions between the two ways of living, these were more irritations over clashing customs than fundamental conflict over irreconcilable principles. Likewise, cleavages in interests have occurred between the foreigner's economic and social plans and native wishes but these, too, were fewer than have occurred in some other comparable areas of the world. The Oceanic natives who came to Palau made no

attempt to impose their ways on the indigenous population and the latter exerted little pressure on the newcomers to conform. A few retained their cultural autonomy, the majority peacefully assimilated. Palau customs forbid reminding people of their origins and so there was no crystallization of the more recent native immigrants into a series of small minorities.

(3) Continuing cultural contact with the outside world has been accompanied by what has been deemed by the native population as advances in standards of living. Even when the expectations have been higher than the realizations, or even when there have been setbacks, the general attitude has been one of optimism toward further interaction between Palau and foreign nations. In support of the efficacy of their belief, natives point to the progress they achieved from the change-over from Spanish to German, and from German to Japanese rule. They know America is a far wealthier nation than Japan, and hence have greater hopes for the future. Gains are judged both in social life and in material goods. Foreign items have great prestige in Palau and are welcomed as valuable additions even when less efficient than their own. Similarly, there is no animosity to the introductions brought by other natives who have come to Palau: their ways are examined with curiosity and selected aspects adopted. The demand is for more exposure to outside ways and more introductions. Those who have little personal preference for acting like the foreigners still acknowledge them to be "good" for Palau and bear no resentment toward individuals who do accept them. There is little nostalgia for the ancient era and an impatient eagerness to swiften the pace of "advancement." Differences in opinions exist as to what should be changed and how far reforms shall go in a single generation but not over the ultimate ends themselves.

(4) The changes which have taken place have modified the social architecture without undermining the cultural foundations of Palau. The facade of native institutions is quite different from that of the past, yet the basic principles of ordering human relationships remains fairly intact. An ancestor returning to Palau would not recognize all of the external features but he would have no trouble comprehending how the society functions. The permanent losses have not irrevocably undermined the society. For example, the outlawing of native warfare and female attendants in the men's club houses seriously changed patterns and created new problems but did not dislocate the entire social order. The individuals do not feel deprived of cherished, irreplaceable values and frustrated in their attempts to find equivalents. This does not imply that there is complete integration or total satisfaction with the existing social world, but it does mean that there is in no sense total bewilderment or cultural collapse.

(5) The successive foreigners influenced Palau in the same general direction. While there were interruptions during transitions, there was not a major break in the basic relationships to the natives. Methods of administration differed but more with regard to procedures than with respect to native policy as a whole. This continuity, in part, may be due to the continuing use of foreign cultural agents whose basic roles were much alike. This does not imply that the governing nations had the same motives, that they focused on the same aspects of Palau or that they behaved in identical ways. But it does indicate that the consequences for Palau were in the same directions. Hence, Palau was not forced to completely reverse itself with each incoming government. The same natives who worked with one foreign administration worked for the next one, the doctrines introduced in one period were acceptable in following ones, the techniques developed for dealing with foreigners remained much the same under successive administrations.

(6) The "social character" of the Palau people today is highly adaptable, the culture is plastic, and the society favorable to innovation. These qualities allow changes to occur without general social disorganization and personal demoralization. Enthusiasm for new ways offers the mental climate necessary for accommodation to the emergent social order. Inventions of new customs usually are welcomed--especially when sponsored by the elite--and relatively little emphasis is placed on the preservation of the ancestral. This orientation stands in sharp contrast to that of the past. Kubary wrote seventy-five years ago, "They had indeed the opportunity of taking over many things from the strangers, as occurred on many other South Sea islands, but I am not acquainted with any other South Sea people who have taken over so little as the Palau islanders, in the course of their hundred year relationship with the foreigners." It was not until the middle of the Japanese era that the elite of Palau committed itself to accepting foreign ways as much as possible. Up until that time, the question of acculturation was a political issue within the elite class and only when a combination of chiefs came into office in the two most powerful districts of Palau--Koror and Melekiok, who led the modernization movements--did it gain general acceptance. Thereafter the heads of Palau institutions were judged not in terms of conformance to the precepts of their ancestors but rather by the degree to which they were within the framework of "modern" conditions. Heads of clans once were subject to removal for deviating too far from the ancestral code, for such behavior threatened the welfare of the group; now they may be removed for departing too far from the rules of the foreigners and thereby evoking other comparable threats to their well being.

There has been no deep sense of guilt over departures from the pre-existing as long as they are approved by the elite and have resulted in greater prosperity. It was only during the great crisis of the recent war that many turned back to ancestral patterns and, once the emergency was past, the present orientation re-asserted itself.¹

The Palau people display ingenuity in reworking social arrangements to incorporate the new into the old in a satisfactory and workable manner. The plasticity of Palau is not one of normless opportunism. Despite the existing readiness to make and accept changes, there exists a hard core of values. These values have enabled Palau to maintain social solidarity on the fundamental concerns of life even though there exist cultural variability and social instability. They are the source of Palau's unbroken self-confidence in its own future.

Human Resources

There are a little more than 6,000 inhabitants now living in Palau.² This figure includes in addition to those ordinarily thought of as natives to the area, a small number of individuals who were born in other areas but who have made Palau their permanent home. There are Chamorros from the Marianas, peoples from Sonsorol, Wolcai, Yap, Truk, Ponape, Jaluit, Sumatra, Korea, Okinawa, Formosa, China and Japan. Some Japanese and Okinawan children were given to natives for permanent adoption when the repatriation of enemy nationals took place at the end of the war. The distinction between foreign and indigenous natives is an arbitrary one, and the ratio between the two is determined by the date selected for their differentiation. If the date set is the fifteenth rather than the twentieth century, a large portion of the present inhabitants would be classified as descendants of "foreigners." In Palau eyes, anyone who settles in Palau with the intention of remaining indefinitely and who accepts the duties and way of life of the

- 1 See, Useem, John. "The Changing Structure of a Micronesian Society," American Anthropologist, 47: 4, 1945.
- 2 Two independent censuses taken in Palau in June of 1946 and November of 1947 differ by less than 2 percent in their total counts. The 1946 Census was made by the U.S. Commercial Company Economic Survey and reported a population of 5912. By correcting this figure for births and deaths in the ensuing period, the number becomes 6050. The Civil Administration Census in 1947 enumerated 6157 persons.

native population is deemed a member of the society. It is a violation of etiquette and a technique of abuse to remind individuals of their origin. It is also an old practice for those who accidentally drifted to Palau to be adopted into one of the established clans and villages. The largest foreign element in Palau before World War II was the Japanese and Okinawan population. There were about fifty Japanese in 1910. Mass colonization of the area began in the early part of the 1920's and by the middle of the next decade, the Japanese were more numerous than the natives. Between 1930 and 1940 the Japanese in Palau increased from 2,078 to 23,768. With the onset of war, large numbers were evacuated to Japan and, in turn, more than 125,000 troops and auxiliary forces were stationed on the islands. After the surrender, in addition to the surviving troops, there were about 16,600 civilian Orientals, nearly all of whom were returned to their original homeland: 7,500 went to Okinawa, 6,000 to Japan, 3,500 to Korea, and more than a hundred to China. In contrast to the pre-war period, there are now comparatively few aliens residing in Palau. Koror alone had nearly 5,500 Japanese in 1938, and in 1948 there are less than a hundred Americans on that island.

The native population is once more increasing. Palau was formerly many times larger than its current numbers. It fell sharply during the early years of contact with the outside world, and then slowly began to recover. The estimates of the size of the population prior to the coming of the foreigner range from 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants. One of the estimates places its numbers at 10,000 in the middle of the nineteenth century. Kubary, in a competent study of Palau, computed the total to be 4,000 in 1910, the German government calculated the natives just before World War I to be 4,540. The Japanese governmental records are not consistent; in some years their published population figures for Palau vary so greatly that no reliable trend can be determined. One commonly cited set of statistics gives the following figures: 1920, 5,605; 1925, 5,735; 1930, 5,794; 1935, 6,013; and 1940, 6,587. The general picture is clear. Palau underwent a sharp fall in numbers and then started a slow recovery. The recovery received a temporary set-back during the war years, not so much through combat casualties as through deaths caused by malnutrition, by inadequate medical care, and by a drop in birth rates. The long time upward trend has resumed its course once more and has even quickened its pace. The crude fertility rate (per 1,000 population) which was 25.6 in 1936 has risen to 33.0 in 1946, while the crude death rate in the same time interval has fallen from 14.9 to 11.3.

There is little prospect of an overpopulation problem confronting Palau as a whole in the next few generations comparable to that which existed a century and a half

ago. The density is the lowest of any comparable area in the trust territory: Palau's current density has been estimated to be 33.1 whereas the mean density for the rest of American Micronesia is 74.9.³ However, within Palau, there is a wide range in density between localities, which may make for population pressures in particular places: the present range in island density is from 24.7 persons per square mile in Babelthuap to 333.3 in Koror. The man-land ratio cannot be computed realistically without taking into account intervening cultural factors which determine the accessibility to resources, the utilization of available land, and other comparable factors. Families are not scattered at random over the entire countryside, but live in concentrated villages. Most villages have sufficient accessible lands to provide for their subsistence. The only major exception to this occurs on the island of Angaur. Angaur's four villages contain a total population of 350, which is but a fraction of its ancestral size: before the coming of the foreigners there were thirty villages and 2,500 or more inhabitants, and by 1870 the numbers had fallen to four villages and a total of fifty persons. The present pressure is not due to the growth during the past eighty years, but to the reduction in the lands open for subsistence production. The mining of phosphate has expanded from the German, through the Japanese, and into the American periods, thereby restricting the land available for raising food in the northern villages. These villages were relocated in part in the lower section of the island by the Japanese. For three decades the villages have disputed amongst themselves the distribution of the available land, and this controversy still continues. The full scope of the issues are too involved to be given in detail here, for they include not merely questions of land rights, but also the political relationships between the villages, old feuds between clans, and a new struggle for power within the elite class.

Recent scientific studies have concluded that there is enough land for everyone's subsistence needs, but that objective fact alone cannot be used exclusively in the evaluation of the man-land ratio on Angaur. Koror's lands are limited in utilization by virtue of social traditions, economic activities, and foreign populations. Even before the modern era, Koror procured food supplies from Babelthuap through a well established trading arrangement. The high rental returns from land leased to the Japanese and the greater returns from employment with the foreigners made it more profitable to limit the lands used for subsistence and

³ Navy Department, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1948.

the manpower invested in food production. The large number of Japanese residents and installations further restricted the areas available for crops. Hence, while there is a high population density on Koror, there is no population pressure for there is access to food resources from both the natives of high production areas and the foreigners.

Every class and household on Babelthuap now has access to land. Prior to the coming of the foreigners there was a landless class in Palau which occupied the lowest status in the social pyramid and who drifted from village to village. With the decline in population, this class was assimilated and no longer exists. The Japanese acquired large portions of Babelthuap for their agricultural colonists and though the natives were not happy over the reduction in the size of their holdings, there was no case of an acute land shortage.

Polleliu has gone through a series of cycles in its history. Prior to the introduction by the foreigners of a variety of food crops and effective means for saving water, Polleliu experienced severe shortages at times. Its population was large and the numbers were increased by many groups who came to Palau from the outside and settled in Polleliu. Whenever the one taro crop or rainfall failed, some households or villages were either forced to migrate to other islands or compete for the limited supply. Several of the few known wars of extermination took place during these crises. The extensive migrations to Babelthuap and the marginal islands to the north of Polleliu, the decline in its own replacement rates, and the introductions of foreigners ended the pressure by the German era.

The small islands of Palau were inhabited during the period when the population was at its maximum. With the decline in numbers, all of these islands, with the exception of Mayangel, were abandoned. While every family does not own as much land as it would like to possess, none suffer from a lack of resources. More than 600 persons in the productive ages are currently employed outside of their permanent residence. These cases are not landless individuals forced to live elsewhere, but primarily ones who have found greater income opportunities in non-subsistence employments. A sample of sixty households scattered throughout Palau disclosed that while a fourth did not have legal title to land, all had access to land for cultivation. More than half of the land owned is not under cultivation. It appears unlikely that Palau will experience, in the forthcoming period, pressures due either to a large native or foreign population.

Palau's population today is composed of about the same total proportion of males and females. There is, however, a significant difference between the two sexes in their life expectancy. Women have a lower life expectancy than men.

This is evidenced in part by a comparison of the sex ratios in successive age grades. Women comprise 51 percent of the age bracket 15-45 and but 46 percent of the more advanced age grades. A comparison of the age-sex composition of Palau a decade ago with the present discloses that there has been a rise in the life expectancy of adults, but not for aged women. In 1936 females in the age class 15-45 made up 39 percent of the population, whereas, as noted above, they now comprise 51 percent. The ratio of females to males in the upper age category has increased less than 1 percent. The reduction of the female mortality rate in the reproductive years may reflect the beginning use of hospitals in recent years for childbirth.

The age composition of Palau reveals a greater concentration of its population in the younger ages and a smaller percentage in the older ages than any of the other Caroline islanders. More than a third are under the age of fifteen and less than 18 percent are past forty-five. The most marked contrast is with the neighboring island of Yap, which has 22 percent in the under 15 category and 33 percent in the 45 and over class. Although Palau does have a more youthful population than other Caroline islands, it ranks below any of the Marianas in this respect.

The birth rate in post-war Palau is higher than in the pre-war era. How much higher it is depends on which set of Japanese census figures one accepts as authentic. There is some reasonably reliable evidence that the fertility of the population was increasing at a moderate rate during the Japanese era. A comparison of the crude fertility rate for a decade, the last half of the 1920's and the first half of the 1930's shows a rise from 24.4 births per thousand population to 26.1. The crude birth rate dropped during the tumultuous war period, and now has resumed its upward climb, reaching 33.0 in 1946 and 33.9 in the following year. For the trust territory as a whole, the crude birth rate was 33.1. The median number of children per family in Palau is 2.7, but this is a misleading statistic, for there are 250 families with no children and 300 with five or more children. Kramer studied the fertility patterns of a sample group of clans for a period of 150 years. He found that until 1800, the reproductive rate was uniformly high and that a gradual decline took place followed by a sudden drop around 1800. Thereafter the number of one child families increased substantially. The fertility pattern of the last generation he covered shows that only one-fourth of the married women had between five and ten children. The same patterns prevail today. The modal ages that women have their first child is between twenty and twenty-four and nearly 30 percent have their first child at an age of twenty-five or older. These figures stand in sharp contrast with the common belief that "primitive" peoples in the tropics start their reproduction at a rather early age. Methods for

the prevention of conception and the termination of pregnancies, it is claimed, were known before the foreigners arrived in Palau, and are still practiced.

The fertility of Palau is lower than that of the Marianas and the Marshalls, and higher than the rest of the Carolines. Palau's ratio of children under five per 1,000 women aged 20 to 44 was 693 in 1946. Even though this is considerably below the physiological limits (estimated to be somewhere between 900 and 1,200), in combination with the present mortality rates it is more than sufficient for replacement. The crude death rate has been on the decline in Palau; the exact amount is subject to the same qualifications concerning the use of pre-war figures. During the second half of the 1920s, the crude death rate averaged 21.5, and in the next five years fell to 19.6. The 1947 average is 11.5⁴. Though the mortality rate is falling, deaths among infants and children which have been high in the past have continued to be rather high. The 1946 Census reported that nearly one out of every two families has lost one child through death. Computations for 1947 disclosed that 39.8 percent of the deaths in that year occurred among children under ten years of age. Mortality is twice as high among male children as it is among females under the age of ten; the reverse occurs in the ratio after that age. The higher incidence of male fatalities in these earliest years is common to most populations.

Palau's death rates are lower than that of the other islands of the Carolines, and some of the other islands of Micronesia. With a rising birth rate and a falling death rate, the differential has increased. Using the crude rates for 1936 and 1946 for comparison, the net difference was 10.7 in the former year and 22.6 in the latter, which is a considerable gain.

The exact incidence of sickness in Palau is unknown.⁵ The same items reported by the Japanese continue to be general: gonococcus infection, tuberculosis, pneumonia, influenza, intestinal parasitism, and various digestive diseases. During the initial years of contact with the foreigners, epidemics were rather common. As is so often the case in such situations, the introduction of medical care lagged years behind the bringing in of diseases. There was little overt opposition to the introduction of modern sanitation facilities and medical services, even though some of the German emergency measures undertaken were, at times, of necessity rather drastic, such as the

4 For the trust territory, the crude death rate was 17.19.

5 The only records available for the post-war period are the number of patients treated by the medical staff. See Navy Department, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1948.

burning down of native homes when any of its members contracted an infectious disease. Foreign health programs did not come in direct conflict with native medical care:⁶ individuals in need of treatment not infrequently used both types and continue to do so in the present era. Both the Japanese and American medical programs have improved markedly the general health of the population. Though no major ascertainable reduction in the prevalent diseases has taken place thus far, there has been no uncontrolled epidemic in Palau which threatened to decimate the population and there is ample evidence of substantial contributions to the health of Palau. The forthcoming years may witness further declines in mortality rates and the curtailment of the prevalent diseases.

The island of Babelthuap now has 57 percent (3,533 in numbers) of the total population. In the earliest known period of Palau's history, the majority of the inhabitants lived on the outlying islands. The reasons for the earlier reluctance or inability to occupy Babelthuap in numbers are unknown. Subsequent migrations from the smaller islands led to Babelthuap's nearly complete occupancy by villages. The first decline occurred in the interior villages and then along the western coast. One western district has twenty-seven abandoned village sites. The Japanese hastened these trends, for they preferred the interior and western sections for the settlement of their agricultural colonists, acquired other portions of the west coast for bauxite mining and military defense. Today there are no native villages in the interior and a greater proportion of the population reside on the eastern than on the western shores of Babelthuap. Babelthuap will continue to be regarded as the "mainland" of Palau. Its human and natural resources give it a dominant position. During the past decade its population has increased proportionately less than Koror, but in spite of that it remains the largest population in Palau. Babelthuap is the only island which exports agricultural produce to other islands. It is the "taro basket" of Palau.

Koror was one of the last of the principal islands to be permanently settled in the early history of Palau. But because of its unique location between Babelthuap to the north and Peleliu and Angaur to the south, the use of the island by most foreigners as the base for trade and government, and the full exploitation of its opportunities, Koror has become the pivotal island in Palau. There are slightly more than a thousand natives currently residing on Koror, but an

6 The one known exception is that of the attempts to restrict the right of the modekngei to use their techniques for treating the injured and ill.

additional group daily commute to the island from southern Babelthuap, and there is a steady flow of visitors from all the other districts of Palau. Almost half of Koror's residents and slightly less than a third of the other islands are in the age grades 20 to 45. This is due to the high percentage of young persons who are employed by the foreigners--most of the work with foreigners is on Koror. Koror is also the place where individuals escaping from the controls of their home communities or desiring closer contact with the foreign way of life congregate. Important political figures find frequent trips to Koror indispensable. While the birth rate of Koror is greater than its death rate, Koror relies more for its population growth on influxes from other islands than on its own reproduction. The refined birth rate (the ratio of children under five to women between 20 and 44) is much lower for Koror than the rest of Palau; in 1947 the refined birth rate was 640 for Koror, 956 for Babelthuap, 944 for Peleliu, and 927 for Angaur.

The two southern islands, Peleliu and Angaur were among the earliest inhabited areas and once contained the largest populations of Palau. Since modern times they have smaller numbers than Koror or Babelthuap. Peleliu now has nearly 800 and Angaur less than 350 inhabitants. Both of these islands had, in proportion to their own size, fairly large Japanese settlements, although these were never equal numerically to those on the northern islands. The Japanese were engaged primarily in phosphate mining in peacetime, and during the war they concentrated on making the two islands the perimeter of Palau's defense. Because of the substantial Japanese settlements and garrison forces on these small islands and the local enthusiasm for the foreigners, culture contact was more continuous and intimate than was the case on Babelthuap. As a result, the assimilation of foreign ways occurred to a greater degree in the southern than in the northern islands--only Koror equaled them in this respect. The large size of the American forces temporarily occupying the two islands during the war enabled the natives to acquire considerable wealth, personal property, and some familiarity with the incoming foreigners. Taking into account the current fertility and mortality differentials, the net replacement rates indicate a more rapid growth than for the rest of Palau; the present birth-death differential amounts to a gain of 39.2 per 1,000 in Angaur, 25.7 in Peleliu and 22.6 in Palau as a whole. These contrasting rates of growth may be temporary; should they prove permanent, Peleliu and Angaur may loom larger in the Palau scene.

Kayangel in the far north contains the smallest population of the four islands (113 inhabitants) and it is stationary in size. Important in the early history of Palau, Kayangel has played a relatively minor role in the recent development of Palau.

The four islands of Koror, Peleliu, Angaur, and Kayangel each constitute a district. Babelthuat subdivides into ten districts: Airrai is the southernmost and Ngerechelong is the northernmost district, the east coast districts are Ngchesar, Melekiok, Ngiwal, and Ngarard, and the west coast ones are Aimeliik, Ngedbang, Ngeremlungui, and Ngardmau. The average Palau district contains 300 persons who reside in five villages. The median village consists of twenty-five households. Although the locations of districts, villages and households are relatively fixed, the populations who make up each social grouping are more fluid.

There is a high degree of population mobility in contemporary Palau. Everyone has a village to which he "belongs," yet it often is not the one in which he resides⁷ or works. Seldom does a person remain in one community his entire life. The culture calls for and individuals are habituated to intermittent movements. Each day, crafts of all types transport several hundred people in varying directions. These movements are deemed routine today and involve no complex arrangements in advance. Hospitality patterns require the host, who is usually a relative, to provide shelter and food, and hence all that usually is carried on trips are a few light objects of clothing and food for the trip itself. The addition of a bed roll, wrapped in a woven sleeping mat, ordinarily indicates that a more permanent move is taking place. Many baskets of food may mean that a "gift" is being sent to a relative with the expectation that a reciprocal gift in Palau money will be forthcoming.

The patterns of mobility may be sorted out into several types. The least voluminous is the "permanent" migration type. Somewhere between twenty-five and fifty families⁸ and about a hundred individuals undertake such

⁷ A person may be born and reared in the villages of his mother's husbands (usually there are several in progressive sequence) and then inherit rather late in life the headship of his mother's clan (keblil) and a village or district office at the same time. He is expected to "return" to the place he "belongs" and shift his loyalty to his home village. In the pre-foreign era, this might mean going to and thereafter giving complete loyalty to an enemy district of the one with which he had been previously identified.

⁸ This refers to the immediate family unit (ongalak) and not to the household (blai). A household is a most stable unit: even when all of its members are scattered, it still retains a separate identity in its traditional location. Persons descended from blai located in villages abandoned many generations back still refer to their home as being the ancient one.

"permanent" movements each year. By permanent is meant that the migrant states an intention to remain indefinitely in the new locality. Some of these are newly married women who move into their husband's household, which is more often than not in another village, ex-married women who are returning to their own family, persons inheriting social positions in other places than the one in which they had been residing, and those who find greater economic opportunities elsewhere. A second and much larger class of travellers are visitors who stop with various branches of their extended family. A small number have made this into a parasitical form of living. For the vast majority, visits are ones of welcome reliefs from the pressures of ordinary activities, as well as a social necessity on certain social occasions. A third class of travel may be designated as pertaining to various types of transactions--commercial, governmental, religious and social. This includes trips to Koror to sell produce and buy foreign-made goods, to negotiate with foreign and important native officials, to attend school and church activities, to learn the latest news, etc. The fourth kind is of a more limited nature in distance traveled but more universal in occurrence: daily trips by women to the taro fields and by men to the coconut tree areas and to the fishing grounds. A fifth class consists of group visits in which a whole village or district visits another for a period of several days of festivities (klechedaol).

These incessant movements give a special character to Palau life. To an outsider, communities seem nearly empty during the course of the average day and the vessels skirting the coasts usually appear to be overloaded with passengers. The high incidence of mobility makes for the transmission of news at an unbelievably rapid pace. The ease of movement is also one of the means by which accommodations are made to new circumstances with a minimum of strain. From infancy on, individuals learn to adjust to a semi-mobile life. Parents usually take one or all of their children with them on visits. A third of those whose permanent residence was changed in the past two years were children under the age of 15. By adolescence, young people make frequent trips around Palau on their own. Even the very old spend much of their time traveling from branch to branch of their clan. The casualness with which these trips are undertaken are in part indicative of an attitude that they are a normal part of living in contemporary Palau. Intermittent traveling does not unduly disrupt the economic or social systems, but rather form an integral part of their functioning. The extent of these intermittent movements are more common today than in ancient times. Formerly most districts were fearful of military attack and therefore cautious about allowing outsiders to drift in. Districts erected fortresses at the points of entry into their main villages, regulated the flow of sea and land traffic, and required travellers to secure permission prior to traveling or settling in the area. Numerous other travel

restrictions were in force. Most of these precautions are no longer exercised and the receipt of approval to settle in a new locality is secured with a minimum of difficulty. The introduction of modern facilities for travel has also added to the amount of travel. Formerly it took several days to go from the north end of Babelthuap to Koror; now by motor boat the trip can be made in a single day. On the neighboring island of Yap there are individuals who have never been to many of the districts outside of their immediate ones; the average Palau has been at one time or another in nearly every district in the area.

The physical makeup of the Palau people is not only an admixture, but also one which is still changing. The origins of the population are not fully known. A tabulation of family histories indicated the following derivations. There is a sizable group who came in successive waves from Ulithi by way of Yap; others stem from the smaller islands of the central Carolines; still others came from Malay and Melanesian areas--especially the small scattered islands off the mainlands; and it seems likely that others derive from the Philippines. Even today, natives from the south and east occasionally drift into Palau and in time marry local women. The Chinese were in Palau well before the coming of Europeans. In recent times, English, Portuguese, German, Chinese, Japanese, Okinawan, Korean, Chamorro, and Americans have bred into the local population. There is no indication that out of these old or new mixtures a single modal physical type has appeared which might be identified as distinctly Palau. The most conspicuous uniformities are the medium brown skin, scanty body and facial hair, dark brown to black head hair, and medium stature. But there is a wide range in each of these and other features. Skin colors shade from a pale yellow to a deep dark brown; there are short stout and tall slender individuals; some have frizzly and others curly hair, broad and aquiline noses, thick and thin lips, etc. There is no correlation between physical type and subcultural patterns. Palau is not as much a distinguishable homogeneous physical type as it is a distinctive society with a common culture shared by people of many backgrounds.

The social consequences of the changing human resources in Palau are manifold. Both the composition and the distribution of the population have undergone substantial changes. Following initial contact with the foreigners, the population dropped to the point where it seemed doubtful if the society would survive. Even after survival was assured, the depopulation had a disturbing effect on social life. More than 150 villages disappeared. There literally were not enough people to perform the traditional functions and to qualify for the various specialized roles contained within the ancestral social order. The meaning of the social

dislocations may be more readily comprehended if we imagine the results in the United States should this country be reduced in numbers from our present 140,000,000 to 14,000,000, an equivalent proportionate loss to that in Palau. Still the ensuing adjustments were not those of a defeated people in a state of total disorganization. Adaptations were made to existing circumstances and the surviving populations sought to maximize the benefits from a more favorable man-land ratio. As soon as the opportunity presented itself to employ the instrumentalities of the foreigners to offset the high mortality rate, it was readily taken. There was comparatively little opposition to the introduction of modern medical care and sanitation, even among the more conservative sections of the population. As noted previously, the present birth and death rates indicate that the population is increasing in numbers. But it is unlikely that Palau will equal its former size in the immediate years ahead. The recent trend has led some clans to reactivate extinct households and districts to make plans for the re-establishment of ancestral villages. Recent growth has also added to native confidence in the future. Planning for the future was notably lacking in the society according to Kramer and Kubary. Now that concern is rather widespread. "It isn't our custom to worry about the future. We know we are in a new day and must work for the future."

Economic Trends

Since the onset of acculturation, Palau has developed a dual yet integrated economic order: one segment consists of a subsistence economy using a traditional-oriented, handicraft technology; and the other is a commercial economy with a foreign-oriented, machine made technology.⁹ The two sets of patterns are structurally interlinked and functionally interdependent. A detailed analysis of the budgets of sixty sample households for both the pre-war and the post-war periods reveals that every family in varying degrees is in both economic systems. The occupational histories and current employments of adult male workers also discloses that a majority of the laborers engage in both types of gainful work, whether concomitantly or at different stages of their life cycle. The daily patterns of living exhibit various combinations of the two schemes.

9 While this division is technically correct, certain qualifications are necessary. There exists a degree of commercial enterprise in the traditional economy: goods in excess in one village were sold to others with shortages and a small class of entrepreneurs (merau) performed an accepted function as middlemen. In addition, it is necessary to recognize that today the foreign economy is regarded as much a part of Palau's traditions as the subsistence one. There are customs which surround it and have been incorporated into the mores.

High speed motor launches are used to transport baskets of sweet potatoes to a neighboring village for a traditional social festival. The aboriginal adze is employed to carve out a canoe alongside of a gasoline-driven sawmill turning out a hundred feet of plank. A million-dollar industrial plant mines phosphate adjacent to women who plant taro fields as they have done for generations. Natives drive trucks and pound typewriters to acquire enough money so that they may offer the customary gifts to their wives' clan. A sorcerer, expert in matters concerning the weather, chants aloud and waves his arms to turn away a local shower at so many dollars a day, hired by carpenters trained in modern schools and using the most recently developed tools of the craft. Fisherman toss hand-grenades into the sea to catch fish, and then sort out their catch according to those which are tabu and those which go as tribute to the rubak, from those they may sell on the open market or consume. A nativistic leader (modekngei) waves a red cloth (an ancient symbol of power over ones fortune) to deflect the course of bombers flying overhead. A Japanese trained native businessman mass produces with chain belt methods handicraft in order to acquire sufficient American money to purchase a piece of Palau money so as to enhance his family's prestige and bargaining power in competition for the headship of a district. Sears Roebuck catalogues are consulted in order to send for implements which nearly everyone has half-forgotten how to make or does not want to make. A meal may be made up of a mixture of American-canned and South-East Asia derived foods, prepared in Spanish iron pots, placed in Japanese dishes on a table made of Philippine driftwood, eaten with German silverware in a commercial restaurant housed in an American Quonset hut which has been financed by a Japanese credit pattern and is operated by a native clan as a family enterprise, while a Japanese version of an American phonograph plays African derived dance music. These are merely illustrations of the interconnections between the traditional and newer forms of economic life in contemporary Palau.

Contact between the foreign and native economic system began not through formal treaties for trading rights by accredited representatives of the great powers, nor through conquest of the islands by force of arms. The first interaction took place with the intermittent visit of private traders who were eagerly welcomed by the natives. The first European traders had a greater immediate influence on the political balance of power than on the economic order. While they and the early Japanese traders did bring many new implements to Palau and in turn obtained local goods for export, there was no fundamental change in the subsistence type of economy. The German and Japanese eras brought about the dual economy. Everything possible was done to foster a commercial economy. Production for profit was made a central theme--the virtues of the work ethic were indoctrinated into the younger generations through the schools. Incentives for output were

offered in foreign goods. Numerous new crops and livestock were introduced. Scientific experiments in agriculture were undertaken and the findings taught to native farmers. Implements suitable to the local industries were sold at a modest price. Subsidies were granted to expand lands under cultivation and where these proved an insufficient incentive, persuasion and some pressure were used. Joint government and private-capital concerns built installations, factories, and transportation facilities. Joint native and foreign associations were formed to market native products, import manufactured goods from abroad, and to foster commercial enterprise in the islands. Groups of foreign experts were sent in to explore the potentially useful resources and to work out feasible means for their development.

During the earlier years, imports into Palau greatly exceeded exports. As Palau's output mounted, exports rapidly increased, while imports also continued their upward trend. Both exports and imports were six times larger in 1940 than in 1930. In 1940 more than 5,350,000 yen worth of commodities were shipped from Japan to Palau, and over 11,780,000 yen in Palau goods went to Japan. Palau sent nearly a fourth of all the exports from the Mandates and received nearly 30 percent of the Mandates' imports. Only Saipan and Tinian had greater exports and none equaled its imports. The gains of this expanding economy were evidenced in steadily rising levels of living for the entire population. Natives built new homes, dressed in foreign clothing, bought many luxuries, and dreamed of an ever-improving level of living.

World War II temporarily and rather sharply disrupted the existing economy.¹⁰ Since the end of hostilities the subsistence economy has been restored more rapidly and more fully than the commercial one. A dual economy functions once more with a different balance between the two systems. Imports once more exceed exports.¹¹ Economic rehabilitation is, however, underway. Production for the market is steadily mounting. The mining of phosphate on Angaur actually exceeds the pre-war output and more significantly brings a very substantial royalty to the natives which the Japanese did not

10 See, Economic and Human Resources, Yap and Palau, Western Carolines. U.S. Commercial Company, 1947. Vol. I.

11 The total cash value of commercial exports in 1948 is less than 5 percent of the estimated value of pre-war exports. It is important to note that these figures pertain to goods shipped from Palau and not products exported for which the Palau people secured a direct payment. A large share of the profits of the exports in the Japanese period went to the Japanese.

pay. The trochus shell industry, a major pre-war source of income, has revived substantially. The net returns from copra, also an important income source, is today one-fourth larger than a decade ago--the pre-war volume of production was much greater but the post-war meteoric rise in world-wide copra prices has made for this increase in cash returns. Explorations have been made into the means of re-establishing the fishing industry. The consequences of these trends in terms of family budgets are revealed in a sample of sixty Palau families which were examined.¹²

In 1939, the average sample family had a net monthly income from all sources of \$44.33; in 1946 the same group's average was down to \$14.57 and by 1948 it had increased to \$58.47. Nearly every household today has some source of income from gainful employment, just as they did before the war. The extent of the recovery since the end of the war is indicated by a comparison of the total capital possessed by the sample families: the 1946 assets averaged \$186.00 in cash and in 1948 this had mounted to \$306.90. An analysis of the purchasing power of money reveals that the gains are not quite as great as the above figures show. Inflation is affecting Palau in the same way as in all post-war societies; there is more income, but the cost of all items is higher.

12 These families constitute a 5 percent sample of the total households in Palau. They were drawn from twelve different districts (omitted were the two smallest ones, Ngetbang and Kayangel). Within each district five families were chosen to secure a representation from the various major socio-economic status groups. The heads of the households were first interviewed in 1946, and again in 1948. The same schedule was used in both instances and the repeated interview used as a check on prior responses. The first interviews were made by Paul Breese and Harry Uyehara and the second series by Madoes and Uyehara; thus, both a foreigner and a native interviewed the same individuals and Mr. Uyehara served as a cross checker of the materials. The comparison of the two sets of responses on the same periods, 1939 and 1946, revealed some discrepancies, but these proved to be surprisingly small. A comparison of the same families with the census of households indicated that the sample was not significantly different from the total population with respect to size of household, number of dependents, age composition, sex distribution and similar items. In order to make the data comparable for the pre-war and post-war periods, yen have been recomputed to dollars at their conversion rate for the year 1939--roughly 4 yen to a dollar. For the purpose of this analysis a family is defined as an ongalak.

The changing cost of native produced commodities is partially indicated in a composite price for consumer and durable goods during the past decade. Ten native food items¹³, collectively advanced in price from \$1.75 in 1939 to \$4.38 in 1946 to \$8.64 in 1948. In this same period the average cost of a house in tsubo units¹⁴ increased from \$5.40 to \$8.66 to \$27.00. While every household raises most of its own food, few are entirely self-sufficient to the point where there is no need for making purchases from others. The division of labor within the subsistence economy involves specialization in some production. For every family to send someone out to fish, for example, would be deemed an unwarranted duplication of efforts and expenditure of time. A rise also has taken place in the prices and quality of imported commodities.¹⁵ The rising prices of commodities grown locally have accrued to the immediate benefit of producers for the native market, and as a result villages with goods to sell have experienced a decided increase in their incomes, while those families who rely more on wage work have felt pressed. Advancing consumer prices has been accompanied by higher wages and greater returns for export goods. But the total earned income has not increased more rapidly than the total expenditures for living.

Those in a position to do so have stepped up their use of Palau customs to secure additional income to offset their deficits. During a three-month interval, two-thirds of the sample households studied had contributed and one out of four had received some income through this means. That these transactions are not merely token sums is indicated by the fact that the recipients secured as much income from this source as households which contributed collectively obtained from their gainful employment. Because the circulation of funds is not an equal one, but rather enables a limited group to acquire a disproportionately large part of the returns, the pressure has been keenly felt. This, in part, explains the mounting discontent among the younger generations over the continuation of the mutual aid customs.

The income of Palau families ordinarily is derived from multiple sources. In addition to the regular wages of those employed by the foreigners, there are returns from a variety of other sources. The number of supplementary

13 The foods included are fish, taro, sweet potatoes, tapioca, banana, chicken, coconut syrup, coconut oil, crab and lobster.

14 House costs are computed on the bases of tsubo units of space.

15 This has been fully presented in "A Preliminary Comparison of Micronesian Islander's Pre-War and Post-War Income and Purchasing Power," prepared by Edward A. Gallahue, which appears as an appendix of Summary of Findings and Recommendations, U. S. Commercial Company, 1947.

sources of income are once more approaching the pre-war figures: the average sample family before the war had four different sources of income and today has two. The mean family net returns from the supplementary sources was a fourth greater than from the main income in the pre-war years, dropped to half as much in the war period and now is only 10 percent below it. Between 1946 and 1948, the income from the main occupation has doubled, while that from supplementary work has tripled. Should the present trend continue, income derived from supplementary sources may return to pre-war levels. It may be noted that at the present time families have more income from their main occupation than they did before the war, while they have less now than then from their supplementary income. The significance of this goes beyond the mere question of type of gainful work. The supplementary income sources are open to a broader age range and are mainly performed in the home village rather than in the foreign center. If they expand again, more individuals in the villages will have direct access to foreign incomes. This, in turn, may remove some of the pressure on wage earners to share their earnings. It also means for the Palau family whose members are not employed by the foreigners a higher level of living.

The pattern of employment during the past decade is mirrored in the number of different kinds of work done by the sample family heads. Twenty-two percent have had the same work from 1939 to 1948, and 45 percent are doing the same thing in 1948 that they did two years before. Half of the workers have had three different jobs, and more than a fourth held two different jobs between 1939 and 1948. The high rate of turnover in itself does not have abnormal connotations in Palau. Occupational mobility is the expected pattern in the course of a man's lifetime. There has been a narrowing in the number of different kinds of income-producing work opportunities and a shift back into the more traditional types of subsistence work. This change has affected the male population far more than the female group, for the latter have remained more completely within the orbit of the subsistence economy. The kind of work a person does, by and large, is less important than the amount of income derived from the employment.¹⁶ The esteem of various kinds of work is

16 Two types of work have little appeal: common labor gang work in the sun for the foreigners which involves long hours of uninterrupted work. A prestige factor enters here to the extent that some workers in this position have even resorted to subterfuges to avoid being seen by other natives, such as wearing good clothes at work and hiding the tools used when natives pass by. This is, however, by no means a universal pattern and is cited merely as an indication of an attitude. Working for other natives also is not popular, for the employee feels that he is devoting his

by the social status of the employed individuals rather than the reverse. Thus the distinction between skilled and unskilled workers is subordinate to the social rank of the individuals involved.¹⁷ Hence the Palau groups who are anxious to have the income opportunities expand again are less concerned with the question of regaining a particular type of employment as with having expansion in the means of gainful employment. Those villages which have been accustomed to considerable gainful work in the past are now anxious about the future economy of Palau.

The desire for income stems not merely from a demand for funds to purchase goods and luxuries but also to fulfill social obligations under Palau customs. While the possession of wealth is the source of envy, the expenditure of wealth for the glory of the family brings added honors from all quarters. A feast given for some occasion which draws a very large number of people will be widely and favorably discussed as proof that the donor is really well respected. Outlays are expected to be made as a part of many social transactions, personal activities, and clan and marriage obligations.¹⁸ No self-respecting village would build its own club house (abai) and few men would consider constructing their own house (blai), in spite of the possession of the necessary skills and the question of economy. Another village of the same social rank is invited by the community to perform the task and the man wishing a new home hires others to construct it. There are, therefore, many pressures on an individual to possess wealth in order to meet his social obligations and to play his ascribed roles in society. How the income is acquired is less important than its possession. An individual who can extract or produce an income from any source and by any means is respected for his success.

efforts for the benefit of another native rather than himself, and is thus advancing someone at his own expense. Moreover, there is the further anxiety that his employer will deceive him and pay him less than expected. Native contractors deem it legitimate to engage in a certain amount of deception.

17 While occupational skill per se does not determine a person's prestige, the lack of any aptitude does detract from one's reputation. It also needs to be recognized that while foreign learned skills are not prestige-giving in themselves, they are esteemed because they enable the trained to deal directly with the foreigners and to handle modern business transactions. The carpenters lare ah are an outstanding example of this. They are regarded not merely as experts at their craft, but also educated men who understand the ways of the foreigner.

18 This subject is covered in another CIMA report in full detail.

Districts are not homogeneous economic units: villages differ in the extent to which they make or earn a livelihood. In most districts there are villages which are engaged mainly in self-subsistence activities while a few of its members are producing for the market or working for wages. Still other villages within the same districts have a larger percentage of gainfully employed in occupations which yield a cash income. The net per capita income derived from goods and services sold to foreigners was two and one-third times as large in the most foreign-market-oriented district than that with the least in 1938-1939, and a comparable range exists at present. The contrasts are ones of differences in resources, opportunities, and preferences. Ngardmau district moved from a low into the second highest per capita income when the Japanese started bauxite mining in the years immediately before the invasion and now ranks again in the lower brackets. Angaur's phosphate has kept it at the top in both the pre-war and post-war periods. Kayangel, Ngedbang and Aimeliik have been content to remain predominately subsistence economies whereas Airrai, Melokiok, and Ngeremlungui have sought energetically to expand their produce for sale and proportionally a larger number of their workers find employment with the foreigners. Koror has had the unique opportunity to acquire income through the provision of various services and the rental of lands to the foreigners. While wealth is greatly desired and the desire for an expanding economy is general, still it must be recognized that in many fundamental concerns of life other values transcend wealth in Palau. The social status of groups is not measured in terms of the amount of foreign property and money possessed, and even native money, while important, is only one element in the social status system of Palau. Inventors of new technology have never been accorded the same honor as inventors of new social customs. Men with status can use their power to acquire wealth, but men with wealth need more than that to acquire status. Palau is neither other-worldly nor a pecuniary oriented culture.

II. PATTERNS OF POWER

It is a sociological truism to point out that the aftermath of prolonged and intimate contact between a "primitive" society and a "higher" civilization is that the native social organization experiences profound and extensive changes. Less commonly recognized, but no less significant, are the effects of acculturation on the structure of power within a native society. Changes within this sphere may reorient a number of social relationships--the allocation of authority to make and enforce decisions; the administrative techniques for managing native and foreign affairs; the interaction between native rulers and the ruled; the mores governing the rights and duties of various subdivisions, e.g., territorial units, age grades, and status groups; the means of settling social disputes and legislating new ends; the codes which determine the distribution of rewards and social privileges; the responsiveness to nativistic and modernistic reform movements; and the prevailing sentiments to the outside world.

The Power Pyramid

The management of Palau affairs has been concentrated in the past almost exclusively in an elite class. Their legitimate authority (ilteet) was symbolized in titles (dui)¹ of public office which designated them as the senior-ranking members of society. They were not only superior in secular matters but also holy in sacred ones. In the modern era, the upper ranks of this class, the meteet, are thought of as the real rulers of Palau, the lesser rubak titles having lost some of their prior power. The political elite, in all social relationships, expected to be treated with deference and accorded special privileges: commoners stepped off the pathway and bowed when a titled person approached; half crouched at a respectful distance, with face averted, in their presence; spoke softly and only if the conversation were initiated by the rubak; passed the home (bai) and clubhouse (abai) of the elite quietly and slowly, and, if possible, avoided coming too close; remained outside of the house of a rubak until invited to enter; maintained a quiet household if a rubak entered; observed precedence in the order of going in and coming out of places, seating places, and eating

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- 1 Title holders are referred to by that designation and never by personal name. Titles are graded within each village and district, they are not standardized in nomenclature for Palau as a whole. Male and female titles are independent of each other, but at each status position there is one for each sex. Female titles invariably continue in the matrilineal line whereas male titles in some instances have become patrilineal. (see kinship and class).

arrangements; respected the handbasket of the elite in the same manner as his person by never touching or jumping over it; contributed choice portions of the fish catch; obeyed the requests of the elite without debate; and accepted the basic doctrine that only those with titles had the right to lead and to decide. A meteet could resolve any doubts by asking, "Who is above me?".

Power was distributed unequally and along hierarchal lines, yet it was not linear but circular. Legitimate authority was an attribute of offices and not the private property of persons. While paramount chiefs² outranked other title holders, their right to rule was circumscribed. No chief could act without the approval of other title holders. In theory, the order of rank was changeless; in reality, there were numerous cases in which it was changed. Inheritance rules set the order of succession to titles but did not guarantee anyone the right to positions of authority. Those in line of succession to titles had to prove their qualifications for office and those in office had to demonstrate a reasonable capacity to govern. There was no automatic inheritance of a rubak position, the leading candidate had to be passed on and failing to qualify could be passed over. Through actions of the klobak a rubak could lose his title. Assassinations and forced resignations of rubak could be engineered legally by members of a title holder's clan. No rank was beyond social control. Chiefs who violated the mores were subject to punishment ranging from fines to death. Authority for Palau was not concentrated in a single group of men. Each locality had its own titles and within each locality a division existed between male and female title holders.

From childhood on, individuals were taught to obey and fear the ruling class. By adolescence, children eligible to become rubak began to exercise positions of leadership over their contemporaries. The social life of Palau was highly organized and through these organizations discipline was maintained over the adult members of society. There were

2 For the purpose of this report, chiefs are the senior-ranking title holders in a district or village. Paramount chiefs will be used for the first-ranking title of a district, or village, or a confederation of districts. The term civil servant is employed to designate those natives who work for the foreigners in roles which involve high-policy matters.

relatively few individuated types of activities and natives preferred, wherever possible, to work and associate together. The elite exerted direct control through their headship of societies and indirect control through the interlocking of associations which ultimately were subordinate to the rubak. Thus a chief could issue orders through his own clan and also through the klobak which was made up of the heads of the leading clans. These clans were large in size and in turn contained families or sub-clans whose heads held lesser offices in many organizations. No individual or group was beyond control. The lines of administration left no one in doubt as to the source of authority.

Fines, banishment from the group, confiscation of property, loss of social privileges, and the death penalty could be ordered by the rubak against those who violated their regulations. An obstinate person might witness the forced withdrawal of his wife and children to her clan. Perhaps the most effective technique of social control was the use of open scolding (milidiich) which put a person to shame. Nothing is more feared by a common man than having the meteet publically ridicule him and thereafter act as though he does not exist. Palau people are deeply anxious to avoid loss of respect and will go to great lengths to avoid it. "We swallow our saliva so nothing will happen". The loss in reputation reflects not only on the person involved but also on his family, clan and village. The counter pressures exerted by these units to avoid such a disgrace induces the individual to be most sensitive to not arouse the disapproval of the meteet. Because the individual is so highly dependent on groups and can do so little as an isolated being, he is most anxious to retain his good standing. The possibilities of escape have been rather limited. A person could not run away to start all over again among total strangers, even if he felt so impelled. To leave Palau required a hazardous sea voyage over many hundreds of miles and was ordinarily inconceivable to an individual in trouble. More feasible was to move to another village or district. But this required the approval of the chief in the new locality; chiefs allied would be reluctant to harbor opponents of their associates, chiefs opposed might be suspicious that the refugee was using chicanery to spy on their defenses. Offenders could be extradited for punishment to the place where the crime took place. Offenses committed elsewhere might not arouse the same amount of hostility, but a man's reputation was nevertheless impaired and his social standing lower in the new settlement. The primary defense open to those who offended was a verbal one. Fabrication of the facts was a well-developed art. One early learned to appear innocent and tell a story that would appear sufficiently true to avoid censorship. Rationalization of the acts performed to make them seem as though they were motivated for the benefit of the group, plus reiteration of

a past replete with instances of self-sacrifice for the larger welfare also helped. But these were uncertain defenses for one could not talk back to the meteet. An offense against a rubak was not a personal injury, but a crime against the state. Criticism of the elite, even in private, was also a grave offense and few dared to be caught engaged in this kind of "agitation." A more common procedure was to overtly acquiesce to any orders given but to evade their execution, while simulating compliance. The order might even be enthusiastically applauded and then either "misunderstood" or worked at without ever being quite accomplished. These negative defenses against the meteet never undermined the system of power itself. There is no known instance of commoners seeking to overthrow the ruling class and seizing power for themselves.

The mores surrounding the use of authority allowed for some latitude in the behavior of the rulers. There were pronounced differences in traditions between districts in the ways the meteet functioned, as well as the expected contrasts amongst the personalities of the chiefs who successively held office. One prominent district was renowned for the use of violence in administration (death penalties were rather frequent) whereas in another equally outstanding district fines were more common. Two stereotyped figures emerge from the folklore: a chief who ruled "by the torch" and one who followed the doctrine of "using bait". The former was alleged to have pushed through those plans which would enhance his own glory; to have constantly proclaimed his right to dominate; to have clumsily administered social activities, resorting to coercion to secure obedience and rushing decisions before people were ready for them; to have failed to assume his share of the burdens; and to have oppressed the people in general. The latter was said to have used his authority to advance the condition of the whole community, to have fully consulted with the members of his council, and yielded when in error, to have accorded the respect due to lesser-ranking chiefs and associated with lower-ranking people without constantly reminding them of their differential status, to have employed flattery and persuasion to motivate others, and to have skilfully worked out social arrangements even to inventing new customs which met the needs of everyone. This polar classification reflects as much the current controversy over the proper behavior of chiefs as it mirrors the past. It is now reiterated in some circles that chiefs in ancient times were more of the latter type, whereas the present ones are more like the former--thus using a selective idealization of the past as an ideological weapon in the present. Upon closer inspection, the division into what appears to be desirable and undesirable traits in a ruler is not so sharply drawn. Everyone concedes that an effective leader uses some deception and trickery; and such acts are greatly admired when their clever use results in success.

Many rulers maintain that to retain confidence of the group they must not appear in doubt and go around asking people their opinions. To confide in the common people or to invite open discussion of issues brings agitation, unrest and confusion --for ordinary people know little about Palau regulations and see issues only in relationship to their immediate personal wishes. Moreover, they point out that the Palau people are quick to enthusiasm for any new idea and this mercurial quality must be checked from completely upsetting the social order. Hence it would be proof of weakness rather than of strength of character for a chief to fail to issue firm orders or not to be a "real meteet" in demeanor. Justification for the self-interest of the chief in his own clan is also offered. No greater disgrace could befall a chief than to be responsible for his clan losing out to another. Ambitious rival keblil are alert to any opportunity to grasp the title of those above them. Moreover, the lower-ranking meteet can afford to be more concerned with the public interest for they cannot directly gain as much from the orders, whereas the first chief can so profit and it would be foolish indeed to pass up the opportunity. No one actually advocates complete equity in the distribution of rewards, and there are no records of anyone openly urging any reform in the power structure--until the coming of the foreigners.

The establishment of permanent relationships with the outside world did not precipitate a domestic political upheaval of revolutionary dimensions though it did eventuate in a series of changes of native institutions. Neither the foreigners nor the natives possessed any strong motives for the abolition of the traditional schemes for political management in Palau. The foreigners were concerned primarily with questions on how to effectively utilize and supervise native government. This inevitably required reforms in order to bring local institutions in closer accord with the foreigners' modes of administration. Thus the foreigners were reluctant to deal with the congeries of social groupings and the series of leaderships at various levels scattered over the islands. To negotiate with several hundred individuals who possessed some degree of authority seemed too complex and cumbersome an organization to work within. Some form of centralization and concentration of authority appeared to be the rational answer; the chiefs gave promise of being a suitable solution and the chiefs themselves were eager to take advantage of the opportunity to enhance their statuses and so readily responded. This development contributed substantially to the decline in control of the meteet class over the paramount chiefs. By this type of process many changes came about--though not purposively sought. Comparable circumstances induced sections of the native population to promote reforms which, in turn, indirectly affected the functioning of the power structure.

The challenge to the men of power in Palau was to invent new techniques or refashion old ones to fit the changing social scene. They were not a unified group and their personal interests diverged on many issues. They differed amongst themselves over the means and the urgency of corrective measures. Despite these internal divisions and without a formal plot, the elite succeeded in retaining the hard core of their authority. The first asset they possessed was the retention in the mind-set of the population that the meteet are the elite and are to be accorded their due respect. Even the most zealous reformers have not openly repudiated this premise. A second strength resided in their continuing dominance. As long as they remained ascendant, they were in a position to guide if not to dictate the actual decisions made and to supervise their execution. The task was to thwart those programs which jeopardized their standing, to administer measures so as to perpetuate their interests, to delay the execution of reforms which could not be rejected, to exert pressures on those segments of the society which threatened their power, etc. These actions were not systematically pursued in a calculating manner at a conscious level. Yet they took place. Several illustrations serve to make the patterns more explicit.

The foreigners recruited and trained natives to serve as administrative assistants. Because they were close to the seat of ultimate power, they were in a strategic position to influence policies. Native interpreters, for example, controlled most of the channels of communication between the foreigners and the natives. They became not merely translators but experts in knowing what to say to the foreigners to elicit favorable responses, arbitrators of which questions were worthy of the attention of the government, explainers to the natives of the foreigners' intentions. Natives expected interpreters not to convey precisely what was told them but to offer advice on what tactics to pursue and to design the right formulae to bring success. The manning of these crucial roles was, therefore, of the utmost importance. The leading clans of the meteet class early perceived the advisability of placing some of the ablest members of their ingroup in these positions. Buttressed by the belief that a low-ranking person could not function easily in roles which required such prominence in Palau, the competent young members of the elite gravitated into the foreign service. Still the meteet were not fully protected for some of these young men were captivated by the foreigners and began to place their allegiances to the "modernization" of Palau even above their own clan interests. Various corrective remedies were attempted. In the German period, for example, one individual who proved too informative to the foreigners was killed. But this traditional technique of handling extreme deviants carried with it the threat of counter-action from the foreigners. Other pressures of a more subtle but convincing nature were subsequently applied. These ranged from conferences with the

civil servants to exercising indirect influence through negative sanctions affecting the individual's prestige. A civil servant invited in to advise a district chief is performing a highly honored role according to traditional Palau custom. Yet lacking the prescribed right to argue with chiefs, the individual is compromised for the agreement reached in such conferences is binding. Only the most skilled native politicians have been able to maneuver these situations to enhance their own interests. But because the control the meteet class can exercise is imperfect, they are, at times, deeply anxious over the hidden motives of the men who work for the government. The civil servants are not a highly cohesive group with a single set of loyalties. This, too, has helped limit their collective power. But perhaps most important of all, the civil servants contain but few who would like to change the meteet system; the majority lean toward the development of an educated, modern-oriented meteet.

The diffusion of foreign goods and money threatened to disturb the customary concentration of wealth and the differential levels of living. While the meteet, along with all other sections of society, were pleased to have access to additional money and implements, they were unwilling to have these bring to an end the prestige growing out of their greater possession of valued objects. The initial reaction was an attempt to forbid commoners to use foreign incomes to secure certain items. Commoners caught using umbrellas or wearing selected types of garments were fined. The resistance to the spread of foreign items eventually ended. The meteet shifted their efforts to extracting as much of the foreign monies as possible from those who secured them. The traditional Palau customs of gift-exchange and related patterns were converted by a series of inventions and adaptations into enterprises for obtaining sizable sums. The groups who have had access to foreign currency have managed from time to time to win minor reforms restricting this extraction process but even these lesser reforms have been undermined by extremely ingenious techniques. The young, foreign-oriented men of Palau today are especially resentful of the system. Despite the discontentments, the meteet have thus far succeeded in maintaining their economic ascendancy.

A special problem in control appeared with the rise of a new wealthy class of business men. While there have been men of wealth without rank in the past, their numbers were small and their prestige modest. The members of the new business class are more numerous and have some standing due to their close ties with the foreigners, which appeals to the younger generation, and to their wealth, which attracts the older. Their economic success has been accompanied by a slight rise in their political fortunes. In many districts they are now invited into the community councils. In these, however, they usually speak only when specifically invited to

by the meteet. The business group has developed some solidarity but so far it has not been used for political purposes. They tend to accept the existing system; some are endeavoring to use their wealth to acquire titles (which has occurred in the past although not usually admitted). Many have private sympathies for selective reforms, yet they outwardly submit to the meteet and support them in all major affairs.

The introduction of foreign schools has provided an orientation to youth which holds up foreign models of life rather than native ones. Spearheaded by the school teachers, this section of the population has increasingly favored changes in Palau--many of which would undermine the ruling classes. The reorganization of the men's societies in the Japanese period also contributed to this state of mind. The young men's societies carrying the foreigner's flag were collectively guided into embracing ethics of the outside world. Despite their criticisms of the status quo, these groups of educated young men have not yet emerged as a dominant political force. They submit to the pressures of their superiors. Their right to attend or speak at high policy meetings is not recognized and, in most communities, they complain in private and acquiesce in public. The meteet are not alarmed but they are uneasy.

Democratic processes and theories, introduced since 1945, brought a new dimension into Palau politics. The younger generation, for example, stressed the theme of liberty which was interpreted by them to mean the right to do what they pleased. The elite countered with the argument that this could not be the meaning of liberty for surely the victorious foreigners in the recent war displayed group discipline. The inauguration of the scheme for the popular election of chiefs made the latter slightly more public-relations minded in dealing with the rest of the native population but did not cause any immediate shift in power. Most of the hereditary chiefs were elected. But there has intruded into the thoughts of some circles the possibility of electing some one more competent from the groups supposed to provide the chief--possibly from the male rather than the regular female line or even from another branch of the extended family. A few unusual events of this sort have already happened and may become more common in the future. The meteet are not entirely united in their view on this subject for they see in this development different opportunities for climbing or descending the socio-political ladder. There is little anxiety that these processes will get out of hand and the common people try to take over themselves--even the commoners would regard this as inconceivable in the present. Though the elite have less formal control in many spheres, they continue to serve as the pivotal power in Palau.

Political Alliances

There are a number of formal political federations (renged) in Palau. These may be classified on the basis of six principles: (1) the nature of the affiliated groups, (2) the scope of the alliances, (3) the degree of subordination--superordination, (4) the activities of the confederation, (5) the rights and duties of the member groups, and (6) the duration of the bonds.

(1) The nature of affiliated groups include: a series of villages within a district, two villages in different districts, a village in one district with another district, two districts, and a series of districts. Most social units have some alliances, but they differ substantially in the extent of the affiliations; some villages and districts prefer to remain as aloof as possible and accept only those alliances which are indispensable for survival or social propriety, whereas others eagerly seek to maximize their attachments in order to expand their influence and prestige. (2) the scope of the alliances include: a series of villages occupying the same area or adjacent ones, a group of villages scattered over a district which are united not on the basis of geographic contiguity and may exclude some of the villages in the same locality, a series of districts and certain villages confined to a common region, and a variety of districts and villages located in different areas of Palau. (3) The degree of subordination include: a district subordinate to a village in another district but not to the second district as a whole, a village subordinate to another district than the one in which it is located, a district subordinate to another district or to several districts which may or may not be affiliated, a district divided into two halves and each half is under districts which are rivals, and a village subordinate to one or more villages within its own district. A double system of subordination consists of a village under a village or district which in turn is under a third district. There are also confederations in which a coordinate relationship exists between two or more villages or several districts. Finally, there are several cases in which a main or "mother" village dominates all villages within the district and in some instances outside villages or districts. (4) The primary activities of the confederations are of several types: mutual aid in which member groups assist one another when there are local shortages in resources or manpower; political cooperation for the purpose of working toward greater prestige and dominance in Palau and thwarting rivals with similar aspirations; social affairs wherein the associated groups jointly participate in various ceremonies and celebrations; and prior to foreign control, military expeditions to wage war against a powerful enemy. (5) The rights and duties subdivide into reciprocal ones which provide for an itemized series of privileges and obligations

and non-reciprocal ones whereby the superior has special rights and the inferior has special duties. In the latter instance, the pattern may have been set by the terms ending an ancient war,³ the migration of a group from their ancestral village or district to another locality, or belief in a mythology of a common origin.⁴ (6) The duration of bonds include: federations which have continued unbroken throughout the entire known history, intermittent ones which have been broken on occasions but the tie was re-established again, and infrequent alliances designed to achieve a particular end and were then terminated. Some groups are traditional friends or legendary relatives and in any emergency will unite whereas others are mutually hostile or strong rivals and will work together only in a major emergency or where self-interest clearly dictates an alliance of convenience. Temporary alliances have been contracted for the time required to perform a particular task. A district confronted by a subordinate village or district which was failing to meet its obligations or threatening to withdraw from the relationship would contract with an outside district (which might be an enemy one) to discipline the unruly group. During the period of the conflict, the districts bound by the contract would become temporary allies and after the settlement, their traditional relationships would be restored. In return for the services performed a payment would be made or an obligation to render a comparable service in the future established. By this process the traditional allies who were in dispute avoided direct conflict, and the intervening agent was not held morally accountable, for it was merely a hired intermediary. Temporary alliances have been created when one community has been forced to live for a period in the jurisdiction of another due to a shortage of food and water in the former or as refuge during a war. In World War II this practice was common for so many villages were forced to relocate. In accord with ancient custom, the visiting village pays a fee at the end of the stay.

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- 3 For example, Koror defeated Angaur and thereafter had the right to enter any Angaur home for a night's hospitality, to walk into any village without securing in advance permission from its rubak, and none of its citizens had to bow down to an Angaur elite. These rights are no longer used.
 - 4 Four districts claim descent from a common mhas: relationships of older-younger brother and sister-brother exist and the older district advises the younger, the younger never opposes the older, and the brothers come to the aid of the sisters without extracting any reward for their efforts.

While specific political allignments have changed since the coming of the foreigner, the principle has not. During the course of the past forty years many social units have shifted their affiliations and redefined their relationships. This process is still underway and underlies some of the recent disputes between localities. The issues have not been primarily over the advisability of preserving or liquidating these political bonds, but rather over the adjustment of the relative rights and duties involved between groups in the modern era.

The most conspicuous and most controversial confederation is the bitaliang which divides the districts of Palau into two competing groups which are headed by the paramount chiefs of Melekiok and Koror. These two chiefs currently hold the most prominent positions in Palau:⁵ in some respects, they have more power than the remaining eighty four heads of districts and villages, yet in other ways their authority is the most tenuous of all. Their authority stems more from the actions of the foreigners than by right of native law. When the foreigners first came to Palau, a division between the east and west districts already existed. With the assistance of the foreigners, Koror subordinated the district of Ngeremlungui which was a rival and former head of the western confederation, annexed several districts from the eastern confederation, forced other districts within its own confederation to completely accept their dominance, and defeated Melekiok in war. Melekiok survived as head of a more limited competing confederation. Despite these smashing victories Koror still possessed only limited control over the rest of the districts within its confederation, and its military dominance was viewed as a temporary condition. During the German era, the chiefs of Melekiok and Koror were used to communicate orders to their "jurisdictions" as a matter of administrative convenience for the foreigners in the transmission of information, but not as legal heads of sovereign states. The Japanese continued and extended this practice and gave to the two district chiefs the honorific headship of the confederations while at the same time re-districting their authority to initiate actions on their own. The Americans initially assumed that the two confederation heads had undisputed title to govern and instructed the two chiefs to create a full native self-government. Thus the two confederations have evolved from a temporary and loose combination of districts with a limited headship into a permanent and presumably united confederation with an

5 The headship carries no title of office. Hence the bitaliang heads go by their district title.

unlimited headship. The reaction to these developments have been mixed. Some districts now accept the orders of confederation heads only if they are represented as the explicit directives of the foreigners who are using the confederation chiefs as their intermediaries. Others accept the prevailing system as the political reality created by the foreigners and submit to all of the orders of the "high" chiefs. It is premature to forecast how much authority bitalianged heads will hold in the future. They dominate the three political bodies recently created to deal with interdistrict affairs. Confederation klobak⁶ consist of the senior rubak and assistant chiefs of the districts who meet for the consideration of their own group's affairs and to discuss Palau matters as a whole. They are controlled by the Melekiok and Koror chiefs, and their sessions are known as "so be it" (uasie) meetings. For a short period, a Palau Government, was organized. Its membership consisted of the two bitalianged heads, prominent native civil servants, and a few others directly related or dependent on the two paramount chiefs. This instrumentality no longer exists. The Palau Congress is composed of elected district representatives without titles and serves as a advisory body to the foreigners. It too is controlled indirectly by the high chiefs and delegates who have presumed to speak out without prior approval have been reprimanded.

The two confederation heads are united in the preservation and extension of their power, still they are divided on many other issues. They work together in facing the foreigners and district chiefs who question their power. But neither one dares fully trust the other. The Koror chief is eager to push modernization, and the Melekiok chief wishes to retain native customs. Each watches the other's maneuvers as a check on political adventures which might change the existing balance of power. The inner circle of the Melekiok side has privately considered a political gamble which might catapult their head into a headship for Palau as a whole. But after some exploration of the prospects they abandoned it; it seemed likely that the Koror federated district would be able to block the move. They are confident that with their superior political skills, and more energetic political activities, they can at least hold their own against Koror. Their Achilles heel lies in the problem of controlling the subordinate districts and dissident young men: some of the former assert their political independence, and the latter are attracted more by what Koror stands for than Melekiok. Koror is more self-confident of its ability to remain on top.

6 Sometimes also called rubekul a bitalianged

Although war has been eliminated as a means for the establishment and termination of intergroup federations, other functionally equivalent methods are available. Political maneuvers to prepare the way for new arrangements are quite common. So, too, there are a continuing series of informal discussions, formal negotiations, and contractual agreements. Foreigners, sometimes unwittingly, have affected these relationships. The early traders, missionaries, as well as administrative and military officials, and even scientists have changed the balance of power between districts. The main means by which this has been achieved may be briefly listed: (1) acquiring and monopolizing as far as possible the facilities provided by the foreigner so that the advantaged district increases its bargaining power in relationship to other localities. During the early years of cultural contact, districts vied to have the traders locate and engage in business exclusively in their area. Successful districts thereby gained access to weapons which materially strengthened their military power and appreciably altered the patterns of superordination-subordination. They also secured implements which were sold at a handsome profit elsewhere--which in combination with war indemnities demanded from the defeated, changed the distribution of wealth in Palau. In more recent years, the location of foreign business enterprises, colonists, military installations and public utilities has had a marked effect on the social strength of districts in relationship to each other. Advantaged localities have been in a position to attract allies and gain special concessions from other communities in return for a chance to share the opportunities available, etc. (2) securing decisions or statements from the foreigners which could be used for political ends. Ancestral traditions, problems and controversies are presented to the foreigners so as to elicit from them regulations which in effect alter established agreements and accrue to the benefit of a particular combination of villages. Foreigners seeking to restore "indigenous customs" have been guided into "re-establishing" patterns which in some instances never existed or in different form. Powerful districts protect their interests by retaining control over natives who work for the foreigners and preventing outsiders from assuming crucial offices in the government. The personal opinions and sometimes the alleged decisions of the foreigners are circulated when useful to support one or another group. New laws are interpreted in a manner to accomplish purposes not inherent in the order but which lend themselves to such usage. Even the questions asked by investigators and the nature of the subjects they display an interest in, have been exploited by opportunistic groups to support particular positions. The involvement of individual foreigners through friendship, marital, or other ties such as the awarding of titles, bestowing of special gifts and displaying extreme hospitality and flattery have been used successfully. The conducted

tours of high-ranking visitors who are exposed to a selected group of natives and information has proved rewarding. (3) using the models and theories of the foreigners as sanctions and precedents for political actions. The presence of foreigners in a locality has been used to advance its prestige. The constitutional systems of the governing nation are pointed to in advocating new political arrangements. Foreign mores on lines of authority, legal contracts, levels of administration, and patterns of jurisdiction, discipline, etc. provide ideological weapons.

The personal allegiance of the individual is not confined exclusively to the village and district in which he was born and reared or even the one in which he resides during his adult years. One is not expected to maintain a lifetime loyalty to a particular unit, and to change allegiances is not regarded as a treasonable act. Self-interest determines the choice of a person's attachments. This grows, in part, out of the fact that an individual may inherit an office in a village or district which is a rival to the locality in which he resides. Residence is patrilocal and inheritance is matrilineal (in principle--see kinship) and hence the person moves from the community of his father to that of his mother's clan upon the assumption of office. Successive inheritances may move a man over several districts and he is loyal to each one in turn, choosing calculatingly one which offers him the most benefits. His wife is often from a different district and so his children may exhibit loyalty to a place other than his own. There are instances of fathers and sons holding offices in hostile districts and being, officially, political enemies. Special regulations enable such cases to avoid open and direct conflict. Kubary presents what appears to be a paradox to one oriented to Western norms of political loyalty. At the time of his stay in Palau, the chief of Koror was a native of Melekiok, and the chief of Melekiok was raised in Ngeremlungui, an ally of Koror and an enemy, in that period, of Melekiok. Both chiefs were fighting the districts in which they had been born and raised. The same pattern prevails today in several districts.

Not unknown is the use of outsiders to strengthen one's internal position. In the past a chief would intrigue with the enemies of his district to attack it in order to discredit his political enemies. The same maneuver is used today; competing interests within a district turn to a rival group and induce it to make some decision which will embarrass or undermine the opposition. In such instances, the entire matter is kept as secret as possible for it may boomerang on the instigator if it can be proved that he had been working with rival districts.

The same individual may hold titles in several communities even though they belong to rival federations.

Cases also occur in which a person has titles in two villages which are linked in a subordinate-superordinate relationship. In such instances, the individual is free to choose which of the loyalties he will adhere to and, if he so desires, he may change from one to the other permanently or assume the obligations of each when within its jurisdiction. Women's loyalties are more fixed than those of men for their security lies with their talungalak (see kinship) and while they reside in their husband's village they do not identify their interest exclusively with it. The political elite have much to gain by the preservation of these group identities through the local offices they hold and endeavor to inculcate political patriotism among the lower classes. The latter, today, perceive little self-advantage in such sentiment.

Informal alliances within or outside of the formal structures are common. There are numerous cliques within districts, classes, and other organized groups. Fewer in number, but growing in influence, are alliances between men drawn from all over Palau. This discussion will focus on the latter type. They are not formally organized as political parties but rather are coalitions of men who wish to promote a policy or/ and their personal interests. Some operate in the shadows: their meetings are private sessions restricted to the inner circle and their decisions are not fully disclosed to outsiders. Others are open to anyone who shares the same outlook and their aims are freely announced. In either case the members are morally bound to support one another and to foster the goals of the group. They often are temporary alliances which sometimes bring together clashing personalities who submerge their differences in the interest of a common end. The invitation to join such a group presents a dilemma to a political figure. Even though he disapproves of its avowed objectives, he ordinarily cannot bluntly reject it without running the risk of becoming known as an opponent. Though he may approve of its purposes, he may be anxious to avoid being too closely identified with its expressed ends. The choice in such instances may become one of finding a plausible reason for not participating or of joining and indirectly subverting its efforts. Some individuals have been members of two factions which were working at cross purposes--each clique, if aware of the dual loyalty, is informed in confidence that the person is really on its side and that he is a member of the other side only to try to influence it to change over. Four current coalitions may be used to illustrate their nature.

(1) Perhaps the most powerful clique in Palau consists of a group of about twenty men which formed originally in the German era and reached its maximum control in the latter part of the Japanese period. It still functions today with one of the original leaders, although some of its members have died off or dropped out and others have been added. This group avoids any signs of its existence as an

organized force. All of its members are from the meteet class and most of them have worked as civil servants for the foreigners. Several are advisors to the heads of the two bitaliang chiefs. They have worked together for three central goals, the protection of the meteet class, the softening of the actions of the foreigners, and the gradual modernization of selected features of Palau. Among their earlier actions was the exposure of inner workings of the nativistic movement--a movement which had as one of its ends the reversal of social trends in Palau. To strengthen the meteet over against paramount chiefs, a series of ancestral doctrines on the duties of the chief have been revived and fostered. Projected reforms which would undercut the elite have been modified or thwarted. They were instrumental in the Japanese period in "coordinating" the decisions of the foreigners and chiefs so that a number of social reforms were instituted. In the present period, the group has had a decisive influence on the formation and operations of the recent Palau Government. Its political sophistication may be perceived in one strategem. The leaders quietly withdrew from their prominent posts and allowed the leadership to be taken over by men of opposite viewpoints on the premise that the latter would be unable to perform their functions and would have to assume blame for policies which were unpopular in many circles in Palau. Once the opposition is discredited and realizes its inability to achieve its aims, they will be ready to assume office once more and move toward their ends without strong opposition. One of the group's minor tasks has been the "training" of the future senior title holders through inclusion of them in their inner circle.

(2) A rival clique is now more powerful than the above one. It formed after World War II and is oriented to a restoration of Palau customs where possible and the strengthening of the power of paramount chiefs. The head of this coalition is a personal and intra-clan rival of the present leader of the first group. He comes from the matrilineal line whereas the rival represents the patrilineal line of the same clan. After the surrender, the leader propositioned several men to join him in capturing power so as to prevent the above clique from regaining their pre-war control. They have managed to secure a number of key offices and have established working coalitions with those in various districts who share their opinions and interests. Until recently they were in close alliance with the present leaders of the nativistic movement.

(3) This group consists mainly of young "intellectuals" who have focused their attention on securing major changes in Palau customs. None of its members are title holders, although some come from high-ranking clans and few aspire to hold power. They are articulate over their values

and do not disguise their aims. Known as strong advocates of reform and lacking in political skill, they have had more influence on the opinions of the younger generation than effect on decisions made. The group has proved useful to the first clique in the diffusion of proposals throughout Palau and as a gauge to ascertain the reactions of the foreigners and the chiefs to various plans.

(4) The business men are united in their efforts to secure a more advantaged status in Palau and additional aid from the foreigners. They take no active part in issues not directly related to their own practical interests. In general, they are mildly sympathetic to limited reforms and in tactics, they prefer to act cautiously as an informal pressure group working with all groups who will promote their goals. While some have titles, many are not of the meteet class and few have any desire to hold office. Even though many are business rivals, they work amicably together for their common interests.

Political Roles

Paramount chiefs, i.e., the senior-ranking rubak, are the symbolic personification of power. They are in theory the formal heads of all institutionalized groupings, the official leaders of social activities, and the ultimate arbitrators of political issues. Their activities in reality are limited in scope and their authority is circumscribed. (see district and village) There is no role in Palau which has fluctuated more than that of paramount chiefs. It is a revealing paradox to note that at the present time some paramount chiefs wield more power than that exercised at any previous time since the coming of the foreigners, and yet they feel more insecure than in the recent past.

The role of several paramount district chiefs changed from a symbolic to a functional one with the onset of foreign control. The incoming governments assumed that the senior-ranking heads of political divisions possessed the legitimate right to freely exercise the theoretical prerogatives of their office. Ambitious chiefs made no known effort to convince the governors that they had misconstrued their position in the political structure, and where possible took advantage of the opportunity to enhance their status. The switch from a circular to a linear system of authority, outlined in a previous section, further contributed to the enlargement of their personal power. (see district) But while the Japanese strengthened the authority of chiefs in relationship to those below them, they subjected chiefs to increasing control from above. By the end of the Japanese era, district paramount chiefs had been converted into a new type of symbolic figure; in theory, they were the political heads of their districts; in reality, they

could act on no major concern without the approval of the local Japanese official. The American scheme of introducing indirect rule based on the "traditional" pattern has revived the functional role of chiefs and even enabled some chiefs to obtain more authority than heretofore known. The additional American introduction of election to office may bring about ultimately a redistribution of power within the ruling class. There are influential sections of the population who favor the selection of future paramount chiefs from any branch in the senior-ranking keblil and a smaller group who would like to choose anyone available from the meteet class.

The social prestige of paramount chiefs has fallen, especially among the young and foreign-oriented. They are blamed for delaying reform, accused of concerning themselves with consolidating their own power, and charged with being incompetent to deal with modern problems. Those without formal training in the Japanese schools are said to be unprepared to handle the needs of modern administration, and those with Japanese educations are held to act in accord with the Japanese manner of administration rather than the American style. Compromisers are accused of going on one side and then the other in accordance to their immediate advantage. "We esteem meteet as born leaders. But we feel uneasy; they make us into tools of their own private business--this we do not want. They lead us into the dark and the light, and we are uneasy over the mixture." These complaints, like all other criticisms of men with power, are voiced in private and but seldom in public. The paramount chiefs are aware of the gossip and are not indifferent to it. They respond in several different ways: some react strongly to anyone apprehended engaging in such discussions--reprimanding them for their conduct, exerting pressure on their families and immediate superiors to correct their thinking, and threatening various sanctions for any additional instance of their agitation. Others ignore the critics by refusing to listen to their comments, rejecting any of their proposals for social change, and pointing out that they have no right under Palau customs to concern themselves with high policy questions. A third group of chiefs listen sympathetically to the complaints, and argue that reforms must proceed slowly, and point out that they cannot change unless other localities of equal or higher rank do the same, and that is not likely. "Why confuse things --yes there are bad customs, but why not accept them as part of life," To the common man who looks up the political ladder the chiefs appear to be a secure and contented group. At closer range, the paramount chiefs exhibit the anxieties and internal cleavages common to men of power in a changing society.

The ruling class includes, in addition to the paramount chiefs, a collectivity of other high-ranking, influential persons. The average district contains forty-five

active male title holders who function as rubak at the district or village level, with a range of from 10 to 62 between localities. To this number must be added an equivalent group of female heads (rubak-l-dil). Also to be included, in terms of power, are ex-senior-ranking title holders who voluntarily relinquished or involuntarily resigned their office,⁷ direct heirs to titles who stand high in the line of succession and potential title holders (who might obtain one through a political deal, a shift in the line from the female to the male side, or through "appointment" by the foreigners in collaboration with the chiefs of the bitalianged and the civil servants).

The interaction amongst the members of the ruling class runs the gamut from organized rivalry and hostility to close cooperation and personal friendship. Within each district a different constellation appears, growing out of historic events, local traditions, current relationships, and interests. Customarily, districts were formally subdivided into several organized groups. For example, Melekiok subdivides its rubak into four groups: the first group is headed by the paramount chief and has, in addition, rubak with the ranks 5, 9, 12, and 22; the second group is led by the third rubak and contains 6, 10, 14, 17, and 21; the third group is under the second rubak with 7, 8, 13, 16, and 18 titles; and the fourth group is under the fourth rubak with 11, 15, 19, and 20 titles. In a klobak meeting two lines intersect these four groups: the "allies" (kausechelei) bisects the groups into two halves with groups one and three united and two and four united; the "rivals" (kaucheraro) divides the groups with one in opposition to three and two in opposition to four.

Theoretically, one and two belong together while three and four are united. But a quarrel amongst the senior keblil of Melekiok brought about the change. For most districts in Palau, the traditional combination still holds. These divisions were symbolically stated in relationship to building of club houses; allies worked on different ends of the abai and so were friends, whereas rivals worked on opposite sides of the same end and so got in each other's way. Club house building is no longer done in this way, but the pattern continues in other public enterprises and is evident in social conflicts. The societies of younger and common men ally themselves under these groupings. (see societies). Titled women (rubak-l-dil) also use this system.

While there is a rank order of rubak which officially designates the status position of each, the personality of

7 A third of the districts have ex-paramount district chiefs.

individuals affects their roles in public life. Thus aged rubak who were raised before the coming of foreign schools or those who by temperament have no strong urge to dominate may follow the suggestions of those with positive opinions about current issues in the modern era. This requires a delicate adjustment for no rubak will risk losing "face" as being a mere follower and not a leader. Astute political operators perceive this and have worked out the means for preserving the "face" of the rubak while inconspicuously guiding them toward their desired ends. The less politically perceptive among the younger generation have failed to grasp this facet of rubak character: they make numerous suggestions in the open to the rubak who usually ignore or rebuff them. Even a low-ranking rubak who now possess little power, tenaciously clings to the perogatives of his office. Collectively, they would prefer to see a shift in the balance of power in which the paramount chiefs were reduced in authority and theirs restored.

Every complex society contains "middlemen" who engage formally or behind the scenes in the process of arranging the collective activities of its members. In a society characterized by many contractual relationships, many semi-autonomous groups, an elaborate code of negotiating procedures, and a high rate of social mobility there is need for the services of many experts. They work out practical schemes for handling political arrangements, especially those involving complex social adjustments. Palau's arrangers (armengululau) display mastery of their role. They are adept in the manipulation of social symbols, ingenious in the designing of novel tactics, and sophisticated in the formulation of pragmatic compromises. Numerous even before the coming of the foreigners, acculturation has increased their numbers and enlarged the scope of their functions. The tight control exercised by the elite over this activity is still preserved, but now additional elements have been added to the profession. Ambitious men with wealth, education, and foreign contacts have joined the group. Some are controversial figures for they are below the proper age and social status, and therefore are not eligible under traditional customs to perform tasks which may involve matters of high policy.[§] Moreover, some are unfamiliar or indifferent to the ancestral codes of the political negotiator: they sometimes openly and aggressively express their views in the presence of the higher ranks, without waiting an invitation to speak, exhibit impatience with

§ No one from the lowest social ranks has been able to break into the inner circle of influential politicians, although several have tried. One who is a Japanese graduate of a college has held key posts in the foreign civil service but after many frustrations, he has decided to abandon his public career and retire to farming.

prolonged discussions, prefer direct actions to involved compromises, invoke foreign customs to support their arguments, and in general their actions are not always predictable. They worry and occasionally embarrass the more traditional type of politician.

The idealized qualities common to the most distinguished and influential arrangers are as follows: They are members of the upper class, well advanced in age, have a high level of intelligence, and have demonstrated competence in both personal and public undertakings. They have a reputation for integrity and/or craftiness, are soft spoken, often silent, and when asked their views, express them succinctly and in such a persuasive manner that others are readily convinced. Like a fisherman who uses the right bait at the right time and place, they use the most effective appeals at the appropriate moment with the crucial groups involved. They are well-informed on precedent and contemporary affairs. They are adaptable and work with any one who has authority. Discrimination is exercised in the selection of individuals with whom they discuss public issues, and often they refrain from freely expressing their own preferences. They exhibit a pleasant demeanor and frequently smile and never grow outwardly angry. A false tale can be related and appear to be true because of the sincerity with which it is told and the convincing plausibility it conveys. Their actions seem to be motivated primarily by a genuine interest in the well-being of the group, and Palau as a whole if possible, rather than the enhancement of their own glory or power. They respectfully defer to those above in rank and are sympathetically friendly to those below. When they agitate for change, the proposed innovations are within the limits of tolerated cultural variations and within the pre-existing political framework. They do not propose reforms which would undermine the power structure or attack the basic social systems. They rarely resort to crude techniques of persuasion, such as threats or coercion, but prefer to rely on more subtle maneuvers,--the manipulation of anxieties and aspirations, flattery and gifts to win good will, instituting cross pressures to prevent unwanted decisions etc. These are the ideal attributes and seldom are all found in the same individual. A slightly new set of traits are exhibited by those who have assumed this role in recent years. They combine a high rank in the native hierarchy (from either the female or male lines), some support from the foreigners and a mixture of traditional and contemporary political techniques. Since the Japanese era, men in their late thirties have participated in this activity because their foreign training and intimate contact with the foreigners have made them experts in certain affairs. But they have found it more practical to work in the shadows and to use some prominent and more traditional figure as their spokesman. The ancestral pattern of soft spokenness underwent modifica-

tion in the Japanese years when a harsher manner of speech seemed to be one of the symbols of foreign strength. With the coming of the American, the soft-spoken politician has come back into style. Similarly, the earlier ceremonial mark of status was to be first and to be served. Now it is a sign of status to others, such as lighting the cigarettes of inferiors. defer to.

The growth in the complexity of the issues, accompanied by the rise of new interest groups and divergent practice has made the role of the negotiator a more difficult one. While it is legitimate to simulate favoring the opposite sides of the same question as one works from one group to another, (a tactic known as tuluchoid), it is harder to maintain a reputation for integrity and neutrality when the issues are openly joined rather than privately negotiated. The making of decisions is thus a more involved process and agreements are more difficult to achieve. Though there are many who aspire to the function of political arranger, only a few have been successful in the performance of the role. There are probably no more than two dozen men who combine the qualities needed for this activity. Though few in numbers they wield great influence in Palau. Their present importance lies less in their role as middlemen in working out the more traditional types of social arrangements and more on their influence exerted on decisions involving basic policies. Personal advisors to those in high office are in a strategic position to influence the making of decisions. Unlike most other roles, advisors are expected and are free to argue with their chiefs, to warn them of the consequences of their actions, to suggest alternative courses which might be pursued, and to provide the necessary information required for the formation of policy. Conferences occur continuously between the senior-ranking officials and their consultants. The content of the conferences are seldom divulged to the outside world for they are deemed closed meetings of the inner circle. Advisors officially work in the shadows.⁹ The fact that they are acting as advisors is generally well known. People seek them out for aid in support of their interests and for advice on their own problems. An advisor is free to raise objections and to propose new schemes, but once a decision is made he is expected to be bound by it; any opposition to the program expressed by him thereafter is regarded as a serious case of

9 One important district chief has worked out an arrangement with an individual whose judgment he trusts but whose position he does not wish to compromise by making him into an official advisor. When there is an important problem the two meet late at night in a special spot for a free discussion of the question.

disloyalty. The advisory group to paramount chiefs usually includes the next in line for the title, close relatives holding important positions in the foreign and native governments, high-ranking title holders, administrative assistants, outstanding personages renowned for their abilities and knowledge, and even representatives of rival factions within the keblil, the village, and the district. These last are relied upon to help work out a common program which will assure inner unity in facing other native groups or the foreigners. It is also a means of committing the rivals to policies decided upon so that they are unable to subsequently attack them. This constellation of advisors is not always a stable, cohesive ingroup. Its members serve only as long as they are invited to do so. A chief who shifts his political position may at the same time discard his prior advisors. Thus when a hitadanged chief altered his basic policy from pro- to anti-modekngei, the leaders of the nativistic movement who were once in the inner circle were no longer asked to offer their advice. Other advisors have been dropped after their reputations have been tarnished and their shady dealings threatened the prestige of the chief. Still others have been apprehended using their office to advance their own interests in a disapproved manner or for engaging in counter intrigue designed to subvert the decisions made. Some individuals move in and out of the inner circle and have come to view their role as an opportunistic one to be used for what it is worth in relationship to their total set of values or their personal interest. An invitation to serve is not one that may be easily declined, and most men are eager to accept the honor and the chance to be close to the center of power.

Female political figures are less socially visible and less common than their male counterparts in the present era. They now tend to operate behind the political scenes rather than to hold public office, and their political activities are more accepted than admired. This decline in the power of women is correlated with the disintegration of their once potent societies, their limited voice in the formation of public policies, and their restricted opportunities for holding major offices. Most districts still retain some semblance of the traditional women's associations but they now exercise little control over their own members and have only nominal functions in public activities. Once there were women who acted as paramount chiefs of villages and districts, but this would not occur today. Women have no representation in any of the councils which discuss and decide on fundamental issues. No women have held any important positions in the foreign civil service or in any of the governmental organizations created by the foreigners. Their civil service positions as employees with the foreigners has been that of hospital aids, school teachers, and minor clerks. There are several underlying causes for

these conditions. The foreigners who ruled Palau were all men and came from more or less patriarchal societies where women do not play an active role as important public officials. They had no experience or interest in dealing with native women as public officials. The establishment of the dual economy diminished the economic importance of women and along with this their bargaining power in political affairs. While women continued to provide the subsistence through their work in the taro fields, men could now secure cash and some food from the foreigners. The shifting over to the male line in kinship, the loss of the right of the mhas to control the total wealth of the clan, the weakening of the talungalak meant that women were less dominant in crucial matters. In short, the political status of women declined following acculturation.

Despite these changes, some women still exercise much influence. These are in the upper class and either hold an important title or are in line for one. Some wives of men with power also are active in politics. They tend to concentrate on furthering the interests of their own clan and often will vie with the female title holder of their husband's kebliil. The latter under Palau custom has the right to advise the male head of their clan and to ask him to issue orders to the people on their behalf. A merreder whose wife comes from an ambitious or competing clan may find himself between two conflicting interest groups. An outstanding case of this now exists in Palau. One of the high chiefs is married to a young woman with a deep interest in politics. She is the sister of the paramount chief of one of the less powerful districts. She has dedicated herself to restoring the power of her clan and district. Prior to the present marriage, she was married to one of the leaders of a nativistic movement when it was ascendent. When the movement fell apart, she abandoned her husband for the current one. Her devotion to her clan's interest brings comments of approval in her home district, but the opposition within her husband's clan to her is strong.

Not all wives of elite persons play such an aggressive role. More common is the political activity of the senior titled women in the clan who are consulted by the male head prior to any major decision. A woman's political behavior is more restricted than in the past. She attempts to appear casual rather than dictatorial and relies more on the merreder to execute her wishes than on her right to give orders to all the women under her. Foreign-educated women have not entered into politics in the same way as the men with similar exposure, though some now express a marked desire to do so. They will be strongly resisted by the older chiefs who look upon them as a threat to the recently-won male dominance and who claim it would now be a violation of the "traditions" of Palau. Selective reinterpretation of

Palau's past is taking place. These same chiefs deny that there had ever been a female paramount chief in their districts in the past and maintain that women have never been present in the councils of Palau. While it is true that female chiefs used an intermediary male rather than attending the klobak meetings, they did have a powerful voice in decisions made. Mention is often made of the behavior of the last great female chiefs of some districts to prove their incapacity for public office. They were said to be weak of heart, lacking a will of their own and constantly seeking advice from everyone. Moreover, the moral behavior of one of them is frequently mentioned as proving that women's interests are not primarily in politics.

There are three influential roles in Palau society which from time to time are filled by individuals who possess the appropriate combination of personal qualities. These are the extraordinarily brave (pigou), the unusually wise (holimosk) and the charismatic spirit (representatives of the chalid). When individuals have emerged on the social scene who could win any one of these designations, they have wielded considerable influence.

Persons of unusual courage are feared and sometimes respected. They are said to lack one of the most salient characteristics of Palau personality--anxiety. This is exhibited by an indifference to the ordinary restrictions on conduct and the threats of punishment from those with greater power. There are two general types: pigou dengerenger and pigou melomes arngl. The former comprise individuals who are uninhibited in most social relationships, enjoy conflict for its own sake, and may strike out unpredictably at anyone who provokes them. The latter are more self-restrained, remain silent and smiling until there is "just cause" for aggressive action, and then discriminately select a legitimate target. Status distinction also subdivide the pigou. Upper class pigou were free to act in accordance with their character at any time whereas lower class pigou were cautioned to confine their militant tendencies to wartime. The termination of native warfare left the latter with no officially sanctioned area of activity but has not meant the end of the role. Meteet-class pigou "have a chair and can reach higher"--they receive a larger share of whatever is being divided within a group and in the years of native wars they secured a handsome portion of the indemnity extracted from the defeated opposition. The lower class pigou are advised not to be too ambitious and over-reach their true status: they may become an advisor to the elite and made merreder of their keblil even though not in direct line for the office. The accolade of pigou is not a formally assigned designation, but one which is won as a reputation growing out of critical test cases. Thus an individual who openly expressed his opinions on important questions to the chiefs and the foreigners and no one dared

stop him, because of the obvious truth of his comments, fished conspicuously in an area belonging to another district, and when World War II came showed little fear during the bombings was deemed truly pigou. There are many folktales of men who were pigou in the past. No one currently qualifies as truly pigou.¹⁰ The descendents of pigou are sometimes referred to as having inherited that quality, but this is said more in flattery than in expectation of its actual existence in the successive generations. Some of the present generation who have firmly expressed their opinions on important questions in open meetings and everyone knew that they were speaking the truth so that no one dared directly oppose them, are spoken of as having the pigou spirit-- but it is quickly added, they are not really pigou. To achieve the latter would require the courage to continue to boldly contravene the chiefs and the foreigners, even at the risk of one's life. Such a desire is manifest in varying degrees by many individuals from time to time, but no one by temperament or conviction is ready to play that role at this time. Hence there is no one who is pigou in Palau today.

Individuals distinguished by great wisdom are deeply respected and sought out for advice. One who is holimosk is not an expert in some specialized field of knowledge, but rather he has a grasp of every known subject combined with a high degree of demonstrated competency in all of the basic skills of Palau. "Holimosk know the condition of the sea and the land, of the ways of the rubak and the common man; they can tell when people lie and no one can deceive them; there is no topic to which they are strangers whether it be the behavior of men and their customs, economy and fishing or even the weather; they give orders which satisfies everyone and make decisions which seem just; they can work equally well with their heads or their hands." This quotation from a discussant of the role covers many of the ideal qualities of the holimosk. A few other items are usually added. The holimosk position, like the pigou is not an institutional office or a designation which is officially assigned to anyone. It is a role which an individual gradually assumes through winning a reputation for high intelligence, broad knowledge, and great ability. As a result others turn to such individuals for information and advice. They are of such superior quality that they feel no competitive urge to advance themselves beyond their ascribed status, and no one finds them a threat to their own aspirations. Holimosk are modest and unassuming by temperament, they are neither grasping for power nor demanding of glory. Their outstanding

¹⁰ As a term of ridicule pigou-a-ngerel is used for those who are "courageous with their mouth" and talk back to rubak.

aptitudes automatically win them high prestige. A kebliil will pass over other candidates to select a holimosk for its merreder, some have been given high titles for which they were not otherwise eligible, and many become the advisors to the meteet. Yet no one is supposed to express any resentment of their advancements for their work is deemed to be for the group's benefit. When they speak everyone else is silent and the spirit of their discussion is marked by freedom from partisanship, preoccupation with the truth, and the formulation of practical solutions to issues which would prove satisfactory to all interests. Whatever duty they undertake they perform well, and hence they may be called upon to perform the most crucial tasks involving the welfare of the whole group. Holimosk-l-dil are outstanding women who have comparable talents concerning all matters pertaining to the women's world. They arrange village affairs so that everything works smoothly, conduct an orderly household, raise better taro and outstanding children, tactfully correct their husband's mistakes, and when serving as mhas of a kebliil give sound advice. Only a person well advanced in age could secure this reputation, and the opportunity of displaying these qualities is greater among those in the higher classes. There is no living person today who is universally accepted as holimosk, although one individual comes close to it, and there are several younger persons who are said to have the potentialities. The former is a member of the meteet class who is past seventy years of age. He has invented many customs which added to the wealth and prestige of the elite, served as an advisor to the high chiefs on native affairs and on negotiations with the foreigners, is an expert in several Palau crafts, and has a brilliant mind. Still some say that he lacks the full spirit and well-rounded set of aptitudes to be truly holimosk. Two other members of his kebliil, the merreder and the mhas in the middle part of the Japanese era were accepted as holimosk and holimosk-l-dil even by those who stemmed from a rival branch of the same kebliil. One of the younger generation in this kebliil, it is agreed, has the possibilities, but he is yet too young and too involved in work with foreigners to acquire the experience essential for achieving this standing.

Persons endowed with charismatic qualities are feared and deferred to on special occasions. In the past, representatives of the chalid were fairly common; today they are rare and have difficulty winning acceptance. Formerly, they were the custodians of the social customs: they could outlaw (mugul) new practices which might violate sacred traditions and give sanction to selected innovations. Major political plans were submitted to them to ascertain the probability of success and social disasters were diagnosed by them to discover remedies. Rubak sought their advice on matters of high policy; a rubak who departed too far from the precepts of his ancestors could be removed from

office for his irreligious conduct disturbed relations with the supernatural and / or jeopardized the welfare of the group he governed. Ordinary persons also consulted with these functionaries prior to making important decisions. Now, native religious officials who claim charisma, are less powerful and more disputed figures. Some would restore the pre-existing order based on the ancestral gods which brings them in direct collision with those who regard the foreigner as the source of the ultimate sanctions. In this struggle for dominance, various charismatic leaders have won control for a period but have been unable to maintain it on any widespread scale for any length of time. The most renowned of these attempts is the modekngei movement.¹¹ It is now a minor group in Palau with several individuals competing for the position of the legitimate headship. Within their own groups, the leaders continue to exercise a strong influence. Outsiders, especially those closely identified with the foreigners, make every effort to thwart their plans and endeavor to prove that the actions of the leaders are motivated by personal profit rather than those of a truly charismatic person. While more difficult than in the past to gain acceptance, it is possible that in the future individuals will appear on the social scene who can convince the population of their supernatural qualities.

The most important new role which has appeared in Palau since the German era is that of native civil servants employed by the foreign government. At present there are about five hundred persons working for the foreign administration in one capacity or another. The vast majority of these laborers have no political influence. The most important functionaries are those who serve as interpreters, administrative assistants, constables, judges, advisors, labor recruiters, etc. About fifty individuals form this top layer of officials. Some have made government service their life-time occupation and have continued in office despite changes in the foreigners who control Palau. These individuals have become experts in activities indispensable for the conduct of the government. As previously noted, these persons have been drawn largely from the elite class of certain districts of Palau. There are comparatively few men in the "outlying" districts who now possess the needed training and experience to qualify for the available positions. Those who do have the required background also find affiliation with an important klebliil or personal sponsorship by a member of the ingroup exceedingly helpful for obtaining a

5 See: Economic and Human Resources
Yap and Palau, Western Carolines, U. S. Commercial
Company, 1949, Vol. I.

governmental post. The mores permit, but do not require, natives with such aspirations to offer a suitable gift to those in a position to further their candidacy. A few lower-ranking persons have entered the inner circle, but when they hold prominent offices which call for the issuance of orders to the rest of the population or for dealing with higher-ranking personages, they have encountered difficulties in executing their assignments. The senior-ranking clans attempt to place their more promising younger men in line for titles in this type of service as a means of preparing them for future roles of importance in the native government. This has become in part an acceptable substitute for the traditional practice of assigning such persons to the apprenticeship of heading the societies. (see societies) The work also enhances the prestige and power of the group they represent.

The role played by the public servant is twofold: he is an assistant to the foreigner and a representative of the native society. Each of these involve obligations. As an aid to the foreigner, the native is expected to be impartial and efficient. The official wishes to acquire a reputation with the foreigners for personal integrity and competency. The rewards for achieving this reputation are high: higher wages are paid ^{than} for most other types of work; there is the prospect of further advancements to positions of greater authority; it insures the opportunity of being intimately associated with those who are the cultural models for many and the ultimate source of power for everyone--the foreigners. As an agent of the society, the civil servant is expected to work for the welfare of the immediate groups of which he is a member and Palau as a whole. Personal relations rather than impersonal principles are supposed to govern his actions in dealing with natives. The rewards from the native society are less tangible but nevertheless real. It no longer is deemed entirely proper for a native civil servant to accept any outright gifts. He can, however, add to his prestige which in turn will increase his chances of successfully competing for a title in the future, as well as help advance the glory of his kebliil. The punishments meted out for infractions of the ^{role} ~~role~~ expectancies are far greater by the native society than ^{by} the foreign administrators. The former can permanently ruin his reputation through gossiping about his actions and the elite embarrass him and his whole family and bring intense pressures to bear upon him. The latter are free to dismiss him or exercise other penal sanctions which are painful experiences but not so devastating. The official thus faces at times a dilemma. Because he is personally held responsible by the natives for the policies he administers, he cannot excuse his conduct by declaring himself to be an impersonal agent merely carrying out orders. Nor can he openly justify to his superiors in the government that partisan decisions or modifications

of their rules are the practical necessities for the discharge of his assigned duties. Thus natives engaged in the enforcement of law and the administration of justice are confronted with two different sets of precepts. The administration wishes all violators apprehended and punished according to the nature of the offense while the society desires recognition for the status of the violator and differential treatment of offenders. Policemen and judges are continuously faced with the problem of reconciling these conflicting demands and devote considerable thought to working out acceptable compromises. In one instance, the judge was called upon to administer a fine against high-ranking natives caught in a state of drunkenness. He assessed the fine, and then invited the convicted individuals to his home for an informal drinking party and carefully apologized to the persons that he had to enforce the law even though he did not wish to do so in their case. Policemen try to settle cases outside of the legal framework in instances involving offenses not deemed real crimes by the society and devote considerable effort to working out explanations for their actions acceptable to their superiors, should these cases come to their attention. Occasionally, there have been foreign officials who have accepted native codes and have facilitated the process of finding a compromise.¹² More often, the natives have had to work out their own solution. Glaring failure to work out a satisfactory one has led to the dismissal of the official by the administration or the enforcement of social sanctions against the individual by members of the native society. Successful native public servants are characterized by ingenuity in finding the means of reconciling their dual roles.

Tenure of position is dependent on one's supporters. The good will of the foreign superior is essential. This requires an adaptable outward personality which can adjust to the wishes of successive officials. The person who rigidly adheres to one mode of action or beliefs regardless of the expressed desires of each new set of superiors cannot survive. The support of other native public servants and the native political elite is also indispensable. Failure to win this backing provokes strong indirect pressures on one's relatives. Moreover, it may lead to embarrassing situations in which the disapproved official is ignored by other public servants or

¹² One foreign officer had a remarkably successful record in this. High ranking offenders were given special consideration and in return for this were called upon to be especially loyal to the official who had intervened on their behalf. Thus a personal fealty system was established in which the forms were adhered to and the native mores not violated.

finds himself maneuvered into a compromising position which in the end may lead to his own withdrawal or discharge. The core of officials who have retained office for many years are highly adaptable in relationship to their superiors and sensitive to the climate of opinion of the society. A few officials have risked violating these prerequisites, but they carefully adhered outwardly to the forms in doing so. Thus natives anxious to secure ends not approved by the foreign rulers or the native elite have restructured orders and information. Some have done so to protect Palau interests and others to hasten desired social reform. These activities are generally done "in the shadows" and it is difficult to ascertain how often or how effective they have been.

The ladder of advancement and descent does not conform to Western definitions of a merit system. One of the most common starting positions in a governmental career has been that of constable. Nearly all of the top-ranking posts are now held by men who were once members of the police force. This is in part an accident of history for the policeman was one of the first types of major appointments opened by the foreigners to natives. It is possible that the clerk is now a similar type of starting position. Advancement, however, cannot be calculated on the basis of years of faithful service in a series^{or} of lower office which with progressive promotions ultimately leads to the highest posts. Successful service in a lower position does make one visible for being chosen to a more responsible duty and thus increases the chances.

An individual moving upward switches readily from one type of activity to an entirely different one: a policeman may become a teacher and an interpreter may end up a judge. The good will of the key foreign officials, the other native civil servants and the outside elite class are the ingredients of success. Descending the ladder has occurred, but it is more common for an individual to leave the service rather than to be demoted in office.

Within the civil service group there is personal competition and clique rivalries. Individuals who are becoming quite prominent are subject to the process of undercutting by their associates. The plans of a rapidly rising man may be rejected if it appears that their acceptance will enhance further his standing. If the plans he advances appear to be popular, the attempt may be made to share the credit for their authorship or to reject the scheme proposed and reintroduce it under another title. Beyond the personal rivalry for prestige, there are contrasting viewpoints on tactics and ends. One segment favors pressing for early reforms, while another prefers the delay of these changes for at least another generation. There are divided loyalties to particular districts and clans. These subgroups

in themselves contain individuals who are not in complete agreement. In relationship to outsiders they are united but within their own circle they seek to persuade one another to accept a particular opinion. Some individuals are not permanently attached to any faction and change their loyalties with altering circumstances or the relative power each group has at any given period. These divisions are not a post-war phenomenon, but go back to the early part of the Japanese era. A tradition has developed among the civil servants that their task is more than being the instrumentality of the foreigner or the agent of the native society. They conceive of their function as a crucial one in determining the future of Palau. The civil servant is a parvenu in the power structure. A previous section noted the anxiety felt by the meteet concerning them. They have also become the target for the discontentments of other sections of society.

The Making of Decisions

The decision process involves a complex series of social relations. No person possesses the legitimate authority to decide alone on high policy matters. A high-ranking title holder who independently announced a course of action without proper consultations and the consensus of those with the right to pass on issues, would not only violate the political mores but would be thwarted and undercut. If he persisted, he would stand in danger of losing his title. Even the most powerful chief makes the effort to appear as though he is following the prescribed routine in decision making. The rights and duties of the men who make decisions in various groups are outlined in other sections of this report. So, too, the organizations within which decisions are made are presented elsewhere. (see social systems). We are here concerned with how decisions are made.

The existence of cross pressures, invariably delays a decision or calls for a compromise one. Major policy decisions are made when the senior chief of a senior district has the support of those immediately around him (e.g. the senior rubak-l-dil, his successor, local advisors, and those working for the foreigners), the ex-chief and political rivals in the elite class, the high-ranking title holders, the klobak or rubekul, the head of the bitalianged, the meteet of other districts, and the foreigners.¹³ Opposition

¹³ In the words of the paramount chief of Koror: "I too once favored changing all customs. But as I see now, it cannot be done with one man's opinion. One must get the opinion of all the people."

from any of these sources will cause him to move cautiously. Decisions in lower-ranking districts on major matters usually await the leadership of the more prominent ones for it would be deemed unfortunate to be first and draw the criticism of others. Consideration also must be given to precedents from the past and prevailing sentiments in various social circles, to the social consequences for the future of the groups involved, to the immediate claims of the conflicting interests and their political strengths, to the feasibility of enforcement, to the appropriate timing of the decision with respect to the readiness of the population to accept the new order, etc. These items are discussed at length prior to the formulation of a new basic policy. The subject is submitted to the various consultative bodies and numerous conferences are held. Until some agreement can be reached on means and ends the matter is held in abeyance. Where no satisfactory answer can be found the subject may be deferred for future consideration. In the interim period those who have a major interest will bring various pressures to bear to advance their position. Social crises may precipitate an immediate decision but once the emergency is past, the question can be reopened for reconsideration. As a result, those with the authority to decide and those vitally concerned with the decisions are acutely aware of the issues involved and devote considerable time to them. In a society which concentrates the power of decision and is confronted by many issues, the formulation of high policy is a major enterprise. A technical distinction may be made between traditional and new types of social issues. There are areas of controversy which are inherent in the social order: conflicts between districts, villages, clans, and households have taken place throughout the known history of Palau. Social cleavages generated by status rivalries within the elite class and competitive struggles among societies have been common. Various combinations of groups fought other groups for control of titles, money, and land and for glory. Interpersonal quarrels and feuds were continuous. These controversies were routine patterns which were accepted as an integral part of Palau lifeways. No one expected a permanent settlement, and the mores regulated the conditions under which conflict took place. The new types of issues were generated by acculturation. Now there were divided viewpoints between those accustomed to the ancestral and those oriented to the foreign. The foreign segment subdivided into those with Japanese-inculcated habits and the nascent American-acting and splintered along other lines over tactics in promoting further changes. Changes in institutional systems transformed patterns into problems: the division of labor between the sexes, the relationship between the paramount chiefs and the rest of the metet class, the teachings of the schools versus the values upheld at home and in the societies, the exchange rates of Palau and foreign money, the accentuation in the use of Palau mutual

aid customs in contrast to rising demand for greater individual freedom from social obligations, the clash between the nativistic and modernistic movements, between district and bitalianged authority, etc. Unlike the traditional issues, these controversies are not accepted as "normal" and a "final" solution is sought for them.

The pattern of discussion calls forth from all factions declarations concerning the common welfare. Etiquette does not allow self-interest to be a sufficient rationale for favoring or opposing. Rather there is an appraisal couched in terms of various codes of ethics, supported by evidence in the form of personal or group sacrifice brought on by the existing conditions; evaluations are based on selected ancestral practices which are proffered as universal Palau customs, on models designed from the ideals of the foreigners, on doctrines deemed to be innate to the going social systems, and on freshly invented precepts conceived by the politically ingenious. No one is without a moral ground on which to stand, and everyone feels confident that a satisfactory answer can be reached. The politically astute concern themselves with tactics, the established vested interests rely on inertia to preserve their position, the discontented turn to the foreigner to serve as an external force to impose changes, and reformers press their programs directly and indirectly whenever the opportunity presents itself. On the surface, no one dares freely and openly declare his exact position. Even the most powerful senior-ranking men exercise caution.

The intensity of feelings differ perceptibly with the issues and between groups. Thus the division between the older and younger generations over Palau reciprocity customs generates more emotionality than the cleavage between the sexes over the rights and duties of spouses. There is as much genuine interest in one as in the other, but the younger generation are determined to win concessions while the women are resigned to their fate. Districts exhibit marked contrast in their level of interest: in four districts there is continuous discussion of "what to do", in three there is only a mild interest, and in the remainder there are intermittent periods of high and low interest. Cycles of concern are also evidenced. A new cycle may be set off by a foreigner's declaration or even expression of an opinion, by rumors of proposed or pending orders, by the concerted actions of a reform group, by the behavior of a meteet in some specific situation, or a crisis brought about by a clash between two individuals. The news rapidly spreads, and even those with low interest levels are alerted. Informal discussions and small meetings may be followed by attempts to induce the foreigners or the native leadership to make a new decision. Everyone becomes anxious and even the most powerful are conscious of the alerted state of public opinion. If no decision is forthcoming, the subject may

become latent for a period. The aftermath of a decision is an attempt to ascertain how it will be enforced.

Enforcing of Decisions

The enforcement of orders and regulations include a multiple system of controls. Every social group is to some degree responsible under native law for the actions of its members and the heads of groups are expected to enforce the established rules within their jurisdictions. Thus an entire family can be held collectively liable for the offense of any of its members. So, too, associations, villages, and districts are obliged to see to it that no violations occur. Those in charge of enforcement, try to be "realistic" in the discharge of this duty. Unpopular orders received from above will be transmitted with the subtle implication that obedience to it will not be rigorously enforced unless a case comes to the attention of the higher authorities. Orders may be modified in their interpretation so as to take into account local practices. Junior officials in some instances are alert to the prospects of using regulations for their own self-interest or for purposes for which the original rule was not intended; there are well known tactics by which this can be done so that the official may not be accused of subversion and yet enable him to accomplish his ends. Only in a few localities do high-ranking officials directly intervene in the administration at any level they wish. Administrative mores call for the observance of the established lines of authority. Heads of villages issue orders to heads of blai who in turn pass them on to the members of the household unless there is some special regulation which is promulgated by an assembly of the total population of a village, etc. Hence lower-ranking officials have some control on the orders which they are called upon to enforce.

Acculturation has brought about some blurring in the conception of what is an offense and the nature of the penalty. Traditionally every type of act regarded as an offense against another person, the community, and Palau customs was specified and the exact form of the punishment was fixed. Social change, the decisions of foreigners and native leadership have altered these in varying ways so that little uniformity now prevails. Most offenses are still settled outside of the foreign-created statutes and institutions for the administration of justice, despite the attempts of the Germans and Japanese to discourage natives from punishing other natives. It is deemed a disgrace to family and village for an individual to be tried in court, whereas the payment of a satisfactory sum for the offense committed in accordance with native law automatically absolves the person of any further blame. The majority of the cases which come to the courts concern infractions of foreign rather than native law, e.g. drunkenness, the making

of intoxicating liquor, the acquiring of government property unlawfully, and the use of dynamite in fishing. While there are court cases of refusing to obey a village or district chief, they are not common. Most disputes between individuals are settled by formal negotiations between the families of the persons involved or by the local rubak in cases involving the violation of Palau codes. Indirect pressures usually are sufficiently strong to make most men law abiding (mangedung) without necessitating formal actions. Word from the district chief to a family ordinarily prevents a repetition of the offense.

Many attempts have been made by the foreigners and higher native authorities to enact a new code which incorporated both ancestral and modern principles. But so far, none of these efforts have proved enforceable. Heretofore the elite were subject to the same penalties as any other class, and the injured had a right to collect an indemnity: now some meteet violate even their own regulations with some degree of immunity. They control the courts: district courts are presided over by the district, senior-ranking rubak and often other high ranking rubak serve as his personal advisors or "watch" the proceedings. The next higher level consists of the justice court which is made up of native civil servants most of whom are members of the elite class. They clear with the appropriate chiefs informally during the course of a trial. Constables are fearful to charge the meteet with crimes. In the administration of justice the meteet are less likely to be arrested, tried, convicted or punished. While the lower ranking and commoners are not immune, they have means of avoiding apprehension or punishment. In all societies there are social norms which determine the degree of conformance expected and social techniques for deviating from the prescribed patterns of conduct for various status positions. The governed in Palau, in principle, are expected to adhere to all regulations issued by those with authority. No one may openly reject an order, but there are means for altering its nature and consequences. Six common types are:

- (1) systems of evasion, (2) manipulative thwarting,
- (3) contravention and subversion, (4) voiding of enforcement,
- (5) agitation for reconsideration and reform, and
- (6) involving the foreigners.

(1) Systems of evasion consist of simulated acceptance and actual non-compliance to the regulations. Orders abolishing one custom are accepted, and the same custom is practiced under another name. In public the rule is formally acquiesced to as binding and thereafter is ignored when the authority is no longer present. Those activities which cannot be engaged in in a public situation are done "in the shadows". Ends which no longer may be pursued directly are achieved by indirection. Conformance is verbally declared to hold and in behavior deviations are carried out. Required acts are performed in a cursory way to appear obedient.

(2) Manipulative thwarting involves the appearance of following commands while in effect not doing so. Misunderstanding orders, working without accomplishing any results, abiding by the procedures without attaining the ends they are designed for, delaying and deferring actions for what appear to be proper reasons, appearing to be inadequate or incapable of performing the required tasks--all enable the individual to act as though the rule is being followed without following it. These devices are most effective when accompanied by enthusiastic endorsement of the order at the time it is issued saying whatever will please the superior, and the flattering of the authority for his wisdom in making such an excellent decision. (3) Contravention and subversion comprise the undermining of the power from which the regulation emanates or casting into doubt the efficacy of the rule. This takes the forms of insinuating ulterior motives to the actions of the official or circulating gossip about his character and personal conduct which makes the law appear as one he does not really believe in or obey himself, thereby sanctioning others to do the same. Counter pressures may be invoked by inducing rivals to the official or others with some authority in the same area to make contradictory decisions which confuse or cancel the regulation. Invidious comparisons may be made with other localities or cultures to show that the regulation is unnecessary, not in keeping with more successful groups, or harmful. (4) Voiding of enforcement takes the form of involving the author of the order or some close relative in a compromising situation so that the enforcement of the order would prove embarrassing or unprofitable. It may include the presentation of gifts to the officials who thereafter are indebted and may discharge their obligation by non-enforcement or the mitigation of the punishment. The pressure of relatives may be used for the same purposes. (5) Agitation for reconsideration and reform includes appeals to political advisors, arrangers, and intermediaries to intercede with the official to modify or suspend the rule. Complaints are planted in devious ways which will reach the authorities. Proposals are suggested for alternative ways or compromises which might be acceptable as alternatives without loss of social esteem on the part of the authority. Incessant discussion of the subject may cause the whole matter to be brought before the various legislative bodies and new decisions made. (6) Involving the foreigners entails acquainting the administrators, missionaries, and scientists with the "facts" which are so presented that they are aroused to comment or to act by the issuance of a counter order. The comment of a foreigner with no formal authority may nevertheless be used to prove the validity of a particular case within the native society. Administrators are given "confidential" information with the hope that it may elicit a decision which suspends the rule established by the native official.

Public Opinion

There is no anonymity in a small-scale society; everyone has a visible status. The politically eminent are known throughout Palau and even the least prominent are familiar to most persons in their districts. While everyone does not know personally everyone else, the characteristics of individuals are common knowledge and the subject of continuous gossip. Those who are powerful are discussed discreetly among intimates, whereas the ordinary person is talked about in a more open fashion. The social prestige of individuals is determined by a combination of five factors: their ascribed status, current roles, recent social activities, personal temperaments, and the rumors circulating about them. The behavior expected or tolerated among the elite differs from that of the lower ranks. A member of the meteet class who engages in shady affairs may cause ordinary people to say enviously, "If he can do it, why can't we?" or evoke either expressions of admiration for his shrewd deceptions or comments disapproving his actions. While his personal "popularity" may be affected, his social standing has not been jeopardized. He is still a man of power, and one does not dare accord him less deference or complain too openly for fear of retaliation. Political rivals may exploit the opportunity by embroidering and spreading the rumor in the hope that it will do some damage, but they cannot destroy him politically. Comparable behavior on the part of a commoner elicits public condemnation of his activities including dreaded scoldings from the meteet and various types of punishments. An outstanding instance of the tolerated deviation from the group norms by the elite without loss in social standing is the case of the heir to one of the senior-ranking district titles. This person has a record which includes convictions by the foreigners for the crimes of assault while serving as a constable, burglary and the embezzlement of public funds assigned to him for the payment of native workmen. He has forced native business enterprises to accept him as a partner which ultimately resulted in their failure. He has used his various positions with the foreign government in both the Japanese and American periods to extract various types of special benefits for his household. Despite this well-known record, he is an important, highly-honored, and respected figure.

The social roles one plays also enter into one's reputation. Those who exhibit unusual ability or the lack of the same become known for this quality. The extent to which available roles are assumed and actively performed also draws widespread comment. Thus the senior woman of a distinguished keblil may be renowned for her firm control and active participation in clan and community functions, while another in a similar position is thought of as being retiring and of no great importance. Those roles which

involve access to the locus of decisions or permit participation in the making of decisions are the most visible and induce universal comments.

The recent activities of an individual constitute the substance of the gossip which circulates. The first question asked of a visitor is, "What is the news?" Topics covered are deaths, marriages, births, divorces, conflicts, achievements, etc. These are presented not merely as events but are accompanied by further comments and speculations about the actors involved--their reactions, aspirations, and future plans. By this process reputations are made. One may become known as being "empty" in personality(bachachau), without any capacity in any direction(colit ra gim), low in intelligence(delbei), negativistic(tegangel), unstable (tegerawau), despicable(chetik), malicious gossipier(tulechoid), childish though an adult(ngalek), foolish(kebelung), a "big wheeler"(misisiich), courageous with his mouth(pigou a ngerel), a small time official who uses his authority for his own benefit but shrewdly avoids being detected by superiors (tuyu el kululau el obuch ra ralm), verbose(pegetogoi), arrogant(ilad), egocentric and boastful saying "I am a meteet and have no use for anyone" or who acts as if he is meteet (kedidai arngl), opportunistic and shrewd in handling personal relations for personal profit regardless of what happens to others(bechechelingaol arngl), does not see you if you are unimportant and acts as if you are not present (mad er imeungs); or one's reputation may be that of a fairly substantial mature individual(meduch), a fine-admirable person(soak el chad), a wise and able man who knows how to handle himself and others(mellones a rengul), generous upper-class person who does not exploit his advantage(ngario arngl), skilled in handling people in a pleasant way(melomas arngl), etc.

The circulation of rumors are classified into six types, half of which are socially approved. The approved kinds are those in which the informant (1) serves as an official messenger to tell specified groups designated items, (2) conveys news which relates good fortunes, and (3) relates misfortunes with sympathy for the victim and adequate explanation of the reasons for the happening. The disapproved classes are cases in which the informant (1) discloses stories in violation of confidences, (2) illegitimately acquires information through eavesdropping and passes on what he has overheard, and (3) invents a rumor and spreads it about as being true. The inventive type of rumor is especially feared and is rather common. This type may serve as part of a campaign to undercut someone by making him appear "dirty". It may be fabricated out of a suspicion that something has occurred which is then reconstructed into a story of what actually took place; the only known fact may be that two individuals were seen talking together, but this may be

sufficient to suggest the rest. Important political personages are rather sensitive about such rumors for once they are started, the opposition may be able to use them for their own ends and they may produce general unrest in the district. Although everyone is a part of the communications network, there are certain persons who are known as rumor-mongers(toutulechoid), expert in character assassination.

Public opinion consists of more than the reputation of individuals. It also includes the events of households, clans, villages, districts, etc. Each ingroup attempts to keep information which diminishes its prestige confined to its own membership. Favorable news is spread as rapidly as possible to add to the group's glory. Persons who engage in scandalous behavior or tell outsiders facts which may embarrass the group are accused of disloyalty and are subjected to severe pressures to prevent the recurrence.

There are several channels of communication: formal announcements at meetings of an assemblage of the entire population in a locality; the declaration of news to representatives of various bodies who in turn convey the information to those under them; the dispatch of special messengers to pass on the story; the diffusion of rumors and stories by persons traveling and visiting. The last of these is the most informal and the most important medium. Information within this channel travels more rapidly than official news and reaches a much larger audience. It has been demonstrated numerous times that policy announcements made in Koror to a collective body of district officials never seems to quite reach their intended audience in full while unofficial stories originating in Koror are known all over Palau within a few days. Although the channel is informal, it is nevertheless structured. There is a division between men's and women's news and distinctions by age grades and social status. Thus the older men of the meteeet class have selected subjects they are especially interested in which are transmitted within their own circle. A young woman of common status would not serve as an intermediary even though she knew the facts and was the first person to travel from the source of the story to a distant place which had no prior knowledge.

It would be inaccurate to speak of public opinion as being unified in Palau. There are marked contrasts in the opinions held between social groupings and these differences are not made articulate. People are cautious and calculating in expressing their views for fear their opinions may be used against them, or run counter to those held by the more powerful, or otherwise be used to their disadvantage in some future relationship. One says whatever the listener wants to hear(mekngmes). This is the polite way of talking in Palau. Only the foolish and the brave speak bluntly. In the traditional meetings of the klobak,

views were not expressed for open discussion but were whispered to special messengers who carried the opinions to the appropriate recipient. Though this formal practice is no longer common, the same spirit permeates public discussion; when men speak their eyes closely watch the reactions of their neighbors. It is unseemly for those of subordinate rank to express themselves before their seniors have spoken or to argue with them in a direct clash of viewpoints. The mark of a wise leader is his reluctance to speak. The exchange of opinions is often accompanied with the agreement to keep the matter confidential. Many of the crucial conferences are held in closed groups and sometimes secretly. As a result, the prevailing sentiments are not always known universally.

Fluidity is a characteristic feature of public opinion. There are fads and fashions in attitudes. Palau people are quick to enthusiasms; one theme may be most popular for a short time and then disappear. Styles in opinions may be set by a small group who then propagate them throughout Palau. They have also appeared as an outcome of imagined or chance remarks made by foreigners. The climate of opinion is therefore subject to runs of attention.

Despite the existence of a high level of interest in public affairs, there is a decided difference in the intensity of interest. Isolated villages concern themselves only with those political questions which directly and immediately bear on their welfare. The same holds true for sections of the lower classes who say politics is the business of the rubak. Young women are rather indifferent. The oldest age grades have a genuine interest in clan and village questions but pay little attention to the relationships to the foreigners. The interest level is at a maximum among the elite of villages which are dominant or have aspirations to achieve a higher social position. Young men with foreign educations, especially those with strong reformist convictions, are alert to issues which they discuss with strong feelings. Older women who hold important titles are less open but nevertheless devote much of their thoughts to these questions. The epitome of preoccupation is found among the meteet, the civil servants, and their political associates. They are the hard core of those attuned to public issues, and they are the opinion leaders in Palau. They are the intermediaries between the foreigners and the native populations and so form the transmission belt by which alien ideas are introduced into various social circles. They are the inventors of new doctrines and the judges of the acceptability of ideas circulating in society.

Living in a tightly organized society means for the individual a high sensitivity to public opinion. Personal and group reputations are zealously guarded. Even the most "emancipated" from traditional customs are anxious to preserve the mantle of respectability and eager to acquire and maintain social esteem. This orientation enables those with power to manipulate the society's anxieties and thereby to insure control.

III. SOCIAL SYSTEMS

The patterns of power in any society are woven into the entire social fabric. The social organization of Palau has undergone considerable alteration in structure and function as a result of acculturation. The ensuing section depicts the consequences of these changes. The historical setting of these changes is included only in so far as it is essential for comprehending the present configuration. Necessarily, only selected features deemed most relevant are subjected to close analysis.

A searching portrayal of the minute details stands in acute danger of losing perspective on the whole. Hence it is pertinent to focus briefly on the whole, prior to an inspection of individual items. The social systems of Palau form an integrated network which are separable only for the purpose of clarifying their component features. Every individual participates in all of them and each of the social affiliations determine part of his routines of living, levels of aspiration, and values. While the social systems are universal they are specialized in each locality. Hence, we must concern ourselves not only with the abstract principles but with the actual practices extant in contemporary Palau. For the individual, from infancy to old age, the social world he experiences consists of a series of specific types of social arrangements. To the outsider these may appear infinitely complex but to the participant they seem the normal order of human relationships. Social changes have modified the systems; the family, village, district, society, and class are appreciably different today than in the preceding years. These changes have been accommodated to in a variety of ways. The nature of that variety is documented in the following sections. They are not a manifestation of cultural confusion, for to the average man or woman in Palau they are accepted as part of living in the modern world. Though there are areas of dispute over what is right and expected, there is little anomie. Individuals are as motivated today as in the past to act in a proper manner. The high level of anxiety and self-constraint revealed by psychological tests performed by a member of the party are ample testimony to the desire of an individual to fulfill his ascribed roles in Palau society. Power in Palau can be effective only to the degree that these social systems continue to orient the means and ends of life.

Kinship Groupings

There are five basic types of kinship groupings: klebliil, kebliil, blai, talungalak, and ongalak. The population composition of each of these units was surveyed and a detailed analysis of selected features of the structure of forty-five sample families drawn from eleven districts was

made. These studies disclosed wide variations between localities and social strata, in the population size of each grouping, the nomenclature used, the formal organization and informal practices. The prevailing attitudes toward these variations from the "official" norms range from open acknowledgement of some to reluctant admission of others.

Klebliil is the largest, most extensive, and all-inclusive kinship grouping. A klebliil consists of a network of confederated kebliil which are distributed over several districts. The median upper class klebliil comprises kebliil located in five different districts and the senior-most ranking klebliil contain kebliil in nearly every district in Palau. The middle-ranking klebliil cover on the average only two to three districts and most of the lower status klebliil currently have only one or no active affiliate units. The extensiveness of the klebliil thus correlates with class position. There is more uniformity within classes than within districts. Thus the four leading families in each district are more alike in the scope of their klebliil than they are similar to the remainder of the families in their own localities. The social class of the various branches of a klebliil tends to be at the same or a similar level. Among the first four kebliil in each district, seventy eight percent of the affiliated kebliil in other districts are also in the upper four status positions in their locality. Less than ten percent of the kebliil affiliated with these senior-ranking kebliil have no title of their own. Not all but most kebliil are federated into some klebliil: for example in the district of Ngchesar, twenty three of the thirty three kebliil are members of a klebliil. Practice differs in the computation of klebliil affiliates; some include only those branches which are functional units; i.e., where there are individuals actively members of kebliil whereas others continue to count kebliil which now have no living members but once did. There are several "origins" of klebliil. A fairly common one stems from the migration history of families: as they moved from district to district, they left behind one segment which became permanent inhabitants of each locality and formal branches of the klebliil. This type of klebliil is based on blood relations. Atkar klebliil is a typical case. It was initially located in the northernmost district of Babelthusa-Ngerechelong. Following defeat in war, Atkar, migrated southward and left behind two branches in Ngarard, and one each in Melekiok, Ngchesar, Airrai and Peleliu. The main branch of the klebliil is the one in Airrai where Atkar kebliil is the senior kebliil of the district. A second common type originated not with the migration of a whole unit, but rather by a portion of it. Their settlement in a new locality did not sever the relationship with the parental kebliil but rather made the dispersed section a branch of the klebliil. A third but less common pattern developed out of the formation of a

permanent political and/or social alliance between kebliil in different districts or between kebliil formerly in the same district and now in different ones. A fourth kind was the product of a marriage in ancestral times between members of two kebliil who in turn established a third kebliil and all three were federated. Some kebliil have no knowledge of the factors giving rise to their origins, but accept the kebliil nevertheless as a permanent bond. Most of the kebliil were formed before the coming of the foreigners and very few new ones have been established since then. The writer did find two cases during his recent stay in Palau in which the extension of a kebliil was under consideration. In one, the affiliation was imposed by the head of a kebliil who used his office as chief of a bitalianged to accomplish his aims. His kebliil was eager to gain access to the land holdings of another kebliil. The latter, however, opposed the federation and after some controversy the alliance was dissolved. The second instance involves a series of kebliil who are contemplating federating with another series on whose land they are residing permanently. The details of the arrangements are now being explored but no final decision has thus far been made.

Some kebliil have died out completely and several kebliil have been reduced in population to a few members. Two kebliil were discovered which had only a single surviving individual. The senior-ranking kebliil have been the most successful in maintaining a large population. They have aggressively pursued the policy of recruiting individuals eligible to become active members of branches which were in danger of dying out. Several kebliil are now in the process of reactivating branches which have had no population recently by sending out to the ancestral location of the dormant kebliil families (ongalak) from their larger kebliil elsewhere. A number of special inducements are offered including titles, land, and cash gifts.

The median size of the senior-ranking kebliil today is forty-five members. The largest senior kebliil has more than two hundred members. The average size of the lower-ranking kebliil is twelve members. There is considerable prestige in being a member of a large kebliil as well as offering economic and social advantages.

The collective activities of the kebliil are less today than in the past. Loyalty to the group and even awareness of its composition is much less among the younger generations than the older ones. The authority of the heads of kebliil is also less than in the past. Despite these losses in kebliil vitality, it is still an important unit of social organization. It continues to serve as a mutual-aid group. Persons visiting in another district are housed, fed, and cared for by their kebliil affiliates. Those who

settle more permanently away from home are assigned land and assisted financially in becoming established in their new locality by the klebliil branch in the vicinity. The newcomers social position is determined in part by the social status of his klebliil. His acceptance into the social life of the district is affected by this tie.

In ancient, interdistrict wars, members of the same klebliil were permitted to break their spear points prior to the attack and the symbolic struggle was accepted as sufficient proof of loyalty to the district. The symbolic battle without injury was also credited in the determination of the victors and the defeated. Ancestral, mutual-aid traditions have become the basis for the exploitation of relatives since the onset of the Japanese period. As a result, some think of their klebliil bonds as more of a financial vehicle for extracting wealth than as a pattern of reciprocity. It is held in these circles that a klebliil which includes five kebliil can provide a comfortable living to those in a position to take advantage of the relationship. The two highest-ranking kebliil of a district are in a klebliil having this many attachments; the third-ranking kebliil are in klebliil averaging one less; the fourth averages less than two. Thus the first and second kebliil in a district not only are more wealthy to start with but also have greater access to more wealth. They have had the additional advantage of holding power and adding to it since the coming of the foreigners. The senior klebliil as a result have been increasing the distance between themselves and the lower-ranking klebliil in Palau. (see class)

Kebliil is the second dimension. It comprises the next largest kinship unit in size and scope, and is the designation of what is usually referred to as a clan. It is more limited than a klebliil in that it is confined to the federated and usually more closely related households within a district. It also is a more viable social entity and exercises a greater and more direct influence on the lives of its members than does the klebliil. It is necessary to note that the same units are involved in the designation of klebliil and kebliil but the social coverage, the rights and duties, and the degree of intimacy differ. By way of analogy, Americans are citizens both of the United States and of individual states, and the two roles of citizen are both separable and interconnected; so, too, with the klebliil and the kebliil. The former are interdistrict kinship relationships and the latter, intradistrict kinship ties.

Kebliil are ranked in two social systems--the district and the village. Kebliil which rank first in the district fall into two categories with respect to their village ranks: 46 percent rank first in the village and 48 percent have no title(dui) in the village. Of kebliil

ranking first in a village, 72 percent also rank first in the district and 19 percent have no district title. In other words, the village status is more indicative of district position than the reverse. Keblilil with a rank in the main village of the district usually have the same rank in the district. Within villages, those keblilil with the senior title in the district, either are first in the village or nothing. Among the second-, third-, and fourth-ranking district keblilil, rating in the village tends to be either equivalent or no rank position at all. Second-ranking district keblilil divide evenly between these two types, whereas in the third- and fourth-ranking keblilil, the preponderate majority have no village rank. It is, therefore, essential to differentiate the district and village ranking keblilil to comprehend the concentration of authority in these two levels of government. (see patterns of power).

Within the keblilil there exists a constellation of sub-units. One basic type is that of a keblilil which has attached and subordinate to it one or more additional keblilil. The subordinate units may have higher rank in the village but still they are under the direction of the superordinate. In no case do they have a superior rank to superordinate keblilil at the district level. Among forty-five elite keblilil examined, only five were without these satellites: 15 had one subordinate keblilil, 20 had two, and 5 had from three to six. The explanations offered for the origins of these relationships cover a multitude of circumstances: (1) adoption by an established keblilil of an incoming group to the district who had no land or local title, (2) formation of a new subdivision within a keblilil during the era in which the population was expanding and the main unit was overpopulated, (3) consolidation without complete fusion of two keblilil during the era in which population was contracting and the remaining members of one or several keblilil were too few to continue independently, (4) intermarriage in ancient times accompanied by the formal linkage of the two groups, (5) alliances in which titles that could not be filled through the regular line of inheritance were taken from the "outside". This last condition includes cases in which keblilil drew on a related line in selecting successors to its headship or where an outstanding individual of a lesser-ranking and unrelated keblilil was chosen as the head of the senior keblilil, while still recognizing the differential rating of the two keblilil. There are several outstanding instances where a wealthy person (merau) of a lesser keblilil first served as an advisor and financial aid to the rubak of a high-ranking keblilil and subsequently assumed the office. There are also cases of female heads of keblilil(mhas), who through marriages and intrigue were able to accomplish the same end. That these different patterns are not purely mythological became evident in the discovery of a number of such arrangements

which have taken place during or since the Japanese period.

The nature of the bonds are not standardized in all details. The subordinate kebliil is under the jurisdiction only of the first household(blai) within the senior kebliil and only its head may issue orders. The other blai of the senior kebliil have higher status than those of the subordinate kebliil but no direct authority. In some instances the subordinate kebliil head is the successor to the office of headship of the senior kebliil. There are three known cases in which the present senior kebliil was originally in a junior position and through various activities managed to reverse the relative status of the two. Where there are several subordinate kebliil, they may differ in privileges in relationship to the senior, but they are not subject to each other's command. Thus two subordinate kebliil are dependent on the senior one but not on each other and neither one has the right to rule the other. Those subordinate kebliil which are related by blood ties, especially along the matrilineal side, have the privilege of drawing more fully and more directly for mutual aid on the klebliil branches in other districts. The others can only secure this assistance by the formal consent of the senior kebliil and then representing their cause as being on behalf of the senior kebliil. Marriage regulations between the federated kebliil vary with the nature of the bonds: three types were found--(1) those in which marriage is freely permitted and occurs, (2) those in which it is legal but there are no known cases of its taking place, and (3) those in which it is not allowed. Within a major kebliil with several satellites, all these may prevail. No case was found where the members of one kebliil must marry into another.

The senior kebliil have been able to attract additional groups because of their prestige, land, wealth, and titles. This has not been true of lesser-ranking kebliil and within the lower classes satellite kebliil are rare. Those kebliil which include three satellite kebliil (it will be recalled that it takes five in a klebliil) are deemed able to live comfortably. They have the human resources to maximize the use of their lands and other work. Those individuals who are in a position to employ the mutual-aid customs can secure sufficient income from several kebliil to enjoy a fairly high level of living.

A blai may be defined as the corporate structure of the kebliil. It comprises an ancestral household with its own name, home, land, hereditary titles, and membership. In actuality, not all of these attributes occur in every blai today. There are blai which now contain no people, but the unit still counts in the kinship system and property ownership and it may be re-activated when the opportunity

presents itself. While the primary unit of land ownership is now the blai, this was not true before the Japanese era and there are blai which at present own no land. Many of the ancestral blai houses have been destroyed and the present dwellings do not strictly correspond to the traditional type of home. Still the designation, household, is used by the family unit which occupies it. According to native theory the members are made up of all or a segment of the talungalak (consanguinal family); in practice, since the German and Japanese reforms and especially since taking of the Japanese census, blai have been recorded as ongalak (conjugal family) supplemented by immediate relatives. In principle, a blai continues from generation to generation within the same family; in reality, some blai have passed from one family to related or even unrelated others as a result of the extinction of the ancestral group and other special circumstances. Blai are deemed to be permanently located, still there are numerous cases of blai which have moved from one district to another. In response to the foreigner's influence, the term blai is used now in ordinary conversation merely to indicate the contemporary, conjugal family home but under native customs it carries a broader meaning.

The present population composition of a blai varies greatly. One fourth of the blai include dependent relatives outside of the ongalak, but within the talungalak kinship group. Three fourths of the blai with members outside of the ongalak have three or less additional persons currently residing in the blai. This pattern is a decided decrease in blai membership over the ancestral period when large population and limited blai units made for fairly large numbers living together as a blai. There still exist some blai which have as many as thirty or more members.

The median kebliil today is composed of 3.5 blai which are active (i.e. having living members) and 1.8 blai which are inactive. A blai may have satellite blai, ranging from one to five in number. These stand in relationship to their senior blai in the same pattern as satellite kebliil do to senior kebliil, i.e., a subsidiary household either related by blood or political-social confederation. There are also blai which are in a satellite relationship to a kebliil. Some kebliil have been reduced to a single, active blai and in these cases the two terms are loosely used interchangeably. There are blai without any kebliil affiliations and without the status of a kebliil. In one case a blai was found which was a member of a klebliil but not of a kebliil; this consisted of a family which moved several generations ago from its ancestral home to another district and had not become established as an independent kebliil in its present location. At one time it attempted to withdraw from its klebliil and to attach itself as a satellite to a kebliil in its new locality but the parental klebliil had thwarted

this move by threatening to use magic on it.

An individual may have hereditary rights in several blai, but he may use only one blai affiliation at a time. The usual practice within elite kebliil is for a person to advance from a lower-ranking blai to a higher one as the opportunity becomes available. With each change he moves into the household of the blai and assumes its title and ascribed roles.

Blai membership is determined primarily by talungalak affiliations. This may be illustrated by a single case, the Etei kebliil of Ngerechelong. The Etei group has sixty members in three talungalak. The first talungalak is composed of but one blai of twenty-four members; the second, with thirty members, subdivides into five blai of which four are active; and the third, with eight members, has one active and three inactive blai. The blai of the first talungalak owns the title (Etei) of the kebliil, provides the kebliil head, and has direct authority over the other blai. The second talungalak has one senior blai and the remaining four are subordinate to it and the third talungalak has one senior blai with three subordinate. In the first and third talungalak, the head must come from the senior blai but in the second talungalak there is one subordinate blai which has the right to provide a head for the talungalak if no one directly in line for the office is available from the senior blai. The blai of the second and third talungalak are independent of each other and neither one may issue orders to the other.

Marriage in the above example may take place between the members of the blai of the different talungalak but not between the blai within the talungalak. Where blai are related by political federation ties rather than blood ties, intermarriage is permissive. A tabulation of blai marital regulations indicated that in many kebliil there are some blai which are recognized as blood relatives and marriage is forbidden, and at the same time there are other blai amongst whom marriages are sanctioned but not necessarily preferred.

Although the regulations of the inter-blai relationships are well-known, the ancestral origin of the ties often are not. A special, but not uncommon condition arises in those cases where matrilineal, patrilineal, and a mixed kinship system are simultaneously used by different talungalak, blai, or individuals within the same kebliil. Thus in the Udes kebliil, the Udes blai contains units which employ each of these distinct systems to determine kinship. There are, as a result, three different talungalak lines which converge on the Udes blai and they are in sharp competition with each other. There are numerous instances

in which the same kebliil contain blai following different kinship lines.

In most kebliil, the social standing of each blai is determined by the status of its talungalak. In some, however, the position of the blai within the kebliil is based on its station in the village or district in which it is located. For example, in the previously-mentioned Udes kebliil, there are blai from low-ranking talungalak which have more prestige, wealth, or power than most blai in the first talungalak and they carry more weight in the decisions of the Udes kebliil. The senior blai of the senior talungalak in a high-ranking kebliil in the main village of an important district carries the full connotation of an aristocratic household.

Talungalak is the fourth dimension of kinship. The actual composition of this unit takes three different pattern, depending upon whether the matrilineal, patrilineal, or a specialized combined kinship system is used.¹ Within the same kebliil, all three types may be employed by different talungalak. Moreover, switches are taking place; in the two-year period between the writer's field work, several talungalak changed over from one to the other and, in some instances, while making the formal change retained some of the relationships previously established. The typical matrilineal talungalak consists of an oktomaod (who is its head), the mhas (the senior-ranking woman who usually is his sister), his other sisters, the children of his sisters, and his brothers (but not their children). Many variations in this pattern exist but the general tendency is for a patrilineal or mixed lineage system to revert to the preferred matrilineal system when the opportunity presents itself.

The median talungalak is made up of four ongalak and has a median population of twenty persons. A few talungalak have as many as six ongalak and more than sixty members; and at the other end of the range, there are talungalak which contain but a single ongalak or the remaining survivors of one and with a population of less than six (in some instances there are just one or two persons).

At the risk of confusing the reader, additional distinctions need to be made. The same unit may count as a talungalak within its own village and as a junior kebliil in relationship to a senior kebliil elsewhere. Some talungalak have attached themselves through alliances, as

¹ See Economic and Human Resources of Yap and Palau, Western Carolines, U. S. Commercial Company, 1947, Vol.1.

outlined above, to senior kebliil; in this dual system they possess certain rights and duties as affiliates to a kebliil but otherwise are functionally autonomous. In many kebliil, only one talungalak exists but there are some which have four or more and one which contains fifteen.

Talungalak solidarity is greater than that of the more extended kinship groupings. The German and Japanese administrations favored loosening talungalak bonds and having each ongalak live separately. The traditional talungalak lands were subdivided, but the practice still prevails of having the senior blai of the talungalak retain control of a section of land known as talungalak property. During the war, the talungalak was revitalized for it became the primary basis of mutual aid. Kebliil, for the most part, were unable to function in this capacity. Since the end of hostilities, the pre-war trend toward the weakening of the talungalak has resumed. The future place of the talungalak within the social order is hard to predict; it seems improbable that it will be restored to its ancestral form but, on the other hand, it is unlikely that it will be reduced to a purely symbolic tie.

Ongalak, today, ordinarily consist of a husband, wife and their children. Traditionally, ongalak comprised the above plus the married sons and their families. Since the German era, the tendency has been for married sons, especially the younger ones, to live separately. There are, nevertheless, numerous cases in which one of the sons, usually the oldest, and his wife and children live in the same household with his father. There is more emotional attachment to the ongalak unit than to the other kinship groupings but it is not necessarily as stable. The younger generations prefer to stress the ongalak whereas the older ones are more talungalak-oriented. The most tenuous tie within the ongalak is that between spouses. Husband-wife bonds have never been characterized by high durability. Most men have but a single wife. Polygyny under ancestral law was restricted to the elite and was permissible only in the nine senior-ranking districts: Koror, Airrai, Melekiok, Ngeremlungui, Ngerechelong, Ngedbang, Aimeliik, Ngiwal, and Ngarard. Recently, anyone with sufficient wealth may have more than one wife. Formerly, the number of additional wives was not restricted; now only two are permitted. The Japanese intermittently discouraged plural marriages. When the enforcement was strict they were officially dissolved and when the campaign was over, some of the polygynous marriages resumed. The decline in population and social ceremonies has reduced the need for plural marriages. The elite required an additional wife to help out with the work in the taro fields, to assist in taking care of many social duties, and to serve as a personal companion in those instances in which the first wife was too preoccupied with her obligations. Today, the economic and social duties are

less pressing. The decision to take a second wife is more often motivated by the infertility of the first wife or her involvement in household and child-rearing activities to the point where she can give little time to her husband. The second wife usually would not be from the same blai or village as the first one. The approval of the first wife is expected before the final decision is made. This often involved some negotiations and special concessions to the first wife in return for her approval, and occasionally the threat of a divorce if she persisted in her objections. The fact that a man does not send away his first wife when he contemplates a second one, usually means that his first marriage is permanent in his life plans. The second wife has less security than the first and the rate of separations is many times greater for them. The first wife has greater prestige and seniority in formal social affairs but she has no authority over the second wife. Each has her own taro patch and lives in a separate house. If the meteet lacks two houses, the first wife resides in his home and the second in his parental family home. Meteet usually rotate their residence on a weekly basis, but the exact time of remaining with each is somewhat flexible, depending on individual circumstances. Most wives in plural marriages are fairly friendly, but there are cases in which there is enmity between the two. It is bad taste in Palau for women to exhibit jealousy and a violation of etiquette for one wife to complain about the conduct of the other. Some first wives have become indignant, bring pressure through relatives and the rubak on the husband, threaten to leave and make other demands. With the death of the first wife, the children may be divided into those who return to the wife's keblil and others who remain with the husband under the care of the second wife. The inheritance of each wife's children follows her own line in matrilineal systems. But in patrilineal ones, the first child born has a preferred position in the line of succession. Unofficial types of polygyny also occur. In these instances the male may not desire to have two social wives. Arrangements may be made for establishing a dual marriage which is accepted with all the private rights and duties pertaining to the marriage, but it is not openly announced and is publically "ignored". The 1948 edict from the bitalianged heads to abolish polygyny involved a problem of decision. Some husbands sent both of their wives home, others allowed the wives to make the choice. As soon as the law enforcement is relaxed probably some will be restored or others established. Polygyny is not popular among the younger women and those who accept the lower prestige of the second wife often do so for calculated economic gains.

Marriages before the age of forty are rather impermanent, lasting, on the average, between two and three years. Most marriages are not undertaken with the avowed plan that they will be temporary. Marriages which have

lasted for as long as ten years are not lightly abandoned. Despite the high incidence of marital change, there are cases of a couple who married young and continued their marriage for a lifetime. Some women are more "realistic" or at least cynical, about the durability of marital ties. They say it is not intelligent to marry for love for the man will not be faithful and hence one may as well marry for money and secure as much of it as possible for the oktomaod (head of the talungalak) who is the real source of a woman's security over a lifetime. Women who marry to advance their social and economic status run an additional risk. The man's family will bring pressure on him to give her up for a woman of more suitable status. Husband's rising in rank through the inheritance of higher titles also experience the same pressure to change their wives.

Marriages, today, may be either love matches spontaneously entered into or arrangements worked out between representatives of the two families. In Kubary's time marriage was seldom a matter for the decision of the participants involved. Since the Japanese period, freedom of choice has been more common. In some instances, the family of a pregnant girl may bring pressure on the man's family to marry, preferring this to a payment--especially if it seems that there may be some difficulty in finding a mate for the girl or where the marriage would be to a family with wealth. If a payment is made by the man's family, the child then belongs to his keblilil. A girl reaching the age of about 15 may be advised by her mhas (female kinship-grouping head) to have an affair. To remain a virgin, she is told, may make her ill and will keep her single.² A young man learns the art of talking and gifting which are a helpful prelude. He is expected to have several affairs but is admonished not to assault a female and to select the women with due regard to their status, affinities, etc. Before adolescence, the sex behavior of children is strongly discouraged. It was deemed improper for the parents to closely supervise the activities of adolescents who were thought of as having a period of freedom. Now many of the foreign-educated and deeply Christian parents anxiously attempt to control their children's behavior until a more advanced age. While early

2 The elimination of the pattern in which women lived in the abai of another village or district prior to marriage as armengols did not cause a social upheaval. It did, however, affect the subsequent orientation to sex and marriage as well as inter-district relationships. It would be an error, however, to assume that no distinction is made between conception within a marriage and outside of it. Children born out of wedlock put a burden for their care on the mhas who may or may not welcome it.

marriages seldom last, they are entered into in the hope that they will, for one's reputation is impaired by having too many divorces. The individual is thought of as unstable and a bad risk as a possible mate. Two to four marriages is a fairly typical life history. One distinguished man claims to have had more than seventy mates.^{2a}

No woman is forced to marry, but no known adult woman was found who had never been married. The mores do not sanction the open statement that the marriage is entered into for calculated gain, such as to acquire the status of being married or to secure access to a source of wealth. Still there is pressure on women, especially on widows and divorcees, to remarry.³ Unmarried adult women are regarded as an economic burden on their talungalak. Most such women live in the blai of their oktomaod,⁴ turn over their wealth to him, and must learn to be "blind and deaf" in order to withstand the obvious suggestions from the oktomaod and his wife that they are not welcome for an indefinite period. Hence women in this position are especially receptive to having affairs with men in the hope that they may lead to marriage. They may attempt to involve a married man in the effort to win his affection to the degree that he will sever his marriage and establish a new one. An old and wealthy

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- 2a There is some doubt of the veracity of his claim and his motivation is unique. He is an outstanding authority on family histories and, in order to gain access to private histories of various blai, he married into them. As an informant he proved to be especially well posted on materials rarely known outside of the inner circle of households.
- 3 Widows who have lost several husbands are sometimes called the "lucky ones" (melusech) for they have had several payments in settling of the loss of husbands. Divorcees have a "misfortune" or "accident" (mekerior) and if the cause of the separation, she receives little compensation. The amount paid depends on the differential in social class of individuals with secondary consideration given to the woman's reputation during the marriage, the duration of the marriage, etc. An upper-class woman receives roughly twice as much as a lower-class one when divorced from a lower-class man. Otherwise, the male's family would be criticized by the rubak.
- 4 A few live with their married children or in a close relative's homes. This is a recent development; formerly, native law required them to live in their talungalak home.

rubak is regarded as a most promising prospect. These factors partially explain the high percentage of younger women married to older men. The median age differential between mates is five years and in one-fourth of the current marriages in Palau, there is an age difference of ten or more years. If possible, widowed and divorced women would prefer to live with their unmarried children. Formerly, Palau family law required a woman to return to the blai of her talungalak. This regulation is no longer enforced but to remain with her single children in her former husband's blai requires the approval of his talungalak and that is seldom forthcoming. As a result, in most instances upon the termination of the marriage, the woman moves to her oktomaod's blai and after a few weeks is expected to enter the marriage market.

There is no reliable way of determining whether or not marriages are more or less stable than in the past. Opinions differ. There are no records which can be used with confidence to plot a trend. The permission of the district chief or other high-ranking native officials is supposed to be secured prior to official separation; this regulation was enacted in the Japanese era and recently has been re-established.⁵ What effect, if any, it will have is difficult to ascertain. It is also believed that the presence of children has a greater likelihood of preserving the marriage than in the past. Formerly, children had the security of their talungalak but with the weakening of this unit, parents feel a greater obligation to remain together for the welfare of the children. The exact importance of this factor could not be learned. There can be no doubt, however, of a sense

5 The detailed body of regulations concerning the establishment and dissolution of marriages are not germane to this analysis. Both sets have undergone substantial changes in procedure. The techniques for manipulating the codes have altered along with the changing patterns. Thus, to cite one minor item, an ancestral way a woman had of ending her marriage was to enter a man's club house in another village; now, she may accomplish the same end by entering the foreigner's hospital. This does not mean that female hospital patients are all seeking divorces, but rather that this institution serves the equivalent function for some women. Similarly, a woman desiring a divorce who feels that her bargaining power is weak, will endeavor to secure an opinion from the foreigners who may be less well informed on the actual facts and native regulations. The foreigner is accepted as a substitute for the local native official. Having obtained a favorable verdict, she is then in a position to bargain more successfully for a larger cash settlement from the husband's family.

of insecurity (sebekrengir) among women. There is a feeling that while it is easier than in the past to perform their economic functions, there is little assurance that marital fidelity and hard work will mean any protection of their interests. This uncertainty may have existed in the past as well, but with a major difference--with the decline of the solidarity of the talungalak, women have less ultimate security than formerly. The knowledge of the norms of the Japanese and American families has made some of the younger women more critical of existing practices. The subject is one of some discussion in women's circles.

Parent-child relations are in the process of transition; in some respects the bonds are stronger than in the past and in others, weaker. Fathers today play a more active role in the rearing of their own children. In those families using the male line, the father's role in relationship to the children is much more influential than in those which follow the female line. It is less common now for an irate mother to inform her husband that he has no right to discipline the children and to threaten to return to her own family if he persisted in his unwarranted actions. Children, in turn, are less likely to escape to their mother's family to avoid the discipline of their father. There is also a decided growth in the desire of the father to pass on his wealth to his own rather than his sister's children. Some fathers have made elaborate arrangements to do this after their death. Their decisions in many cases have been disputed and their wills abrogated, which may be done legally by his heirs who are his sister's sons or his brothers. Several attempts have been made to establish new native codes to settle this question, but thus far none have been universally accepted.

Both the levels of aspiration of parents for their children and the methods of child rearing have changed. Many of the younger parents below the meteet class have been eager for their male children to enter into the expanding morau class, or civil service employment, and most young parents have been anxious for the children to acquire the skills and some of the ways of the foreigners. The consequences of these newer goals in terms of their effects on parent-child relations have not been fully perceived--any more than in the case of immigrant parents and their children in America. The results are manifest in the existing tension between generations.⁶ Even though the successful achievement of the newer types of goals are approved, the child is warned not to fail to conform to the traditional expectations of a member of Palau society. Failure to know

6 See: "The Changing Structure of a Micronesian Society," American Anthropologist 47:4 1945.

the proper manner of conduct or to adhere to the Palau codes of ethics and etiquette elicits sharp disapproval. To avoid this trouble parents endeavor to inculcate in their children at an early age knowledge and respect for Palau mores. But the mores are in transition and as a result there are areas of behavior which are not clearly defined. The existence of cultural alternatives with varying degrees of required conformance to each of these in varying situations, makes child training one of teaching specific action patterns more than a generalized body of universally applicable precepts. Under these circumstances the older generations are not united amongst themselves and the younger generation often find the opportunity to manipulate the options for their own ends. Children subjected to unwelcome parental pressure respond in several ways: most common is unenthusiastic submission outwardly to specific demands where the values are in conflict. This is often accompanied by evasion through the simulated acceptance of the imposed edict and the pursuit of personal plans outside of the presence of the parents. Deviations are explored to ascertain the maximum attainable without provoking discipline; in this experimentation, it is customary to allow for an escape. Escape mechanisms include verbal rationalizations for the conduct as well as techniques for a rapid withdrawal from the untenable position. Direct conflict is avoided as far as possible.

The system of rewards and punishments is basically like that of the past, with some modifications. Parents endeavor to motivate children through inculcation of a competitive striving. Children are cautioned not to stand in one spot while their companions run. The psychic returns of having a good reputation are stressed and serve as powerful incentives. The reliance on manipulating anxieties is universal but the threat symbols have changed. Fear in children is aroused by warnings about the potential dangers of certain animals--especially pigs, cows, goats, and cats. The ghosts of the dead were commonly used to frighten older children. The former type of danger still works with the young, but the war eliminated the threat of spirits in Palau in many social circles. The meteet remain as an important threat, arousing anxieties of a major order. To this group has been added the foreigner who, too, might prove most dangerous. The danger is not merely one of fines which would prove a financial hardship to the family, but primarily the social disgrace it would carry for the whole family and even the village. Two other types of punishment have declined. The threat to withdraw the right to inherit a title or wealth was outlawed by the Japanese and is no longer used. Corporal punishment, which was rare in Kubary's stay in Palau, became common in the subsequent period and has gone out of style. Those who continue to beat their children are called ignorant and old-fashioned. Scolding and warning are very common.

There are mixed feelings among parents on the efficacy of the existing socialization-discipline processes to achieve their ends. Some are particularly concerned over the present adolescent generation whose habits were formed in the tumultuous war years. How to offset behavior patterns which seemed essential for survival during the war has yet to be discovered. Yet it would be an over-exaggeration to state that the older generations are alarmed over the basic patterns of the present Younger generation, and similar complaints were made before the war. There is confidence that in time the existing conflicts will be resolved. A major and continuing source of division between parents and children stems from the contrasting types of training a child receives at home and in the school. Prior to the coming of the foreigners there was a basic integration in the ways of living taught in the family and in the societies. The foreigner's schools which have supplanted the societies to a considerable degree as the source of training for the adolescent, offers an orientation which conflicts in many details with those patterns taught at home. The home education is oriented around traditional Palau customs whereas the school's emphasis is on "modern" values. School-teachers are acutely aware of this discrepancy and have sought to obtain from the native leadership a policy declaration but thus far have been unable to do so. The native elite are ambivalent in their reactions: on the one hand, they are eager to preserve Palau traditions and on the other, they are most anxious to have as much of the foreigner's training as possible.

A change has taken place in the norms of an ideal ongalak with respect to the sex composition of the children. A family with four daughters and one son was regarded as fortunate in the past. Since the foreigners, a reversal in preference has taken place. In the past daughters meant added income while sons involved outlays. Today, men are the principal source of cash income and the traditional opportunities of women to acquire wealth have been eliminated or circumscribed. If a marriage is infertile, efforts are made to secure children through adoption. One out of every six children has the status of an adopted child. There are more than 525 at present, and it is a growing pattern in Palau. Adoptions are of two types. The traditional pattern is for a young couple to present a child to infertile relatives, friends or to elderly relatives whose children are grown. The newer pattern involves the foreigners. Japanese and Okinawan parents in a number of instances gave their children to Palau families prior to their evacuation, fearing that life would be too hard in the defeated homeland for children raised in Palau. War-orphaned Oriental children and broken mixed-marriages in which the Japanese mate returned home also led to some adoptions. Half-American children in some instances are now given for adoption. The Japanese discouraged but did not outlaw adoptions.

Two unrelated families who are linked by the adoption have a special bond which, in some instances, has formed the basis of an affiliation of two blai or kebliil. Adoption also is used as a means of retaining children in the biological father's kebliil, especially where there is a shortage of children from other marriages in the kebliil. Where the marriage is shaky and there is fear that when the spouses separate the mother will invoke her prerogative under native law to take the children with her, efforts are made to induce the couple in advance to give up a child, usually to the husband's sister or brother. A child adopted by the father's family retains his inheritance rights on his mother's side, but one adopted by the mother's relatives loses all privileges from the father's line.

Children adopted when older do not overtly show affection to the biological parents in public. This writer observed a meeting in a native boat of two unrelated families, one of which had with it a child given to the parents by the other family. They live in different districts and had not seen each other for some time. The parents were friendly and exchanged information, but the adopted child displayed no great interest in his biological parents. Some conversation took place but not on an intimate basis. Formerly, children adopted when young were not told who their biological parents were; since the Japanese era, they usually are informed. Adopted children may return to their biological parents if they feel mistreated or if there is a major quarrel. Such cases evoke controversy and law suits have taken place in which foster parents seek to recover the cost of rearing the child.

The firmest ties within an ongalak are between the mother and her children and amongst the siblings. As other kinship affiliations have weakened, these have been strengthened. The instability of husband-wife relations has led some natives to conceive of the core of the ongalak as a mother and her children. The loyalty between brothers is one of the strongest social attachments in Palau.

Outward expression of one's inner feelings toward a loved one in the presence of outsiders is regarded as bad taste.⁷ Fathers and oktomaod ordinarily are somewhat reserved toward their children; they are warm and friendly but do not extensively fondle and embrace them, whereas mhas and mothers may be more openly affectionate and have children on their laps a good deal of the time. After a son reaches the age of about fifteen, a mother "cherishes her affection in

7 This generalization applies to the display of one's inner feelings, both friendly and hostile, in other relationships as well.

her heart." It is improper for a boy who has reached the seinan dan level to be too intimate with his mother or sisters. He is expected to avoid being emotionally over-dependent on his mother, not to linger much about the home during the day, to sleep outside of the home frequently (formerly he slept regularly at the clubhouse), and to find his daily companionship elsewhere. In those communities with the highest exposure to foreign ways, the display of emotions has taken on new forms. Thus in Koror, Peleliu, and Angaur, the younger women are reported to have the reputation of being dengerenger, i.e., sort of "wild and crazy" for some have adopted the "petting-necking" patterns exhibited by the foreigners and the foreigners' movies.⁸

Each kinship group has a male and female head. The roles ascribed to each headship are explicit but the designations used to indicate these positions vary from group to group. For the purpose of this discussion, the male head of klebliil, kebliil and blai will be referred to as merreder, the male head of talungalak will be termed oktomaod, and the female head of any unit are called, mhas.

The merreder is the male headship of the klebliil and/or kebliil, and/or blai. The same individual may be merreder of his klebliil, kebliil and blai. Others, however, are merreder only of their kebliil and blai, and still others of their blai. A person does not serve as merreder of more than one klebliil, kebliil, and blai at the same time, even though he may be eligible to do so by virtue of various lines of inheritance. Merreder of kebliil and blai may also have village and district ranks and in this capacity are known as

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- 8 It may be noted that this reputation does not apply to the men in these district. It is one instance in which females have led in the acculturation process.
- 9 Merreder is used as a general term in some localities for the head of a village and the head of a talungalak but oktomaod would not be employed ordinarily for clan or village headships. The term oktomaod actually varies according to the relationship of the speaker to the headship but this is no longer consistently done. Mhas has become a common designation for female headships although technically there are distinct modes of indicating each of the roles. The above three terms are employed loosely for honorific purposes to some elderly persons. Thus aged women are often called mhas whether or not they are "real" mhas etc. For a fuller discussion of the usages see, Economic and Human Resources, Yap and Palau, Western Carolines, U. S. Commercial Company, 1947. Vol. I.

rubak. There are approximately six hundred merreder of kebliil and nearly three times as many merreder of blai in present-day Palau. Not all of these are active offices, however, for in kebliil and blai which are made up of a few individuals, the members actually live with another kebliil or blai and their merreder functions only on special occasions. The number of merreder of kebliil was not ascertained, the technical problems in their enumeration being too great.

The chronicle of the successive individuals who have held this office is one of the basic items in kebliil history and serves as a calendrical system for the identification of past events. The average kebliil has a record of seven merreder prior to the present one, a few have information on eighteen or more merreder back. A tabulation of the duration in office of merreder since the Spanish era reveals that there have been a median of four office holders over the past fifty years in the average kebliil or a median tenure of about twelve and a half years.¹⁰ If this is projected into the past and the assumption is made that comparable periods in office hold true for the pre-foreign era, then the average kebliil has a record of its merreder since the middle of the nineteenth century and those kebliil with the longest chronology trace back to the first quarter of the eighteenth century. It must be recognized that there are some offices of merreder which are quite recent in origin: several were found which started as late as the middle of the Japanese period.¹¹

The selection of a merreder of kebliil is a major decision. It has bearing not only on the immediate members of the kebliil but also on the whole village and district for, as indicated above, the office carries with it a public function. In ancient times, the klobak assembled and sent word to the kebliil to make its nomination. The senior age-group of the senior talungalak made its choice known to the kebliil. The merreder of the various kebliil within the kebliil would then meet to pass on the candidate. The recommendation to the klobak was usually accepted. In the

10 The longest known tenure of a merreder is one who served nearly fifty years and for this achievement was a greatly honored figure in Palau until his death late in the Japanese era.

11 A few foreigners have held the merreder office. Kubary was given the Scharleong title in Melekiok which is the headship of the first kebliil of the fourth-ranking village and carries the right to veto all klobak decisions in Melekiok. Recently another foreigner was offered the merreder position of an inactive kebliil in Ngcharlong.

recent period, the rubak of the district intervene more aggressively in the making of the kebliil choice and the klebliil has less control. This, however, is only a secondary type of change for, in reality, there is widespread consultation amongst the various sections concerned before the decision is made. A man may refuse to accept the offered merreder position on the grounds that he is living elsewhere and does not want to move into the community in which the kebliil is located, or that he is unwilling to assume the responsibility. Instances of this type do occur from time to time, but before the refusal is accepted as final much pressure is exerted on the individual to change his mind. If he is not wealthy, relatives will contribute Palau money and/or offer him other special inducements to help him get started.

Merreder who prove unsatisfactory can be forced out of office either by the kebliil¹² or the klobak. Formerly, a merreder would be removed on grounds that he was violating the established customs. Such violation meant that he was abandoned by his dead ancestors and was thus jeopardizing the welfare of the kebliil. With the shift in ultimate sanctions to the foreigners, the rationale for his removal may be his conflict with the foreigner which threatens the kebliil. Of course, other reasons may determine removal, such as indifference to duties, etc. In those cases where a merreder performs his kebliil tasks satisfactorily but not his village or district ones, he may retain his role within the kebliil and his title in the district, but some other member of his kebliil is appointed to carry out his public functions. Several such arrangements now exist.

The authority exercised by the merreder is less today than in the past. No member of a kebliil has the right to disobey his orders. Disobedience or other offenses against the kebliil in ancient times could result in a number of penalties including an order to have the offender killed or banned for an indefinite period, or a fine levied against his talungalak. Since the German era, the merreder's power to punish has been restricted to less severe forms. Admonition in private is the most common practice and is usually sufficient to secure conformance. Where this proves ineffective, public scolding of the individual and pressure on his talungalak prove effective. Some merreder claim that they still retain the legal right under native law to fine, banish, or punish in other ways but, so far as could be

12 Formerly, the merreder could be forced out of office by his successor through assassination, banishment or forced retirement. This theoretical right was actually used in many instances according to all earlier students of Palau.

learned, they have not exercised these powers recently. The amount of actual control exercised by the merreder varies immensely. In the modern era, kebliil branches of the klebliil consult with the merreder in relatively few matters, such as the distribution of property after the death of the kebliil merreder, and the selection of a new merreder. But in ordinary affairs the merreder of kebliil do not intervene in kebliil affairs. Within the kebliil, the merreder is expected to assign the most difficult and disagreeable work to his own talungalak. His powers over other blai in some kebliil are defined in a contractual series of specific rights and duties. In most kebliil, the merreder oversee the talungalak oktomaod, settle intergroup disputes, administer the wealth of the kebliil, arrange ceremonies, etc. High-ranking, large kebliil require the full-time services of the merreder and he is expected to give up his private business, if any, in order to devote himself fully to his duties. Merreder who substantially advance the welfare of their kebliil gain considerable prestige and are greatly respected.

The oktomaod is the senior-ranking male of a talungalak and the one who is responsible for the general welfare of the members of this kinship grouping. In matrilineal talungalak, the eldest brother of the oldest generation or the eldest son of the senior mother assumes the rule. Among those households which are now patrilineal, the father's eldest brother or son serves as the oktomaod. In those with mixed patterns, special arrangements are made. The individual eligible for the office may choose to not accept and pay someone to assume the function or allow it to be passed on to the next in line. But once having made such an agreement, it is deemed bad taste to ask for it back. It is, however, not a permissive choice in the case of the senior-ranking talungalak of a high-ranking kebliil; the position of oktomaod of this group may not be declined without much scandal and loss of prestige of the talungalak. Formerly only an older man could hold the office but since the Japanese period, many younger men serve as oktomaod. The most eligible may be passed over for someone more acceptable to the group. Several cases were found in which the most wealthy person in line was chosen over the immediate successor. The oktomaod may be removed from office for deceiving his talungalak and misusing its property. The official removal is done by the klobak of the village at the request of the talungalak and occurs only in extreme cases. A surrogate oktomaod may be appointed to care for a branch of the talungalak which has moved some distance from the homesite. For this, a relative in the locality, if available, is asked to serve and is given an honorarium for undertaking the responsibility. A person may act as oktomaod for several talungalak although this is done only as a last resort by talungalak who lack anyone eligible who is otherwise free. A few men are currently serving as oktomaod for

as many as ten different talungalak, sometimes finding it a rather profitable relationship if they maximize their prerogatives and minimize their obligations. Where the eligible men in the female line have been depleted, the male line will be resorted to to secure an oktomaod. Inasmuch as a talungalak includes several ongalak spread over several generations, the question may be posed, what is the sequence to the office. In a matrilineal talungalak, the office first passes in succession through the brothers of the "original" oktomaod in the order of their birth; after their deaths, it then passes through the sons of the oldest sister; if she has no male offspring it passes to the sons of the next eldest sister, etc.

The role of the oktomaod has declined in importance, particularly for those generations now under the age of 50. The reasons for this decline lie in changes made in other relationships. The scattering of the ongalak, mentioned before, reduced the pivotal importance of the oktomaod who dominated the composite group. Formerly, most land belonged to the talungalak and the control over it was exercised by the oktomaod. Since the breaking up of land ownership into blai units by the Japanese, the oktomaod controls only the token segment of land retained by the talungalak. He has no voice in the lands held by each blai and no longer has control of the wealth produced by the members of the talungalak. Nevertheless, despite many attempts at reform, the oktomaod still retains the right to extract wealth from his married sisters and their daughters through "mutual-aid customs". In a few talungalak, the practice remains of giving a portion of one's earnings to the oktomaod, but often this is more of a token payment than a substantial portion of the income. In principle, the oktomaod continues to share jointly with the father of his sister's children the responsibility for the needs of the offspring. The active role of the father has expanded while that of the oktomaod has contracted. The latter usually does not intervene directly as long as his sister's husband is alive and living with his wife. Fathers raised in the modern period resent oktomaod who interfere too aggressively in their domestic affairs and take some pride in being known as a man who is bringing up his own children. However, women are most anxious to retain amicable relationships with their oktomaod. When the marriage ends through death or divorce, the oktomaod assumes full control over her, her children, and her wealth. Moreover, the oktomaod is an important figure in the arrangement of marriage and divorce payments. Hence, wives will exert pressure on their husbands to accept the wishes of the oktomaod and will use various devices to obtain money from the husband for her oktomaod. An oktomaod can break up a marriage by pointing out to a woman that her first loyalty is to her talungalak and that her only real security lies in this durable relationship. The younger generations are slightly less

responsive to this appeal but they are far from having severed the bond. In those instances in which the oktomaod and the father are of different social classes, the dominance of the higher-ranking individual is appreciably greater. There is one renowned case of a man who was a powerful figure as an oktomaod during the Japanese era due to his extensive holdings in bauxite lands. He no longer has any income from these properties and is now largely ignored or "cooly" welcomed in his visits to his sisters' households.

The oktomaod's rights and duties are the subject of some dispute since the Japanese era. One major item concerns the "commercialization" of the ancestral privileges of the oktomaod to use "omeluel." In this custom, the oktomaod brings or sends food to his sister's or niece's family in return for which he receives money. The younger generation of husbands resent but acquiesce to the extraction of wealth in return for food they do not desire. Another point of dissension pertains to the prerogatives of an oktomaod in handling the property of those under him. Two recent cases of this have gained prominence. In one an oktomaod who is renowned for his avariciousness seized the large land holdings and valuable native monies of a war widow and gave her in return only a small sum for herself.--(\$50). He then urged her to marry quickly to rid himself of any obligation. She appealed to her district chief for a return of her properties, and when she received an unfavorable decision took her case to the courts for settlement. In the second instance, a prominent businessman of Koror purchased a stock of materials on Peleliu from the foreigners. His wife's oktomaod on Peleliu who obtained the supplies for him then sold them through the district store at a large profit. Her husband sent his wife to Peleliu to plead for compensation or replacements. She was informed that her real loyalty must be to her oktomaod and not to her husband--to which she submitted. This, in turn, led to the breakup of the marriage.

The ruktemelek (again there are variations in terms) consists of the collective oktomaod within a talungalak or kebliil. Although each person has but one oktomaod, a large talungalak today may have several persons who exercise this role in different relationships. They meet as a group in conjunction with the mhas to decide certain matters such as the contributions the talungalak will make in marriages, divorces, the settlement of disputes, etc. In special emergencies, they meet to discuss common problems of the talungalak. The mhas is the female head of a klebliil, kebliil, blai, or talungalak, or of several of these four. Mhas of the senior-ranking kebliil also have village and district offices in connection with the female klobak and hence are also known as rubak-l-dil. The position is passed from sister to sister and after the sisters die, the oldest daughter of the senior mother assumes the position. However,

in those cases where a daughter of a deceased mother is about the same age or older than her aunt she may be selected if her personal qualities are preferred. The qualities stressed are: having been married (it does not matter how often or her current marital status, or whether or not she has children), her reputation in the district, her ability to control other women, her record as a worker, her mental capacities, and related matters. The mhas may be older or younger than the merreder or oktomaod, but she must be past twenty and usually is in the higher age grades. A woman who is married to a higher-ranking individual may be chosen over one senior to her in eligibility for it means that more income and prestige will come to the group. One case was found in which a 23-year-old daughter of a deceased mother was chosen as mhas over her 40-year-old aunt; the daughter was married to a meteet, whereas the aunt was married to a lower-ranking man. In this instance, the elected mhas calls her aunt "mhas" and turns to her for advice. Comparable cases have occurred in other families. An adopted child who has no kinship blood ties cannot qualify nor can a daughter of a brother in those units which use exclusively the female line. It is more rare to depart from the female line in the choice of a mhas than in the case of the oktomaod. In patrilineal families where the brother's daughters are deemed eligible, the selection is made not on the basis of the age-grade of the brothers but rather on their daughter's status with respect to age, marriage, character, etc. When there is a lack of anyone eligible within the unit for the mhas function, it is overcome by securing a candidate from a closely-related talungalak or keblil, and if possible in the female line. The future mhas of an important keblil is carefully trained from childhood on. In lesser-ranking clans, the training of the potential successors is more informal and special instructions may be given only when the current mhas feels that death is imminent. The newly-appointed mhas must leave her husband's household and return to her own. She usually brings her husband and children with her. The eligible person may refuse to accept the office and a few have done so. The official decision as to which woman is to be chosen is made by the merreder and the mhas just before the latter dies. When there is a difference of opinion, the merreder has the final authority. A mhas cannot retire from office nor can she be removed (in contrast to a merreder or an oktomaod who can be ousted from office) but her duties may be taken over by someone else if she is incapable.

The prestige of the mhas is immense. She is an honored person in Palau folklore and appears more frequently in legendary accounts than any other figure. There is an adage that the merreder is respected for his power, but a mhas is loved because of her spirit. While this is not an accurate basis for the differentiation of these two roles, it is indicative of the symbolic position of the mhas. Her

idealized qualities include the following: (1) she makes people relatives in spirit through her gentle talk and actions; (2) she prefers peace to conflict and tries to settle all quarrels softly; (3) she offers wise advice in all affairs, even men's business and political activities; (4) her calculations and manipulations are not for her own self-glory but for her family; (5) she wishes to hear the good reputation of people; (6) she grows the food on which everyone lives; (7) she is famous for getting along with children and for her willingness to aid all children; (8) she is the "mother" of all social units. There have been mhas who have deviated rather widely from these norms; Aimeliik, for example, has a record of one mhas who, while serving as district chief, was renowned for being pigou (see patterns of power) leading war parties and ordering many men assassinated. But like all idealized projections, the above items indicate the image of a mhas.

The official authority of the mhas is less today than in the past; but her actual influence is still great. The mhas of a klebliil has the right to issue orders directly to the mhas of the kebliil but she seldom exercises this prerogative. The mhas of kebliil continue to actively direct the activities of the mhas of the talungalak. In principle, the mhas of a kebliil may not determine which women within a family shall perform a particular task: she issues the order to the talungalak mhas who in turn works out the division of labor and the individual assignments. Those matters which affect both sexes require the orders to emanate officially from the merreder of the kebliil for the mhas has no jurisdiction over men. In reality, the mhas while conforming to the required procedures, frequently initiate orders directing the entire group's activities. This is especially true in those cases where the merreder are weak individuals or are preoccupied with other activities. The mhas of the senior kebliil in a district is a powerful figure in public affairs. Although the decline of women's societies have reduced the organized instrumentalities of social action it has not eliminated the influence of the mhas from native affairs. The mhas shares with the merreder the responsibility for formulating plans for their kinship group and few merreder would dare make a major commitment without first consulting her.

The mhas of a talungalak traditionally directed the activities of the women of the various ongalak. The wives of her sons were also subject to her wishes in some respects. A distinction is made between food and money for the purposes of loyalties. With respect to food raising, son's wives followed the orders of her husband's family mhas, while with respect to money, she obeyed her own mhas. Inasmuch as a wife usually lived after the first month with the husband's family, she was expected to adhere to

regulations of her husband's mhas.

Since the German edict decentralizing the talungalak, the official supervisory role of the mhas has lessened. Women in the fields are less responsive to her orders and less eager to please her. Although she exercises a dominant influence on children, her control over young women has diminished. The younger generation is less interested in the kinds of information she can impart; many of them say that the mhas have not caught up with the times. If she is aged, they claim that her views are the outmoded ones of ancestral Palau; and if she is middle-aged, they argue that she is too much like the Japanese. Put in another form, the mhas is held to be the custodian of knowledge which makes individuals powerful in Palau or Japanese ways, whereas only the schools offer knowledge which enables one to be powerful in modern, American ways. Despite this decline in dominance, the mhas is still the pivotal figure of family life. This is evidenced in various ways. When a mhas joins a particular foreign church, the rest of the family will become members; or if she is opposed, seldom will other members affiliate with it. In personal crises, individuals of all ages turn to their mhas for advice. She still is the trustee of important information about the social unit and exercises an influence on the style of living of the household. The exact amount of authority exercised by the mhas varies with her personality and between communities. In some localities, the senior-ranking mhas complain that the women will not listen to their orders or carry out their assigned duties. The mhas in charge lacks the means to enforce regulations since the German era in which her right to impose punishments was abolished. Mhas find it difficult, too, in some places to secure conformance to the traditional customs. One illustrative recent experience is that of a mhas who sent a tortoise dish to her three daughters, asking for \$30 from each for an oheral for her older brother. They sent back the plate empty saying that the uncle was rich enough. The mhas was humiliated but kept the incident a secret from outsiders and resigned herself by saying, "They are educated and progressive and, therefore, will not follow our customs."

The inheritance of these three offices cannot be equated with kinship inheritance. For example, the Udes kebliil uses only the female line in determining the successors to positions although both matrilineal and patrilineal systems are employed by different branches in kinship affiliations. More individuals use the patrilineal line in kinship affiliations than in office succession. In 1946, fifty-two percent of the heads of blai were from the matrilineal line whereas only thirty percent of the total population were following the matrilineal line in kinship relationships. In the ensuing two years, there has been an increase in the use of the matrilineal line for

both purposes. This has come about in part through the pressure of one of the bitallanged heads who has been anxious to restore ancestral patterns and also is trying to strengthen his own position.¹³ There is also in Palau a general preference for the female line and with the removal of Japanese influences which favored the patrilineal system, a shift has been taking place. This does not mean, however, that kinship heads have been removed but rather that where a new successor was to be chosen, the tendency is to secure one, if possible, from the matrilineal line. Households do not like to tell others the line they are using, for it restricts their bargaining power in intra-kebliil rivalry and makes shifting difficult.

An analysis of the present office-holders shows that most klebliil and kebliil have as their merreder an individual from the matrilineal line: there is, however, a large minority which do not. Among those kebliil which place an emphasis on the female line, the ratio between those sub-units which are actually using the female line to those using the male line is 2.3 to 1: a few are as high as 7 to 1 or as low as 1 to 5. That means there are two blai which are matrilineal to every one that is patrilineal. Kebliil which are "officially" patrilineal have in their subdivisions a ratio of 1.1 patrilineal to 1 matrilineal, and a range of from 6 to 2 to 2 to 4. In essence, kebliil which are officially matrilineal come closer to fulfilling their norm than do patrilineal kebliil. This is not surprising in view of the higher prestige accorded to the matrilineal line. Two further items are worthy of note: the senior blai of the senior talungalak has a higher percentage of cases which follow the female line, the ratio here is 4.5 to 1 whereas the senior talungalak as a whole more closely approximates the kebliil with a ratio of 2.1 to 1. There are more senior talungalak which use both lines than ones which follow a single line. The satellite kebliil office lineage does not correlate with the senior kebliil, so that one cannot infer from the latter how the former selects its heads in any particular instance. The satellite kebliil have a higher number of matrilineal derived heads than do the senior ones: their ratio is 3.5 matrilineal to 1.0 patrilineal. One clue to this difference lies in the rivalry within the senior kebliil for ascendancy between the two sides, the same has not occurred in the lesser-ranking kebliil. The struggle has been intense for the office of the senior kebliil also carries the title of village and

13 Within his own blai there is keen rivalry between the two sides and he comes from the matrilineal half of the blai. Should the patrilineal line become dominant in Palau, the office he holds may switch to the patrilineal side as it once did before.

and district chieftaincy and other high posts in the native government whereas the heads of the lower-status kebliil are merely offices within the kinship unit or less-prominent community officials.

Still, lineage alone does not decide the line of succession. Most kebliil restrict the position to any of the blai within the first talungalak and prefer the individual among these blai in the order of the blai's ranking. Thus the most qualified would be the senior male (decided according to the lineage system used) in the senior blai from the senior talungalak. Should he lack the personal characteristics desired or decline to serve, and there is no other eligible male in that blai, then the second-ranking blai within the same talungalak would be next in line. Some kebliil which are officially matrilineal prefer to select the merreder from those talungalak which continue to be matrilineal over higher-ranking talungalak which are patrilineal. In some cases, special traditions exist whereby one of the satellite kebliil either has a prior right to the office of head of the senior kebliil or may put forth a possible candidate who may be considered along with other candidates. As indicated elsewhere, there are a number of cases in which the legitimate heirs have been passed over and another chosen for exceptional reasons. In those cases the official line of succession does not change and after the substitute's period in office is completed, the regular order of selection is reverted to once more. Because these alternatives do occur and are taking place even more frequently than in the past, the potential successors and their immediate relatives are sensitive to their status and their possible rivals. The foundation of power in Palau rests on one's kinship group and possession of the leadership of it.

Villages

There are 72 active villages with an average population of 78 inhabitants and 25 blai per village. Kramer found evidence for the existence of 235 villages in 1800 and he estimated their average size to be over 100. For the year 1910, he reports the existence of 84 villages and a mean of 50 inhabitants. Thus less than a third of the communities present in Palau a century and a half ago continue in the present. While these figures are rough indicators of the trend in numbers, they are not to be construed as showing a decline in village life itself. The ordinary native's world still continues to be mainly that of his village. The village is the center of most social activities and is one of the most cohesive units in Palau. Loyalty to the home village is second only to that of the family and is much greater than to the district or larger social units. Though village solidarity is less intense than before acculturation took place, it is, nevertheless, more resilient than wider loyalties.

Individuals are subject to the regulations of the village in which they reside. A person whose keblil is in one village, who works in a second, and lives in a third is subject to the third village. However, if he commits an offense in either of the other two villages, he may be punished by its chief and the chief of the village in which he resides has no authority to intervene. Offenders can be ordered to return to the village in which they were offenders to stand punishment. The consent of the chief must be received for permanent migration in or out of a village. Those who fail to adhere to local rules may be banished from the village.

Villages are ranked in social position within each district. The status positions in principle are changeless but actually numerous changes have taken place. For example in the district of Ngeremlungui, the first village formerly was the second and the third once was the second. In each district two senior-ranking villages on the average have a third more population per village than do the rest of the villages. Persons who are contemplating a move usually prefer to settle in the high-prestige villages. The Japanese officially abolished village rankings but the major change was that the ranking system became unofficial. Only Koror has fully accepted the doctrine of equality of villages.¹⁴ More common is the general acknowledgment that villages do continue to differ in prestige although the formal status positions are

¹⁴ For a period Koror operated on the premise that the official ranking of villages did not hold, the unofficial one did. Since the end of the war, the klobak decided to abolish the unofficial one as well.

used only on special occasions. On the whole, the older generations are more village-rank conscious than the middle or younger age grades. Though these groups do not draw the lines as sharply, they still act in terms of them. The distinction between the first village of a district and the lesser-ranking ones continues to remain whereas the gradations between the lower-status villages are beginning to grow blurred.

There is a wide range in the makeup of Palau villages. The following list indicates some of the salient differences between contemporary villages. (1) There are uninhabited villages which still count as villages with respect to land ownership, legal residence, and formal political structure. In nearly every district there are villages without a resident population. The land belongs to the descendants of the former residents or where there are none known, the site is still designated as being that of the ancient village. Where villages have moved to new locations, the old site may be referred to as the "real village" and should it be reactivated, the original locality would have priority in the use of the village name, title, rank in the district, etc. Several ancestral villages are in the process of restoration and in some instances the plan is to retain both the present and the restored villages within the same social unit even though they are separated by some distance. Some persons refer to their ancestral village as their home community even though they have never resided there and in social relations they are ranked according to their status in this ancestral village. The titles to rank continue to be based on inherited positions from such uninhabited villages and the klobak is still recognized even though it does not meet or perform any administrative functions. In some instances the former residents occupy the land of another village and continue to operate as a distinct and independent village, either cultivating their ancestral lands or those of the place in which they are currently residing. The above population figures excluded uninhabited villages, but this decision was a highly arbitrary one. Thus to cite some of the dilemmas of census taking, there are at least six cases where there are a few individuals living in the ancient villages with the expectation that their numbers will grow equal to that of neighboring communities. These were omitted from the total number of communities. Then, too, there was the difficult question of determining at what point a village was no longer deemed active. Some communities were unoccupied before the arrival of the Spanish and others have been abandoned only during the past decade. A few are even now in the process of abandonment. Titles from ancestral villages are not honored equally in all parts of Palau, some districts retain every one including the lowest-ranking positions; others recognize only the senior titles; and in several others, there are no individuals who hold the titles--but the titles themselves are still counted in the social heirarchy.

(2) Combined villages include a number of alternative arrangements in the degree of fusion. There are communities in which the population consists of several distinctly separate villages for administrative and social functions although there are no geographical divisions between various villages. The following sub-types were found: communities in which there are from two to four village chiefs and two to four klobak, and each with its own jurisdiction. They often meet jointly and usually unite for common efforts, but they nevertheless retain their individual identities. Each regards its chief and klobak as the legitimate head of its own grouping, computes rank on the basis of its own class hierarchy, and possesses a degree of cohesiveness in social affairs. In some communities the different villages are viewed as co-equal in social status and consensus is a prerequisite to any social action which involves the entire population. In others there are gradations in village statuses, with traditional differentials in privileges. One community of two villages has a single chief who has the same social status and title in both groups but the rest of the rankings are distinct and each side has its own klobak. The chief, however, cannot act without the consent of the second title from both sides. Another community contains two groups which keep their separate titles but have a combined klobak--the klobak used is the original one in the present village and the incoming group was incorporated into it. In this particular case, the two populations live on their original village homesites but act as a unit in political matters. Still another pattern consists of three merged villages in which each retains its own klobak but the power to act for the whole is the exclusive right of the senior klobak, i.e., the klobak of the "main" village. In some instances the other groups have a right to a single representative who has the power to veto but not to initiate legislation and in others there are no representatives or they may only have a listener who carries back the news of the decisions made. There are districts which have village klobak only for the major villages and they, in turn, act for all the villages but each village has its own chief. One village is also the district organization and contains the entire population of the district. But being too small and weak to perform some functions, it federates with another district for these activities.

(3) Villages differ with respect to the extent of formal organization. The larger and more isolated villages tend to have fully developed institutions whereas smaller ones adjacent to other ~~small or larger~~ villages have relatively few. The former type may have several active societies and elaborate social divisions and the latter have none apart from their neighboring communities. All retain the klobak system but its powers have diminished considerably in most villages. Some villages have not had a formal klobak meeting for several years. Three types of village conferences are now commonly

used: (a) the village chief plus his administrative assistants, the most prominent members of the community, and the senior-ranking members of the klobak--these are called for the purpose of discussing projects and plans; (b) the above groups and the heads of households--for the consideration of matters which involve the division of labor by family units; and (c) the two above combined, with the rest of the population of the community in attendance--in order to clarify basic issues and to urge the inhabitants to support plans or obey orders. A village chief in only one district of Palau has the absolute right to make decisions without clearance with others and even in this locality it is the practice to consult prior to the establishment of policy. The inner circle of power is held in most villages by the two to four senior title holders in the community. They usually meet informally as a continuing body and from day to day discuss and settle most questions. Where contacts with the foreigners are frequent, the senior rubak faces the foreigners and the next-ranking one faces the village. Villages short of title holders in residence invite those living elsewhere to visit the community when a formal event requires the full set of title holders to be present. Titles below ten are rarely used today in village affairs although there are a few large villages which maintain the ancestral klobak nearly intact.

(4) Villages differ markedly in their social atmosphere. Some villages are somewhat physically and socially isolated from the larger society. They have relatively few visitors and, in turn, do little visiting elsewhere. There is only minor interest in larger political questions, no major discontent with the traditional order of things, and few foreign ways have been incorporated into their way of life. Most of their members spend much of their time in village-centered activities: commercial transactions with the outside world are limited to a small number of items--production for the market is incidental to subsistence enterprises and the prevailing standards of living call for few foreign goods. Such villages have no ambitions to rise to dominance and they cling tenaciously to their own self-dependence. The attempts of the district rubak to intervene in their domestic affairs are resented and resisted. A second group of villages are nearly the opposite in their orientation. They are often the "mother" or senior-ranking village in the district or have aspirations to achieve ascendancy and there is a sharp sense of inter-village rivalry. A constant stream of visitors come to the community and it may stage rather frequent celebrations in which other villages are invited as a whole to attend. Trips to other places are common and there is a lively interest in events occurring elsewhere. Local resources are extensively used to produce goods for export and the demand for foreign articles seems unlimited. Foreigners are especially wanted as residents to add to the prestige and influence of the community and acculturation is evidenced in most aspects of life. Matters of high policy are closely followed and

discussions of public measures are part of the daily conversation. A volatile spirit permeates the community in which enthusiasm runs high for projects which will enhance the prestige of the village. Great pride is exhibited in the construction of public facilities and in their decoration. Mixed scorn and pity is felt toward the above types of communities and there are dreams of further glory for the home town. In between these two types are found a majority of Palau's villages: they reveal admixtures of these polar types and prefer a middle course to either extreme.

(5) The relationships of village to district organization are most variable. The least common, but a major recent development, is that of complete domination of the village by the district. This scheme enables the district chief to issue to villages orders which they must accept and permits the district officials to remove village chiefs. In one district, the first two rubak in every village belong to a household which is a part of one of the four leading kebliil of the district. Orders thus flow not merely from the district chiefs to village chiefs but also from the heads of the kebliil to the lower-ranking blai of the kebliil. Obligations to the clan override other public duties so that a district rubak who is unable to persuade a village chief to accept a suggestion may invoke his role as kebliil head to win conformance. In another the controls are even tighter with only two district kebliil possessing the village chief titles. In such districts the village chiefs are primarily local agents of the district officials and some village chiefs are used full time as administrative assistants for the district and perform few village duties. More common is the pattern of districts in which the rubekul is the pivotal governmental organ and village chiefs are co-equal with district chiefs in authority. District chiefs are followed when there are questions relating to the foreigners and to district-wide actions but in purely village affairs they have no administrative power. Village chiefs have the legal right to block any decisions of the district chief at a formal rubekul meeting. More frequently they merely ignore those policies of the district chief which they do not like without making the subject a formal issue. A dispute has developed in several districts over the right of the district chief to remove village chiefs. The question still remains unsettled. Under ancestral law, some districts authorize the district klobak to remove a village head only if the village consents; whereas in others, the klobak may do so on its own initiative. Where the district rubekul has replaced the district klobak, the problem appears as to whether the district chief may on his own force a village chief to resign. The intervention of bitalianged chiefs into district-village controversies has further added to the complexity. Bitalianged chiefs apply the customs of their own district to the ones in which they intervene and have convinced the foreigners to support them.

This has provoked intense feelings in some areas for the bitalianged chiefs come from districts in which villages are politically weak organizations and district authority is nearly complete. Whether villages may remove their chiefs without the consent of the district is a less burning but unsolved question.

While the village is still a viable social system, politically it has been tending toward greater subordination in some respects to districts. Several factors have made for this shift in emphasis. The relocation of villages from scattered sites to adjacent ones, which occurred in the Japanese era in particular, has reduced their self-containment and the social barriers between communities. District-wide activities and organizations have been increasing in part because so few villages contain a sufficiently large population to act alone. The end of native warfare freed the individual from fear to travel freely outside of his home community. Employment in foreign-sponsored industries and educational facilities, both of which are concentrated in a few localities, have taken the young adult and the child away from village-centered affairs. Workers and school children may even reside away from their home villages during the period of their activities or they may commute to neighboring villages each day. The foreigners have made the district officials legally responsible for whatever events occurred in the villages of their "jurisdiction". Villages which heretofore had the right to decide all of their own domestic affairs and to choose the federation they would belong to were no longer permitted this complete freedom. Ambitious main villages which dominated the district organization and district title-holders with no village titles eagerly accepted the political opportunity provided by the foreigners to expand their control. Though the trend is clear, there are important exceptions in several districts. In two, the villages remain widely scattered and the tradition of self-dependence is so firm that they have successfully resisted most of these developments. Within several districts there are certain villages which have fought outside control and remain as aloof as possible from district affairs. Their local metect exercise complete dominance over village life and those individuals who are unwilling to live in this type of community either are forced to leave or voluntarily do so.

Districts

There are fourteen districts at the present time. Each district has both a name and a title. In the presence of an all-native group, especially among the older generations, the titles are still used. Just as in the case of individuals with social position, it is more dignified to refer to the title rather than to the name of a district. The employment of names to designate districts became more common following the Japanese land surveys. The maps made contained only names and were used in the schools, as a result, the younger generations tend to use district names to a greater extent than in the past. Districts are ranked within their confederation (bitaliang). In theory, the order of rank comes down from ancient times. In reality, district ranks changed as a consequence of war, shifts in wealth, population changes and a series of related factors. Whether further changes in rank can occur is not a settled question. Some of the low-ranking districts have ambitions to rise in the social hierarchy, those in the upper positions perceive no reason why the time-established order should ever be modified again.

The areas which make up districts, in theory, have changeless boundary lines going back to ancestral times. The actual composition of districts, in reality, have shifted in a number of instances. The islands between Koror and Peleliu came under both districts and it was not until the middle of the Japanese period that a fixed line was drawn. Ngchesar was an independent district until the German era, was combined with Melekiok, and then separated again during the Japanese administration. Melekiok for a time consisted of what is now three districts. Kayanagel was subdivided into two halves in ancient times, one half was affiliated with Koror and the other with Melekiok. The village of Ngarsul was once a major district on Babelthuap and is now a part of the district of Ngchesar. There is at least one village which would like to secede from its district and establish an independent one. Every district contains villages which immigrated from other districts and most districts have historic records of villages which have emigrated. Selective memory in the discussion of district organization makes for the omission of these earlier events. This reification of the existing district structure may be due to several influences. Perhaps of first importance is the secretive nature of the information on the "origins" of groups. Knowledge was confined to a select circle of the ingroup and it was forbidden to tell outsiders. Hence in the formal public accounts, much is left out. A second element is the effect of acculturation on the folklore. The foreign-oriented younger generations contain few experts on ancestral history, and the remainder of the population has been exposed to less discussion of the subject and even

when it has been talked about, they have shown little interest in the past. A comparison of the same folklore secured by Kubary and the writer indicates a marked decline in the total detailed knowledge and selective modifications in the details. In addition, past records are altered for the purpose of current usages of the information. The account on Angaur of its earlier history as told to the writer has been substantially changed after the disposition of the phosphate royalties became a major issue. The casualty rate in Palau stories has been almost as high as the death rate among the senior age grades. Without exact knowledge of historic facts, it seems plausible to assume that the culture of one's childhood stretches back indefinitely.

The district is today the primary political framework in Palau. All other units of administration function through its institutions. Still, the district cannot be depicted as a political organism equivalent to the concept of the state. For native customary law does not uniformly assign to it complete sovereignty and unlimited authority: in a few districts the political instrumentalities are confined to several limited functions, an equally small number provide for extensive activities and the most common pattern is one in which the district has complete control in some specified spheres and restricted power in others. The trend has been toward an expansion of the districts political-social functions at the expense of the village.

The district today contains an average of five villages with a range of from one to eleven villages. The median population is about three hundred persons, with one district having less than seventy and the largest being in excess of a thousand. The highest density occurs in the three southernmost districts--Koror, Peleliu, and Angaur. The degree of decline and recovery in numbers varies between districts. Thus Melekiok (including at that time Ngchesar and Ngiwal) was reported by a survey in the German era to have 37 abandoned villages and Ngeremlungui has today records of 27 former villages, whereas the comparable number of extinct villages in Airrai, Koror, and Peleliu are respectively, 8, 3, and 4. The present upward trend, measured in net replacement ratios and migration rates indicates that the growth of populations differs markedly between districts.

The effects of population differentials between districts are only partially calculable. It is fairly certain that the districts which suffered the greatest losses in the earlier period had either to devise methods for maintaining their status or to suffer a decline in position and wealth. They could not put as many war canoes into the sea and hence were more vulnerable to attack, as well as lacking in bargaining power. When the foreigners established their

industries they had less manpower to contribute to the labor market. Similarly, they could produce less native produce for marketing. These circumstances, in turn, placed them at a disadvantage in the rivalry for foreign money and goods. The foreigners located their schools in centers of large populations in the initial period, further contributing to the decline in prestige of the smaller populations. As indicated elsewhere, other factors were equally crucial, but it does not seem unreasonable to accord to the population base its part in the changing political order of districts. Even today, there are contrasting motifs between districts due to their differentials in size. Several with an eye to the future are resettling old sites and exploring how to hasten their growth, whereas other districts rest content with their present numbers or are resigned to their subordinate social rank.

The basic forms of district institutions lend themselves to a fairly simple outline. The elaborations of these forms, however, are most difficult to reduce to a set of common denominators which hold true throughout Palau. This portrait is designed to present a comprehensive picture of the mosaic patterns rather than an intensive study in depth of any single district. It offers more knowledge of the constitutional principles of district organization and how they are applied in various social contexts than a description in full detail of their component parts in each district.

The klobak and the rubekul now comprise the two principal political bodies of the district.¹⁵ In theory, both are legislative and administrative instrumentalities. A brief historical account is a necessary prelude to understanding the reason for the existence of this dual system. The klobak is an ancient institution and the rubekul is a modern one. The latter first developed on a limited scale in the German era in a few localities and was "officially" established in some districts in 1915. Conflict

15 Caution needs to be exercised in the use of these terms. In some districts the natives informally refer to the rubekul as the klobak just as they use interchangeably the terms rubak, merreder, and oktomoad in designating an older person with leadership functions in some social unit. But when the usages are examined, it is evident that in referring to the rubekul as the klobak they mean to imply the new klobak or the "real" klobak for practical purposes. Customs in terminology also contain the interchangeable usage of rubekul and obekul. Each district body has a distinctive title by which it is known.

between the chief of Melekiok and the Japanese administration and its native supporters in that district precipitated the decision. The Arklai of Melekiok resisted Japanese innovations, maintained tight control over the area, and proclaimed openly his right to self-rule. The climax to a series of "incidents" occurred when Arklai declared his position to be that of the Kaiser of Melekiok and staged a parade in which the seinan dan were dressed in German uniforms and marched through the community. The chief was removed by Japanese edict and "elected" in his place was the head of the male line of the same clan. This individual was the chief exponent of "modernization" and worked in close collaboration with the foreigners. But being from the male line, he was not eligible to serve as head of the traditional klobak. In part to overcome the opposition among the rubak and in part to develop a new political organ with which he could work, the rubekul was created. It consisted of the chiefs of the villages instead of the traditional klobak system of representation which was made up of the senior-ranking district title-holders. As indicated elsewhere, village titles do not coincide with district titles and hence there were villages without any independent representation in the district klobak. A bitter struggle ensued between the two rival units. The ex-chief continued to serve as head of the klobak and the new chief became the leader of the rubekul. The klobak supporters were admonished not to follow the orders of the rubekul but its strong appeal to the younger generations plus the personal political skill and popularity of the acting Arklai, and the pressure of the foreigners eventually won the rubekul dominance. Gradually the klobak was transformed into an organization which preoccupied itself with the carrying on of traditional native ceremonies and enforcement of ancestral customs while the rubekul concentrated on the administration of modern affairs. This brief section of history has significance from several standpoints. It is suggestive of the theoretical division of function between the two organizations. Still it is not conclusive, for, as will be noted in a later paragraph, the inter-relations are far more complex than this account would indicate. A second consequence of this struggle for power, lies in the influential position of Melekiok. Soon thereafter, those districts officially affiliated with the bitallanged headed by Melekiok followed the same reorganization plan--without, however, removing the established chiefs. Hence in most districts with the dual organization the same individual presided over both bodies. Once the new style was set a few others, not directly tied to Melekiok, created similar arrangements under Japanese encouragement. But not all districts followed this scheme and even among those which did, new inventions appeared. Even within Melekiok the original reform has been modified. Thus the successor to the chieftaincy has reverted to the female line and he now

serves as head of both bodies and the two organizations now supplement each other.

The ancestral district klobak requires special consideration as an independent entity. Despite its vicissitudes it has proved to be a resilient social organization and there is some sentiment among the meteet that eventually it may be restored to its earlier dominance or incorporate into it the rubekul system. In many districts the members of the klobak attend all rubekul meetings and have a pronounced influence on its decisions. The klobak has the legal right to veto the actions of the rubekul in several districts and to remove from office the members of the rubekul. There are too few instances where these prerogatives have been exercised to appraise how much ultimate control this gives the klobak. In a major struggle for power, these rights can prove decisive. Such a turn of events conceivably may take place in the rivalry between the chiefs and the meteet for dominance. (see patterns of power). The meteet have greater authority in the klobak than in the rubekul and could alter the balance of power by advancing the former group at the expense of the latter. So, too, in a conflict between those who favor and oppose reforms in Palau customs the opposition may throw their support to the klobak for it is identified with the maintenance of Palau customs whereas the rubekul contains elements who are sympathetic to reform. It is, however, unlikely that a sudden break will occur unless there is a major political crisis. More probable, districts will proceed in their traditional way of settling differences--inventing a new synthesis which reintegrates the varied interests in a workable manner. The extent to which this has taken place already with respect to the dual bodies is indicated in a later section.

The klobak at present varies widely from district to district in its prestige, functions, and composition. There are four basic types: (1) Districts in which it has been reduced to a symbolic social order. In these instances the klobak meets infrequently as a formal body and then only for such occasions as the building of an abai or for the staging of some special district-wide or inter-district ceremony or celebration. In some districts the klobak has had no official meeting for several years. (2) Those in which the klobak continues to serve as the only recognized political organization at the district level. Officially or informally, its membership has been reduced in some and enlarged in others. The former has taken place where the titles below ten are no longer recognized or where the leading four clans have a monopoly of power and can dictate to the remainder of the members. The big four meet often and call in the remainder to announce their decisions, or where they cannot agree amongst themselves, which is not common,

the others are called in for consultation. When the latter occurs all title holders plus other select groups are invited to attend the meeting. The invited in some districts include the members of the rubekul, other influential persons, and in special emergencies the entire population. There are, however, restrictions on the participation of the invited. They usually may speak only with the consent of the rubak, they have no vote, and in some instances they may not propose but only discuss what is under consideration. When the whole population is in attendance, their main role is to listen to announcements. (3) Those in which there is no ancestral district klobak and the klobak of the leading village is used or the klobak of the several villages meet in unison to act for the district. Where the leading village's klobak is used, the rest of the villages have a special delegate to represent them in attendance. In most cases the representative does not have the legal right to attend all meetings; he does not participate in sessions involving the leading village's own domestic affairs and he may even be excluded in a few localities from conferences pertaining to district affairs--but this is rarely done. The delegate is the "protector" of the rest of the district, their spokesman, and the intermediary who moderates between the klobak and the other villages. In one district he has no authority to propose, but he can veto any decision--the only restriction on his veto power is that he must give the reason for his veto, but it cannot be over-ridden. In another case, the delegate has the exclusive right to speak openly on any topic at any meeting of the klobak and no one can stop him; he may argue openly, and speak against measures which everyone else present agrees to, but he cannot vote or veto them. In still another, he must be consulted and give his approval before any act is legal. The combined village klobak system operates on a different basis. In two districts, the traditional dual division scheme (bitang ma bitang) is applied to the klobak. The two halves sit opposite each other at joint meeting and must agree before any action can be undertaken. In several others where the combination system is in effect, the rubak of each village sits according to its traditional rank in the district and again consensus of all the villages is a prerequisite to decision. Many of these types are fairly recent in origin. They grow out of the decline in the autonomy and population of the individual village, the need for a district body to deal with measures introduced by the foreigners and district-wide questions, and the loss of power by the dominant village so that it must now consult with the other villages in the determination of public policy. (4) Those in which the district klobak exists from ancestral times and its form remains relatively unchanged, but it has become a specialized branch of government. It faces the native society while the rubekul faces the foreigners. The klobak considers and enforces Palau customs and native law, serves as intermediary between the people and the chiefs,

mediates differences among rubak, and acts as an advisory group to society officials and local project directors. In most instances, the authority is exercised by the upper-ranking members of the klobak who meet informally from day to day to discuss any subject of common interest. The traditional division of labor and seating order within the klobak are used primarily on formal ceremonial occasions. A few klobak functionaries still continue as administrators. In one district the fifth-ranking rubak (and the future successor to the chieftaincy) is the individual to whom the people may present their wishes for conveyance to the klobak. The third-ranking rubak is the official messenger and collector of levies, fines, etc. In several districts there is a title which carries the right to argue openly with anyone of superior status and in a few districts this is combined with the right to veto, in the same fashion as outlined above for outside representatives, where the main village klobak is the district klobak. This privilege has varying origins: in one instance it is attached to a district title which formerly occupies the position of first rubak and was demoted; in another, it developed because only one particular clan could afford to pay the district's debts from lost wars; and in another, it grew out of the religious duties of the title which in ancient times involved the role of official caretaker of the leading god of the district. A most influential series of roles are those of the second and in some cases the third and fourth positions in the klobak. They represent the senior-ranking clans of the district and have an important stake in watching the details of government. Without their approval, the chief cannot act in most districts. Traditionally, the chief who holds the first rank formally consults the second who in turn talks with the third who confers with the fourth. Some chiefs discuss directly with all four and one district chief consults only occasionally and acts even though he does not have consensus. This violation of native custom is deemed a dangerous game--for a rubak may act in such a reckless way that he may embarrass the whole district and jeopardize his position. In one district the second-ranking rubak has direct control over more of the lesser titles and also independent control over more subordinate villages and districts than the first rubak. This office has been used in the past to force the district chief to resign and the two ranking rubak are traditional rivals who must work together. Only when the two agree is a major decision possible and enforceable. In most districts the big four hold the power of decision today. Lesser-ranking rubak may join the discussion of policy matters, but they usually follow the lead of the first four who speak first and last at meetings.

The rubekul contains fewer age-old precedents than the klobak yet it, too, exhibits variability. At one end of the continuum are those districts which have no formal rubekul at all or have one but invoke it for only minor

matters or when the klobak is not in session and there is need to issue an immediate order emanating from the foreigners. At the other end are the few districts who regard the rubekul as the only legitimate governmental body, convening it often and making all major decisions through it. In between fall the majority of the districts, each having its own unique arrangements. Two will illustrate the nature of the going concerns. In one district the rubekul consists of three men from each of the first three villages (there are five villages in the district). These nine men are appointed by the district chief. Six of the group have titles and four have none at present but all are in line to inherit titles. Of those who lack titles, all have the first or second positions in the eldebechel and seinin dan societies. (see societies) These nine men plus the "acting" chief are supplemented by the "ex-chief" who is still the head of the klobak, and the chiefs of the villages. They usually meet once a month formally and informally more often. Most of the major decisions are made by the rubak of the two leading kebliil of the leading village who are respectively the acting chief of the district and the chief of the village. The acting chief, however, has announced that he will not undertake any program if there is opposition or difference of opinion within the rubekul. Instead when such appears likely, a second type of meeting is called. The second meeting includes the rubekul and the klobak. The klobak now comprises fifty title holders--including both district and village titles. This group continues in session until some agreement can be reached. This scheme has been in effect for a year and is regarded by the district as a successful experiment. The rubekul officially handles all problems presented by the foreigners. Still the klobak and the traditional elite kebliil of the leading village insure the retention of native customs and protects the established interests within the districts. The young and reformers cannot complain that they have no voice in the government (as they do where only the klobak exists) while the old cannot say that they have been put aside and the real Palau ways forgotten. It works fairly smoothly due to the political skill of the leadership. In another district the rubekul consists of the district and village chiefs plus the school principle, district secretary, leading business men, the representative to the Palau Congress, the ex-chief, and the heads of the two men's societies. No decision is made until there is a concensus, but once that is reached the members of ^{the} group are bound to carry out the agreement. The klobak has the right to veto the decision of the rubekul but has not yet exercised its authority. The rubekul is scheduled to meet three times a year and as often in addition as is necessary. In the past six months it has met twice. In that same period the klobak has not had a formal meeting. Although informally it has advised the members of the rubekul and enforced native laws where there have been infractions of the

customs. There is no conflict between the two bodies, but members of the younger generation feel they have little voice in public affairs on crucial matters because the representatives to both bodies consist, with a few exceptions, of the same type of title holders.

The role of district chiefs is a study in plural systems. There are a few districts in which the district chief is merely a symbol, created because of the demand by the foreigners for one native to officially represent the district and another few in which the chief is the dominant figure who wields major influence in district activities. In the former cases, the only orders of the district chief which are fully accepted are those that he transmits as specific directives issued by the foreigners. The district chief is accorded prestige but in some districts there is no district title for the office and he is called by the title he holds in the kebliil or village. Among districts with a senior title which is powerful, there is some latitude in the extent to which the legitimate rights of the office are exercised. In four such cases the district chiefs refuse to use their inherited authority and will make decisions only with the consensus of the meteet. Another deems it a sign of personal weakness to be known as the legal possessor of power and yet be fearful to use it. He frequently seeks advice in secret so that outwardly he can maintain the appearance of the dominant figure. The "in-between" type of district chief has a circumscribed degree of authority. In many districts there are dual chieftancies. In one district the first and second titles were switched for governing purposes so that the second rubak who is less important, faces the foreigners and the first rubak is free to concentrate on domestic affairs without foreign pressures. The second rubak is called the chief of the district but he cannot invent orders on his own and he must have the approval of the first rubak before initiating any program. The lines of inheritance of titles continue as before. In another district in which the foreigners removed the first-ranking title holder, the second took over and has been serving as the functioning district chief both in foreign and domestic activities. He does consult regularly with the ex-chief who now is ranked second in the district. The klobak recently decided to continue the chieftancy line in the ex-chief's kebliil, to the great disappointment of the present chief. In general, wherever the foreigners have removed a chief and a new one has been appointed or elected, a double chieftancy exists. In most cases the two chiefs are drawn from the same kebliil. When they come from competing lines within the clan, the interaction is characterized by private maneuvering for dominance and public display of unity. Many of the basic issues are settled within the kebliil which regulates the personal relationship between the two chiefs. In three districts, there are two senior rubak with equivalent ranks. The districts in each case are divided into two halves in social organization. The Japanese insisted that one of the two had to be

senior and the other junior in rank, and this was agreed to for all subjects concerning the foreigners. In purely domestic affairs, each chief serves as head of his own subdivision and consults with the other on district-wide cooperative plans. A special pattern exists in three other districts in which the chiefs are involved in the foreign government or in the affairs of the bitalianged and they have turned over the administration of the district to other functionaries. Two of these chiefs are from Babelthuap districts but reside most of the time in Koror and intermittently return to their home district to preside at formal ceremonies or meetings, to discuss general policy issues, and to help settle any unresolved disputes. The functioning administrative heads differ greatly in the three cases: in one, the chief of the fourth-ranking village who was elected as assistant district chief and is senior in age to the other assistant district chief, serves as the acting district chief. In the second instance, the position was appointed from a blai of the first clan by the district chief. In the third, the director of internal affairs is a district title going back to an ancestral political alliance between two clans who jointly secured control of the district. In this case, the district chief, according to native law, cannot overrule the administrative chief of the district, but in practice, the current district chief does so--to the distress of the district administrator. In turn, the administrative chief in this district must consult with the four major title-holders in the klobak; formerly, he had to consult with seven and gain their consent.

Another specialized form of chieftaincy exists in a district (Peleliu) which has had a series of unique developments of its own. Just before the coming of the foreigners the district was subdivided into two halves. This subdivision was based not on geography but on political alliances among the various villages. Two villages allied themselves and through warfare and the invention of a new god from the west (who was deemed omnipotent, and in direct relationship with the heads of the two villages) they became dominant over the two halves. The first-ranking village, Ngerdelolok, controlled one half and the second-ranking village, Ngesias, was in charge of the other. The chiefs of the two units were required to consult prior to any district action. The two heads had no authority to intervene directly in other villages than their own and had to secure the approval of village chiefs for any orders relating to their villages. During the German period the head of Ngerdelolok served as district chief on matters pertaining to the foreigners. In 1919, the head of the bitalianged, Aibedul, seeking to extend further control of his office and to institute social reforms requested the Ngerdelolok chief to discuss with him all matters before and after meetings with the Japanese. The district was reluctant to accept the control of Aibedul (and his son

who was the official interpreter to the Japanese) and so the district chief refused. With Japanese consent, Aibedul dismissed the chief. A successor was chosen from the same line and he, too, was removed from office. Aibedul then held an "election", using the Japanese term sanchō as the new title of the district head. The district elected as district leader the chief of the other half of the moiety i.e. the chief of Ngesias and as an assistant chief the head of the fourth-ranking village of the same half of the village federation. The assistant chief died and in his place the district elected the successor to the headship of the Ngerdololok village and thus the future head of the other half of the district. The first sanchō soon thereafter died and the cycle was completed with the promotion of the assistant district chief to the district chieftaincy. As assistant chief they elected the head of the fourth-ranking village of the other half--the same one from which the formerly elected assistant chief had come: but in this case reaching down to the fourth-ranking family in the village. During World War II the chief died and the district elected the head of the first family of Ngesias which it will be recalled is the nominal head of one half. He became involved in a controversy with Aibedul over his alleged attempt to secede his district from the bitalianged.¹⁶ The successor elected was primarily a candidate of the younger generation and he was deemed acceptable by the meteet after they traced his geneology and found that he was within the kebliil from which comes the headship of the Ngerdelolok title. However, he does not come from the blai of the kebliil which is supposed to provide the title holder and there are other individuals from the next-ranking blai who

16 This political struggle is too involved to present in detail--it might be noted in passing that the Ngesias head was dependent for an interpreter on a man who belonged to a rival faction in the district and it is claimed that he used his office skillfully to embarrass the district chief thereby forcing the political crisis. But even this was only a part of a whole series of historic factors which entered into the conflict, only one of which may be mentioned: the Ngesias head was a member of the merau group and did not wish to enter into political affairs, he reluctantly accepted the headship of his own kebliil and village and only then with the stipulation that others in his clan would exercise the real authority. He refused the candidacy of the district chieftaincy but was forced to accept under pressure from his clan and village. The fact that the successor elected to him was his bitter pre-war business rival (both had general stores in the same district) added further to the complications.

had a prior claim to the chieftaincy. The matter was compromised by leaving the title in the hands of the senior member of the kebliil and assigning the office to the elected chief--with the provision that the elected chief would consult with the title holder on all matters prior to any decision, that the elected chief would not make any independent inventions, and that his primary function was to deal with the foreigners. Left unsettled was the question of what will happen when the present title holder dies and the next in line who are now too young to serve as a district chief reach adulthood. The proposal to revert to the ancestral tradition that the woman title holder of the kebliil become chief was rejected on the grounds it would not work in dealing with the foreigners or in handling the modern economic problems facing the district. But it was also agreed that she, too, would be consulted over policy questions. A further complication arose over the fact that the elected chief has his principal ties in a village which is lower in rank than the village of the removed chief and in the same half of the moiety as the village of the ex-chief. It again was compromised by agreement that consultation would take place in accord with Palau customs. Since election to office the district chief has carried out his duties with outstanding success, as far as the younger generation is concerned, and his actions have been deemed acceptable by the meteet with whom he is in continuous conference. He has also conferred with the title holders of the Ngerdelolok kebliil but has not done so with the Ngesias village head. The latter, it will be recalled, is the ex-chief and the rival of the present chief, and now devotes some efforts to undercutting the chief. The present chief is deemed throughout the rest of Palau as a model of what the future chief should be (thus enhancing the district's prestige). He is versed in modern business, shrewd in dealing with the foreigners, sympathetic to reforms but protecting the meteet against any sudden reforms or loss in power. It is generally conceded that his successor will be elected but not from the present chief's immediate family line. His role is that of a trusteeship of the office of chief.

Several other districts have equally complex district chief histories which determine their current roles. They will not be presented here for the point being made is to indicate the kind of factors affecting the present power of a "middle-position" district chieftaincy.

The lesser functionaries of the district merit a brief analysis. The assistant district chief is a common office in a number of districts, though it is in no sense a universal one. The office of assistant chief was created in most districts in response to the problems growing out of administering foreign regulations in the district. The inability of the klobak and rubekul officials to personally

supervise the new types of programs led the Japanese to sponsor the establishment of the office. The chiefs were willing to accept this scheme in so far as it protected them from being forced out of office by the foreigners for being unable to perform their expected duties, relieved them of administrative burdens without setting up a rival to their own power, and even added to their authority since functions heretofore assigned to other members of the meteet now came under their direct control through the assistant chief. Not all districts felt the need or responded to the pressure and some districts have introduced the system only in the post-war years. A few districts have a dual assistant chief. In one locality the first assistant chief was selected by the natives and the second was appointed by the Japanese. The former is in the matrilineal line of the chief's keblil, holds the second title of the leading village, and is in direct charge of all matters pertaining to Palau customs. The latter is in the patrilineal line of the same keblil, his father was the assistant chief before him, his oktomaod is the first assistant chief, and he is responsible for dealing with foreign-sponsored measures. Unless the foreigners oppose it, in the future the two offices will be fused and assigned to the first assistant chief's matrilineal line. There is an equal division between districts which elect and those which have appointed assistant district chiefs. Where elections are held, the candidates come from the meteet keblil and usually from the first-ranking one--many are in direct line to inherit the first title of the district. The appointment of heads of villages with prestige or of district title holders among the four senior keblil as assistant district chief is also rather common. In a number of instances, therefore, the assistant chief is also a member of the klobak or rubekul and thus serves in a liaison capacity. One district has an ancestral proconsul type of district chief assistantship. They serve as special watchers over a group of villages to assure their loyalty to the superordinate district. The offices are hereditary. Two of the proconsuls are heads of households (blai) which are branches of the district chief's keblil and assume a title of overseer of the area in which they serve. The third proconsul is the next successor of the district chief and is responsible for the adjacent island which was conquered some generations ago.

Assistant district chiefs in those districts where the chief is aged and cannot function actively or where the chief is preoccupied with the foreigners and the bitalianged, have substantial administrative authority. Their own titles combined with the functions of representing the district chief in local affairs give them a most active role in the district. In principle, they are not supposed to invent but merely to execute orders; in reality, they devise whatever means they find necessary to attain their ends.

Lesser administrative functionaries merit brief mentioning. District secretaries were created by foreign demand for clerks who could keep records. They are usually younger men without titles who are selected from the chief's keblill or another senior-ranking clan. The position has little prestige and no power. The official intermediary between the chief and the people, the chief's "ears and eyes" and the people's "mouth" is still used in a few districts. The official messenger title who carries the word to other districts is now more often employed for special formal events than as a regular courier in most places. The rubak in charge of the local god, the one who serves as custodian of the district's wealth, and the officer who supervises war are honorary holders for the most part.

Each district is unique. Not only do districts differ with respect to their official social ranking in Palau but also in their patterns of ingroup interaction and relationships to the outer world. Every district has its distinct cultural legacy which in part shapes its outlook on the present world. As previously noted there are a few districts which are only nominal organizations and life in these places is centered almost completely in the villages. There are a few more in which the opposite exists--social life is predominately at the district level and villages are of little importance. Districts differ with respect to the degree of amity: some are characterized by bitter feuds between villages, others by friendly but spirited rivalry, and still others by neither conflict nor competition. Districts are unlike in the relationships between social classes and between age grades. They range from those in which the cleavages are sharp and social issues divide the subgroups into hostile factions to those in which the differentiating elements are minimized and there is a real attempt to jointly work out the common problems. Districts vary in their wealth, social prestige, and major interests. Several districts are renowned for their clinging to ancestral ways and another group for their receptivity to anything which is foreign. No single formula can adequately classify the subtle but significant contrasting styles of living. The scope of the contrasts may be made somewhat more meaningful by a crude and not altogether adequate comparison with a more familiar society. Koror is the Manhattan of Palau, Melekiok is its Boston, Ngeremlungui stands like Philadelphia, Airrai is the Brooklyn, Peleliu is the Los Angeles, Angaur is the San Francisco, Aimeliik, Ngedbang, Ngardmau and Kayangel are the Ozark-highlanders, Ngarard is the Chicago, Ngiwal and Ngchesar are the suburban towns of Boston, and Ngerchelong is the Baltimore of Palau. The comparisons are necessarily inexact and subjective but may prove suggestive of the range. Koror is the center of business and wealth in Palau, the place to which the rest of the society comes to learn what is happening, the residence of the foreigners,

and the style setter of modern fashions, and the headquarters of many of the major social institutions. Melekiok possesses substantial wealth but clings more to its old traditions and maintains its leadership of those who are not too anxious to throw away the customs. The dignity of the elite and established class positions are stressed. It is renowned for its age and the distinguished figures who have contributed to Palau's culture. Ngeremlungui was once one of the two most important districts in Palau and still retains much of its former glory, though now no longer in the same political class with Koror and Melekiok. Still it has not remained inactive and the district has a vital spirit of its own which is manifest in little acts as much as in big ones. To cite but a few instances, its Quonset club house contains several hundred painted folk tales gathered from all over Palau, its school building and other public facilities are more carefully looked after, it takes great pride in excelling in quality in whatever is done. Airrai is a large sprawling district with a close relationship to Koror. Relations are free and easy between social classes and age grades. There is more individuation and a large mobile population which combine to make it a convenient place for various illegal activities to operate without undue difficulty. Airrai feels inferior to its more prominent neighbor, Koror, and is eager to achieve more than it has in the past in prestige. Peleliu is like Los Angeles and Angaur like San Francisco in their distant location from the center of the society. They are rivals and neither one ranks in the upper brackets at present but both are ambitious and have mercurial youthful populations. Like the two American cities the two Palau ones are relatively old establishments and have old traditions. The traditions are psychologically not unlike the Spanish one on the west coast--of greater symbolic than functional importance--for the two districts are strongly foreign in orientation. Aimeliik, Ngardmau, Ngedbang, and Kayangel are fairly old settlements which have changed relatively little and are rather content with their style of life. Like the Ozark-highlanders they are more or less self-contained and integrated. They are not wealthy and are mainly self-subsisting. Ngarard is a pivotal district, a power with old traditions and yet receptive to foreign ways in selected features. It is proud and independent. Ngiwal and Ngchesar were once parts of Melekiok district and now are like suburbs of it. Both are eager to be recognized as independent places apart from Melekiok while the latter would like to annex them once more. Ngerechelong is like Baltimore in that it has its own firm traditions and will not change them for the sake of outside appearances. It goes its own way and adjusts to the outside world when necessity requires it. These judgments need to be viewed with caution for they are not designed to cover the full scope of the districts. Moreover, in many instances there are immense contrasts within districts so that only the general pattern has been selected out for

typification. Whatever the criteria used, Palau districts differ in many respects and yet collectively they make up a common society just as the foregoing cities contribute to the American scene.

Those who control the districts constitute the most important political figures in Palau. Though currently they are overshadowed by the heads of the bitalianged leaders, and limited by village leaders, in the ultimate analysis, they are the men who rule contemporary Palau.

Societies

There are approximately fifty active societies in Palau. They collectively include a majority of the adult population in their membership. Numbers are deceptive in the enumeration of this type of social organization due to the difficulties in defining what is an active association, and in distinguishing between nominal and functional members. If we use only the criterion of the number of formal clubs, there is ample evidence of a sharp decline in Palau's societies. There are less than one fifth of the associations Kubary counted during his stay in Palau. Measured in numbers of active members, a less drastic decline has taken place. While membership in societies is expected in most localities, the degree of active participation required is less than in the past. Persons with private enterprises, working for the foreigners, or otherwise occupied in legitimate activities are excused from most of their duties. They may be called upon to contribute funds or to assist in some emergency or special celebration, but otherwise they are free of further obligations. Individuals residing outside of their home district may be invited to join the society of the locality in which they are staying, but they are not forced to do so.

There has been, too, a lessening of the total activities societies engage in. Men's clubs no longer serve as the organized garrison forces of villages and the social status of villages no longer depends on the number of war canoes its societies can put into the sea. Women do not serve as guests in men's club houses and their own societies have abandoned many of their prior functions. The schools have taken over the primary function of the education of the younger generation and those charged with this responsibility within societies are now mainly foreign-trained individuals who know little of the traditions and exhibit less enthusiasm for their assigned task. The reduction in the number of dances and other social celebrations further made for a loss in the role of the societies. Societies have become less prominent on the social scene.

Despite these trends, the social life of most individuals are intimately linked to the society of which

they are members. Friendships are usually formed within the club and a portion of one's time is spent in the company of the society to which one belongs. The preference for group-organized activities to individual-centered enterprises provides a psychological foundation for the perpetuation of societies. In addition to offering a meaningful social organization for the individual, societies are a primary instrumentality by which districts engage in collective enterprises which otherwise would have no organized means of accomplishment. For the men of power, the societies constitute an effective control over the manpower of the district. Orders issued to societies cannot be disobeyed and any orders may be issued which are deemed for the welfare of the district.

Most societies are organized now on a district-wide basis, although some of the larger, isolated, and more independent villages retain their own customary clubs. Many communities maintain club houses (abai) without having any going societies. The members of district societies living in the same village act together in local affairs even though they may not be formally organized at the village level. Every district possesses societies and each society has its own distinct title. Societies are organized on the basis of three principles: sex, age, and status. Within these, further subdivisions occur depending on the size of the population, the usage of traditional competing groups, and informal arrangements within the district.

Men's societies prior to the Japanese were subdivided into rubak and eldebechel groupings which in turn had sub-groupings each with a distinct title and organization. Subgroupings separated along moiety lines and within each moiety there was an additional subdivision into two units and within each of these units there might be several clubs, depending upon the size of the population and the age grades of the members at any particular time. Six to twelve eldebechel associations were not uncommon at the district level. Village groupings were less numerous but constructed on the same principles.

Each eldebechel society had a representative from the senior-ranking kebliil in the locality. The definition of the senior kebliil depended on the locality's class structure. The first four kebliil in one district and the first twelve in another provided representatives. In districts with strong village autonomy and weak district organization, the first kebliil of each village provided one leader for district eldebechel societies. Village rank determined the leadership position of the kebliil representative in the eldebechel. Within an eldebechel society, the man from the senior kebliil or first village assumed the headship, the second-ranking kebliil or village contributed the second leader, the third kebliil or village provided the third position, etc.

These leadership positions were inherited offices: one was open only to the future successor to the chieftaincy, another to the younger brother or son of the chief, etc. No man could qualify for a chieftaincy unless he had served reasonably effectively as the head of an eldebechel group. The leadership of each eldebechel formed a klobak for it and they were expected to assume responsibility for duties assigned to or appropriate to the group--including warfare, manual labor, hazardous or difficult tasks, etc. Moreover, the leadership was to be first in exposing themselves to risks, was expected to be technically more proficient in skilled operations, and was to be the model of stoicism and industry in performing disagreeable undertakings.

The leaders of the eldebechel associations kept records of which families might have offspring who were eligible for membership. Upon the birth of a child, the heads of competing eldebechel clubs raced to the home of the newborn to ask the parents to pledge the offspring. The first head who reached the father won, for it was impolite to turn down an invitation. A man did not become eligible for active membership in a senior-age eldebechel society until reaching the age of about thirty. After the age of six, boys were informally attached to their society and performed minor duties. When a young man reached late puberty, he thereafter slept in the club house (abai) rather than at home and assumed additional responsibilities. The leaders of the eldebechel were responsible for his training and were expected to teach him both the skills required in his life role and knowledge of Palau customs.

Rubak societies were fewer in number but had a comparable set of patterns. The headship of one village society was the chief and that of the opposite half, the second-ranking individual. Rubak societies were the "thinking" and inventing organizations and they had the authority to issue orders to the eldebechel in their own half for the execution of public projects. Their wishes were conveyed to the klobak of the eldebechel, all of whose members, it will be recalled, were representatives from the elite kebliil. The rubak societies had an informal division of labor within their groups based on the rank, abilities, temperaments and ages of their members.

Spirited rivalry existed between the societies and competition between them was fostered by the leadership of the district or village. Each of the major clubs possessed an abai. Eldebechel societies were powerful groups with the right to discipline their members and to undertake certain actions, including military expeditions, on their own initiative. However, should actions, undertaken without the consent of the rubak, fail or result in disaster, the leaders of the club were subject to fine. An injury to a member was

deemed an attack on the entire society. Even the senior-most rubak were not immune to demands for compensation for offenses against the club or any of its members.

The Japanese rearranged these societies into age grades and combined the groups; men past 45 became members of the ronen dan, those aged 31 to 45 were made members of the chunen dan and males between 16 and 30 were organized as seinan dan. The Japanese term, seinan dan became the common title for the young men's societies, whereas the two older groups invented Palau titles for their new societies. The seinan dan societies became widely popular and men well beyond the prescribed age clung to their membership in them. With Japanese encouragement and in response to the declining population, consolidation in the number and distribution of societies took place. Some localities gave up the dual division and most placed their formal groupings on a district-wide basis. Informally, the village members of district societies continued to act together in local affairs but, for most purposes, they served as an integral part of the district societies. The general tendency since World War II is to retain the rubak societies on a village basis and to have a eldebechel-seinan dan society for the district as a whole. Where villages are widely scattered and village autonomy is still strong, village eldebechel and seinan dan societies prevail.

Within the Japanese reorganized societies, the natives worked out a re-division which incorporated the ancestral forms of men's societies. The leadership was provided according to custom from the main kebliil for the eldebechel-rubak societies. Seinan dan societies used three different procedures in various localities: elections, appointments, and inheritance. But regardless of what scheme was officially used, in nearly all cases the leaders came from the elite class and usually from a senior-ranking kebliil and a high-ranking village. Status divisions along traditional lines were recognized between the rubak and the eldebechel and each had its own sub-organization with separate leadership within the official single society. Since the end of the Japanese rule, additional changes have taken place. One district has combined the seinan dan and the eldebechel into a single district organization but retains the Japanese-introduced age distinction and the two grades have their own ingroup activities. The Japanese age-grade system is no longer formally adhered to in many districts. One district has abolished the seinan dan societies.

In a few districts, men's societies have become the principal administrative organization, reducing the traditional district klobak and the newer rebekul to secondary importance. An illustration of this is the district of Ngiwal; the division into two halves still prevails here with

two villages on each side. The eldebechel and rubak comprise one society and the seinan dan the other; each half of the district thus has two societies. The two halves usually meet as a unit but preserve their subdivisions in making decisions within meetings. Major foreign orders are sent to these meeting while minor ones go to the rubekul. All men past the age of 40 are eligible for membership, but a distinction is made within the society between title-holders and commoners. Those with rank speak first and their opinions carry more weight in the discussions. Ngiwal's pre-Japanese klobak of the eldebechel societies contained ten leaders from the ten leading kebliil; now the societies' klobak members, in one case, contain a majority of men who come from the kebliil ranking 3,4,5,6 and 7; and, in the other case, from kebliil 3,4,5,6 and 10. The headship of the two societies are hereditary positions drawn from the first two kebliil. They serve indefinitely--as long as they remain capable and until they inherit a higher title. The rest of the klobak are rubak of lower status in the former and a mixture of eldebechel and lower-status rubak in the latter. Upon reaching decisions, the society klobak call in their members for announcements. Since the district lacks an abai, society meetings are held in the schoolhouse (a modified, American Quonset hut) or at one of the district chief's two homes (he has a plural marriage). This group has held ten official meetings this past year to consider plans for building an abai, copra production, the use of land, road and school repairs, transportation and marketing of produce, the operations of their cooperatively-run saw mill, the settlement of a dispute, and general plans for the future. The seinan dan have a comparable organization. The general rationale seems to be that this scheme makes for more harmony within the district and organizes the manpower into functional divisions in a way satisfactory to both the rulers and the ruled.

In districts where the klobak or rubekul are more prominent, the leaders of the men's societies often attend their meetings. Localities with district chiefs who face the foreigners limit the control of the district chief over the men's societies; the chief must have the approval of the klobak or rubekul to issue orders to the societies and the heads of the societies have the legal right to appeal to the district klobak for a reversal of decisions. The eldebechel, however, cannot openly refuse an order issued by the rubekul or klobak but they may ask for a reconsideration. In daily affairs, the heads of the eldebechel societies exercise more influence than many of the district title holders. The reason given for this is that the eldebechel now work for the welfare of the district while the rubak merely invent, an activity deemed less important right now.

Women's societies parallel men's organizations.

They were once powerful, independent units in Palau. Today, most of them have become inactive and exert relatively little influence outside of making decisions concerning work in the fields, clean up programs in the community and celebration arrangements. In some districts, every girl must belong to the seinan dan until she is pregnant or married or leaves the district. Others offer a wider choice. Even before acculturation, women's societies were not quite as dominant a force in their lives as men's societies. Adult men lived a greater share of their lives in the club houses whereas women resided at home, with the exception of the relatively brief period they served as guests in the club of another village.

Women's clubs meet separately and for special occasions join with the men's societies. Married women belong to their husbands' age-grade and social-status classification and are affiliated accordingly. Thus a young girl married to an old man would belong to the senior women's society. When her husband dies, she reverts back to her own age-status group society. Women who marry younger men usually are given a choice subject to other conditions surrounding the case. Leadership is provided by the same procedures which apply to men's societies.

Classes

The class structure of Palau is caste-like in character; it is neither completely closed nor an entirely open system. Upward and downward mobility occur although in principle social positions are hereditary. Every community contains at least one household whose social rank has changed at one time or another and most districts have historic records of numerous cases of families which have climbed or descended the social ladder. The volume of vertical mobility is not large in the present generation but several instances were found of recent status changes.

There are four distinctive features in the class hierarchy. (1) Each locality has its own determinants of social status. While social stratification extends throughout Palau, the individual's social rank is ascribed through membership in a village and district. Thus a person belongs to the elite by virtue of a title in a particular locality, and there is no way he may hold this status apart from it. Informally, he will be treated with the respect accorded his station in life when outside of his home community but officially he has no legitimate authority to act in his capacity as a title holder outside the confines of his locality. The same individual may inherit several status positions in different places and so rank in the upper class in one village and in a lower class in another. Though every village and district has its own distinctive hierarchal order, the general profile of the social pyramid is fairly

similar throughout Palau. The prestige of a social rank in Palau as a whole, however, is set by the status of the locality from which it is derived. For example, an upper class position in Koror is far above the equivalent one in Kayangel. (2) The two sexes have their own status positions. Inheritance governs the assignment of rank independently for men and women. An elite woman gains her title not by virtue of the possession of a title by her spouse but rather through inheritance. She may outrank her husband or fall below him. The wife of an elite, by courtesy, is given the esteem of her husband, yet she has no legal right to the prerogatives of a member of the ruling class. There is a linkage between the two sexes in the elite social positions in that for every male title holder there is a female complementary title. This does not hold for the lower strata. Except where modifications have taken place in the lines of inheritance, ascribed status positions are inherited traditionally through the female line and hence children follow the class rank of their mothers. (see kinship). (3) An individual may occupy a social rank in several different classes during the course of a lifetime. Through the progressive inheritance of higher titles a person can advance from a lower to a higher status. Exceptional individuals who were not in the line of direct inheritance to an elite position have been advanced to one under special circumstances. (see political roles) The wealthy class without titles (merau), gain or lose status in accordance with the proportionate amount of property held. (4) Social status combines aspects of achieved and ascribed systems. Individuals inherit eligibility to a title but they are not automatically assigned the role when it becomes vacant. They must be approved by the leading members of their clan and the rubak as possessing the prerequisite qualities and may be rejected if found wanting. The title may be withdrawn for failure to perform the duties of the office properly. An additional test has been established for the senior titles by the Americans in the form of a popular election. In one district several candidates were voted on and one of the junior men in line of succession was elected. In most localities, however, the individual most eligible to succeed to the title has been chosen. The foreigners have established this rule only for the male titles who are known as "chiefs", and not for female titles or lesser elite position. Lower-ranking statuses also contain ascribed and achieved elements. The general pattern is one of emphasizing the former but in unusual cases the latter is invoked.

The meteet are the elite class. The criteria of meteet rank differs in usage between sections of the population. It is universally accepted that the first title of a locality is meteet. In many communities the second-ranking title also counts and in

some the third and fourth also are included.¹⁷ How far out meteet reaches beyond the person who actually possesses the title varies considerably. The following ways of counting meteet were found in different localities: (1) the entire keblil of the title holder; (2) the blai from which the title emanates and, in some instances, the households from which a title-holder may be chosen if there is no one available from the highest-ranking household; (3) the senior-ranking talungalak of the keblil with the title; (4) the matrilineal line in which the title is inherited; (5) both the matrilineal and patrilineal lines of the title where either side may be used; (6) the immediate family (ongalak) of the title-holder as long as the possessor of the title is alive; (7) future successors to the title who have a reasonable chance of acquiring it at some time; and (8) the title-holder alone. What occurs, is a case of everyone who can possibly do so, claiming inclusion in the top prestige group. An informal distinction is made in most places between the meteet and the real meteet with the former covering those who are closely identified with the title-holder through kinship and the latter restricted to those who fully qualify for and actually hold the position. To the lower classes, the entire upper-ranking group looms like the meteet, for relations with any member of the group may involve the real meteet and the whole group appear from below as elite. Within the upper classes, the finer delineations are sharply drawn. The exact status of individuals is a matter of no small concern to the elite not only in so far as personal prestige is concerned but also because of the chance that the relative positions of the households may be altered. Social circulation within the elite class is more extensive than movement in and out of the class and is more susceptible to political manipulation. No greater disgrace could occur to an individual than to be responsible for the loss or depreciation of the title of which he is a trustee for his clan. Such a social disaster has far-reaching consequences for it means not only lessened esteem but a decline in power.

The integration of village and district elites constitutes a special set of understandings for there are both village and district titles. Five generalizations may be made concerning the nature of the interrelationships. (1) In localities with strong district organization and weak villages, the district titles carry more influence; for

¹⁷ The first four titles formerly were deemed holy(mean) with gradations in degrees of holiness between the four. The German administration officially divorced secular from sacred titles and since then the status of titles rests on political power and social rights rather than on religious sanctions.

example, an individual who ranks fourth in the district and first in the village will be known for his district title. Persons with a high district title and no village title will be honored in the village but they do not outrank village titles in the making of decisions on intra-village affairs. Village ranks do not have much influence on district decisions and bring only a modest degree of prestige at the district level. (2) In localities with strong villages and weak districts, the reverse of the above holds true. A high district title has less real power or prestige than a lower title in a village. (3) The status of the village determines the rating of the title. Thus a high-ranking title from the lowest-ranking village does not have as much status as one from the senior-standing village even though the title is a comparatively low one. Titles from a distinguished village in a low-ranking district count more than the equivalent title from an undistinguished village in a high-ranking district. (4) District titles are appraised on the basis of the relative status of the districts. The social eminence of district titles in a low-status district is regarded as inferior to those from the high-ranking districts. The social distance between them are not unlike those prevailing between the upper class of New England and the great plains area in this country. (5) Since the onset of acculturation and the accentuation of the district unit in administration, district titles have increased in power at the expense of village titles. Their authority has increased more than their social prestige.

As previously noted, the same person can have several titles concomitantly or progressively. The former occurs when an individual inherits titles from several different villages and/or districts. No more than one title, however, can be held in a single place; i.e. one cannot have two titles in the same village or the same district but a village and district title may be held at the same time. One man was discovered who currently holds ten different titles. In these instances the individual is referred to by his senior-most title but each title is used when serving as a functional member of the locality group to which the title belongs. Progressive title holding takes place mainly where a clan owns several titles. In sequence, the individual becomes eligible to progressively higher titles. He cannot retain a lower title while holding a higher one within the village or district for each status position entails roles which preclude playing any other one within the group.

Immediately below the meteet class is the pukul a blai (the corner of the house, literally). The scope of this status group depends in part on who is included and excluded from the meteet class. In some localities, it is employed for the second, third, and fourth keblil, in others

for the first four matrilineal lines outside of the title holders, etc. So, too, the next lower stratum, oloes belu (derived from the middle of the canoe) varies in inclusion. Several districts have abandoned this class designation altogether. More common is the practice of applying it to titles below the fourth--in one district it extends from the fifth to the ninth titles and in another, from the eleventh to the twenty-second titles. Localities which have dropped the lower-ranking titles or have abolished titles when the household which owned them died off or moved permanently to another district have limited populations who make up this lower section of the elite class. A few districts and villages retain the classification in their formal table of organization and on special occasions invite an eligible person from another place to act as title holder. Others have assigned a lower-ranking family the vacant position or induced a distant heir living elsewhere to return and take up the title. These lower-ranking elites have less power today than do the upper status group due to the concentration of authority in the senior title holders. But they are not entirely content with their present lot and a desire exists in their leading members to re-establish their former authority. They are sensitive to any slight of their traditional prerogatives and resent those meteet who regard them as outside of the elite. The meteet, in turn, are watchful of them for they may move into the top positions and some are not without such ambitions.

The middle and lower rungs of the social pyramid consist of those without titles. There are three major subdivisions. The marad(1)-chad is a "true man" and is called by his family name. He has his life "in order", possesses a reasonable number of relatives and amount of property, but no driving desire to acquire great wealth and little likelihood of ever inheriting a title. He has the abilities to perform competently his life duties, can discharge his social obligations, and when called upon for public duties he gives effective service. The merau are wealthy but, in contrast to the meteet, they have no title. They are more likely to use Palau money not for status and ceremonial purposes but as currency in business transactions. They can support many relatives or are related to many wealthy individuals who can give them support. Formerly, the merau were judged in terms of the amount of Palau money they possessed, now the evaluation is made more in foreign money. Today, a man with \$2000.00 is deemed to be merau in some districts; in others, the figure is much lower; and a few would include only those with \$8000.00 or more. The other classes tend to lump all merau together, but within the class there are discriminating gradations in status. The ebuul make up the lower class. The usage of the term is not popular in some circles, especially when employed by a person of a higher class in a public situation. It is some-

what similar to calling someone "lower class" in the United States. Hence, while everyone acts on the basis of the reality of the status it is not a popular public designation. Some groups use the term, ebuul, in "private discussions", to indicate descendents of the earlier impoverished who lacked land and money. Others apply it to themselves in self-pity as a means of indicating their disadvantaged status in life. A distinction is made between individuals who are poor by circumstance and station in life and those who are medai; i.e., not only poor in money and relatives but also have no promise of rising because of lack of ability or ambition. (This is separate from the category bachachau which refers to men of any class who are "empty" in their personalities, deficient in character or mental endowments).

The traditional classification meau has some currency for the "naked ones"; young persons who will some day inherit a title but at present have no high standing and sometimes for persons of any age who will never have a title. The exact usage of these class categories depends on the locality, the social status of the individuals making the designations, and the spirit of the times. During the writer's earlier work in Palau, he observed a tendency to use meteet, merau, and ebuul as the major divisions and little emphasis was placed on the finer shadings. Now Palau has returned to the pre-war stratification gradients as the spread within the society is re-established.

Vertical mobility in the titled classes is of two general types: the social advancement which comes about through the inheritance of a vacant higher status by someone in the legitimate line of succession; and social climbing; i.e., acquiring a position which ordinarily would not be open to such a person. The former is the more approved manner of upward movement and is freer of controversy. It usually takes place with the death of the prior occupant of the status. Vacancies occurred in the past through the forced retirement or killing of the title holder and take place today when foreigners and the heads of the bitaliang remove title holders from office. While these are spectacular changes they are not the typical pattern. Most persons attain their inherited ranks through the demise of the title holder. The second type of mobility has a special connotation in Palau: it is based on the conviction that social climbing of the non-hereditary type is made at the expense of others. There is no impersonal advancement to a higher position in this society that is not accompanied by what is regarded as the lowering of others. Upward movement is not the ineluctable reward of a successful struggle against nature or achievement gained through appropriate personal efforts in accordance with abstract economic laws and political codes but rather a matter of interpersonal competition in which one side wins out over specific rivals. This is borne out by the recognition that

titles have graded serial numbers and there cannot be two at the same plane in any locality. It is confirmed by numerous instances in which individuals gained a high rank through skillful maneuvering at the expense of the regular heirs. Even in the lesser status groups the same outlook prevails. As noted elsewhere, commoners are reluctant to work for a merau or one who has such aspirations for they feel it is benefiting the entrepreneur and thereby detracting from their own likelihood of advancing.

There is little envy of the meteet by the lower classes for these positions are beyond the levels of aspiration of the ordinary person. Some of the merau do have unannounced ambitions to enter the elite and are pleased to have their children marry into the meteet class. Merau persons have been able to gain some titles even though they were not in direct line of inheritance and some would not be adverse to securing the same status if the chance should present itself. Until the Japanese era, the meteet looked down on the merau as distinctly inferior; some meteet would not enter the home of a merau and ignored them in public. Now, the merau are viewed as socially inferior but they are more acceptable as mates for their children, political advisors, and as economic associates. As a result this class has made the greatest collective advance in social station. Few ebuul have entered the elite in the modern era. An ebuul woman who marries a meteet assumes his social standing only as long as they are married. After the husband's death or upon divorce, she and her children revert back to an ebuul status. In some keblil, by mutual consent, the husband's family may adopt the children of such a marriage and endow them with the status of their household. This is done when there are no other heirs in the meteet family and they are urgently needed. In elite keblil which have switched over to the male line, the children may retain the status of the father and so enter into the meteet class. Ebuul men cannot afford to marry meteet women and while such marriages are no longer legally prohibited they are strongly discouraged. The likelihood of an ebuul becoming a merau is fairly limited today due to the modest restoration of the commercial economy. After the surrender, a hundred and twenty five business licenses were taken out, many of which were by ebuul but thus far no outstanding case has appeared of a nouveau riche being accepted as merau. Nevertheless, there are a number of persons with such aspirations. The opportunity of an ebuul rising to marad(1)-chad depends on a number of factors, some of which are beyond personal control such as the possession of sufficient relatives and a pre-existing reputation of class affiliation. Downward movements are not unknown. Several merau have become ebuul through the personal mismanagement of their wealth or the misfortunes of war which wiped out their capital. There are known cases of descendants of meteet who several generations

back slipped down to a lower class. A recent instance of this was not found. There are a few members of the meteet class who act like merau in that they are primarily concerned with business affairs. But they still count as meteet and are discouraged from continuing in this activity once they assume a major title. One meteet in line for a major title expressed earlier a desire to remain in business rather than to become a paramount chief. He has since then changed his mind.

The social status of everyone within the village and usually within the district is common knowledge to the residents. The senior titles of the major localities are known throughout Palau, the lesser ones are not. The leading members of the merau class are also well-known figures. Children are aware of the status system by the time they are twelve to fifteen years old. Young people decide which kinship line to follow, if they have a choice, after ascertaining the lineage which offers them the highest future status. Thus the son of Arklai, the chief of Melekiok, has an ebuul mother and uses the patrilineal line even though his father is a strong advocate of the retention in Palau of the matrilineal system. Though the differential ranking does not completely dominate interaction among children, it does affect their behavior. In games the children of the elite serve as leaders and when organized programs take place in the schools, if the teachers are not present, they assume the headship. An ebuul child who has a fight with a meteet child, upon telling his parents of the encounter, will be scolded and warned that it may bring reprisals from the meteet parents. The ebuul parents will visit the meteet parents to apologize and make amends. Elite parents urge their children to exercise the role of leadership as a means of preparing themselves for their future life work. There is little inter-class competition within the school for the meteet know their station in life is assured and therefore feel no need to excel in academic activities. This does not imply that children of the elite make no effort in school to acquire knowledge for many are eager to learn the ways of the foreigners, but rather that education is not their only ladder to success as it may be to the lesser-ranking with ability and ambition. Though class is a crucial element in the rating of individuals, personality characteristics are also a determinant of popularity. Everyone wishes to be a respected person and strives to conform outwardly to the expected characteristics of their social status. (see public opinion) Persons of lower rank who act as if they are of a higher status are treated with derision and may be called in scorn, "meteet".

The inter-relations between classes varies widely between localities. Class lines in some districts are sharply drawn and maintained and in others, class distinctions

are not emphasized in daily living. Class conflict occurs in a few communities in which the meteet insist on their full traditional prerogatives and the commoners feel restless over their manner of ruling. It is important to note, however, that in most of these cases other loyalties transcend pure class divisions. The younger generation of the elite may allign themselves with the lower classes and serve as their articulate leadership in agitating for social reforms opposed by the title holders. Where tension exists, the expression of feelings of the various status groups also varies. In Ngeremlungui the common issues are openly discussed with some sympathy exhibited by all groups; whereas in Ngchesar, the elite inform the rest that they have no right to complain or make suggestions. Airrai people talk back to title holders but Melekiok men without rank would not dare to do so. The issues which divide along class lines are not ones over the existing social pyramid but matters growing out of decisions on the practice of Palau customs, the administration of public affairs, and related questions. The social distance between the top and the bottom of the pyramid is also a variable. Several patterns are discernible. (1) The social distance usually is greater within districts than within villages. Personal interaction is more intimate and continuous at the village than the district level. It is, therefore, more difficult to retain as high a degree of social insulation between status groups within the village as in the district. (2) The height of the social pyramid vertically and the width of the pyramid horizontally varies with the size, wealth, and prestige of the locality. Large districts with considerable wealth and high prestige have a normal shaped pyramid. Some have a small peak and a broad base and others have a broad peak and a narrow base which appears like an inverted pyramid. (3) Social interaction within class groups is more frequent and informal than between classes. Friendships between persons of the upper and lower classes exist but are not common. An individual associates ordinarily with others of the same status group or a closely related one.

Social stratification in Palau is an important but not an all-encompassing factor. It is more significant in some spheres of social life than in others. Class position does not determine the location of the household within the village, but it does affect the quality of the home. There are no neighborhoods in which the elite live apart from the lower-status groups. Yet the pre-war homes of the upper class in structure and furnishings differed from those of the rest of the population. During the early part of the Japanese era some of the merau built homes like the meteet. These were burnt down and their owners were fined. Today the wealthier members of the merau class do not face this opposition. The American Quonset hut has tended to erase differences between classes in housing and the limited

supply of foreign luxury goods has curtailed the differentials in household possessions. One of the most conspicuous signs of social status in the pre-war period was the possession of chinaware. Elite homes would have as many as several hundred dishes on display whereas the ordinary household would have only those actually used in daily living. Few homes of the elite currently own more than the essential chinaware. But even with the restricted supplies, there are small contrasts which clearly indicate that furnishings differ by classes. Class standing does not wholly determine an individual's occupation. The senior-ranking women care for their own taro patch and it is the aged rather than the elite who are the leisure class. Those with high status are expected to work harder and personally do some of the most disagreeable and dangerous jobs for their role is that of model for the rest. The recent tendency of some of the elite to withdraw from such activities has brought forth condemnation and the accusation that they are now more inclined to work with their mouths than with their hands. Nevertheless, there are traditional class distinctions in certain economic functions. A lower-class person may be more skilled at an occupation but ordinarily he does not assume the managerial function. When foreigners have chosen labor bosses on the basis of technical ability irrespective of class, the appointed head of the work detail has found his role a difficult one. A few skills were hereditary monopolies of the elite and working with the foreigners as a civil servant is the newest type of semi-monopoly. The social prestige of occupations is judged more by the class of those who engage in them than by any other standards. Social status does not entirely determine the style of life. Orientation to acculturation is influenced more by village-district, age grade, and personal-family elements than by social status per se. The elite are neither more nor less foreign-oriented than any other class. Still there are marked differences in social privileges. Whatever has high value--first access to new items, the right to make social inventions, leadership roles in group affairs, etc.--is accorded to the elite. Everyone participates in group-organized activities and no one is excluded from community affairs by reason of status. Yet the elite have priority in seating order, in the serving of food, and in engaging in social ceremonies. They are treated with deference and their opinions are awaited before anyone else speaks. All are subject to the mores and accountable for infractions of them. While the elite today do not always punish their own ingroup for violations, their failure to do so causes resentment as a break with Palau's ancestral customs. The elite have the power to decide what shall be done, how it should be done, and who will do it. But in making these decisions they are bound to act in accord with that which is expected of title-holders in Palau.

IV. PERSPECTIVE

No effort will be made to "summarize" Palau for to attempt to do so would run the risk of making a caricature of its complex characteristics. The main trends are clear: Palau is once more a growing society with an expanding population and a dynamic culture. Its social structure has been modified under the influence of acculturation but not disorganized. Individuals can still function in a meaningful way within the existing framework and their levels of aspiration seem to them still possible of realization. The image of the foreigner is a congenial one and culture contact with the outside world is viewed for the most part as a distinct gain. There is no sense of defeat or demoralization, and expectations for Palau's future run high. There is considerable impatience with the rate of progress in those circles eager to advance the levels of living and to modernize the style of living; relatively little nostalgia exists for the ancestral world. Still not all men hold the same opinions of the good life and there are sharp differences of viewpoints over the means and speed of achieving the desired ends.

Social stability has not been reached by Palau in the modern era. It probably will not for at least another full generation--if then. While further changes of a major sort will no doubt take place, the general framework of life now extant probably will remain. The patterns of power and the attendant social systems are not only part of Palau's legacy of the past and the social realities of the present, but also an intrinsic phase of its future social order. A century and a half of culture contact has failed to alter them appreciably. It is unlikely that anything new, short of a major event greater than four successive changes in governors and two world wars--one fought in Palau--will do so.

The Palau type of acculturation represents a culture contact matrix in which the following component elements are salient: (1) amity between the foreigners and native population; neither one views the other as hostile or concentrates on thwarting or destroying the other; the outsiders offer selected features of their culture but do not coercively impose them and the inhabitants are receptive to alien ways which can be adapted while being adopted; the relationship is a symbiotic one in which both sides benefit from the interaction in accord with their own ends; tensions between the two groups can be resolved by accommodation and compromises without generating permanent cleavages into antagonistic sides; and superordinate-subordinate statuses are accepted as the social reality with appropriate adjustments to facilitate each attaining its values within a common framework. (2) the survival of the population: following the losses which usually accompany culture contact, there remains a

sufficient sized population to continue as a going society; new health facilities being introduced are enabling the group to expand once more; the necessary adjustments are made to changing demographic conditions without disrupting the social fabric or impairing the confidence of the group in its own future; the assimilation of the mixed-blood "marginal men" into the society so that they do not become a major dissident element but rather a cultural liaison between the two peoples; and the perpetuation of a biological stock who can retain their own identity. (3) the existence of a system of power: despite any changes in political institutions there remains an organized means of social control which insures the minimum necessary conformity to social regulations without which an orderly arrangement of human relationships cannot prevail; the managerial functions continue to be performed through a legitimate leadership which is acceptable to all groups; governmental machinery exists within the native society for the making and enforcing of decisions; there is sufficient political sophistication and skill to allow for the necessary orderly adaptations growing out of the legal changes introduced from above or altered conditions within the society; and the handling of nativistic and modernization movements in a manner which permits the release of feelings into constructive social acts without creating a social revolution or civil war. (4) the possession of resilient and functionally meaningful social systems: the social structure can be re-worked without falling apart into a series of dysfunctional institutions; individuals are able to channelize their efforts in ways congruent with their experience or aspirations through the established social organizations; the social strains resulting from acculturation may be meliorated or do not reach such a point as to create social anomie and loss of any inner solidarity. Not all of these items are completely evident in contemporary Palau but they are sufficiently present to make possible a reasonably successful transition to the modern world.

GLOSSARY

<u>abai</u>	club house
<u>bitalianged</u>	the confederation of districts of which Koror and Melekiok are the titular heads
<u>bitang ma bitang</u>	half and half; a dual division in social organization
<u>blai</u>	household
<u>dui</u>	title
<u>eldebechel</u>	non-titled, adult, working men and their societies
<u>kebliil</u>	clan within a district
<u>klebliil</u>	clan extending over several districts
<u>klobak</u>	village or district council consisting of <u>rubak</u>
<u>merau</u>	wealthy men without titles
<u>merreder</u>	male head of a social unit-- <u>talungalak</u> , <u>kebliil</u> , village, etc.
<u>meteet</u>	senior-ranking title holders and those closely identified with them by blood
<u>mhas</u>	senior woman of a kinship unit; also honorific title for elderly women
<u>modekngel</u>	nativistic movement
<u>oktomaod</u>	male head of a <u>talungalak</u>
<u>ongalak</u>	conjugal type of family
<u>rubak</u>	male head of kinship group with village or district title
<u>rubak-l-dil</u>	female counterpart of <u>rubak</u>
<u>rubekul</u>	council of village heads and paramount district chief
<u>seinan dan</u>	Japanese term for young men and their societies
<u>talungalak</u>	consanguinal type of family with some modifications due to acculturation

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